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AUTHOR'S PREFACE
In design, this LEAA project offered the prospect of combining the
funds and rational planning resources of a large Federal agency with the
humanitarian values and the use of volunteers that have been hallmarks
of the non-profit sector.

The opportunity to evaluate this combination

was exciting_.

Over the past 14 months, this excitement has grown.

At the national

level the relationship between the public and private sectors has sometimes been cumbersome and lack of consensus problematic, but the success

of the local program efforts have exceeded my initial expectations.
The evaluation of the program has stretched our research capabilities
and required methodological innovations, some of which proved to be more

successful than others.

I wish to acknowledge our gratitude to and

dependence on all of those persons who cooperated in the evaluation

process, both locally and nationally.

An estimated total of 275 days of

staff time of national and local organizations were used in the evaluation
plan.

I particularly appreciate the time and energy contributed by the

local and national project staff, especially Bob Murphy at the national
office.
My professional gratitude goes also to the local field researchers
for their dedication and persistence.

The commitment of five senior

social scientists to a part-time research effort was humbling.

The

names and accomplishments of these professionals are listed in Auxiliary
Appendix E.
My professional colleagues at the Center for Applied Urban Research
(GAUR) at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, the support staff, especially
Joyce Carson and Scott Samson, and the graduate student assistants,
Carole Davis, Jim Gahan and Henry Jason, were invaluable.
I wish to acknowledge especially the support and contribution to
the project of Jim Marley, who helped the evaluation from the program

i

perspective and who was involved from the beginning.

Special thanks go

to Robert Bick and Gary Gentry, my research assistants; Beverly Walker,
who read and interpreted my handwriting; Linda Ferring, who edited;
Betty Mayhew, who made all arrangements for everything; and Dr. Murray
Frost, Acting Director of CAUR, who critically reviewed the report and
facilitated the final push.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
In 1975 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration awarded funding
to an unusual program designed to organize the voluntary youth serving
agencies to better serve status offenders

1

and to be an aid to the whole

process of the removal of these young people from institutions.

The

program was unusual in that it was not developed by a single agency but
rather by a collaboration of 16 (later l5) national agencies proposing
to deliver community services by forming and supporting local collaborations
focused on the issue of the status offender.

These organizations were

members of the National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Welfare
Organizations and had been meeting for over a year under its sponsorship
and staffing in an attempt to develop an effective plan for working together
in program areas.

2

This proposal for status offenders represented the first attempt to
take the group's ideas about collaboration from theory to practice.

The

basic methodology of the proposed program was to staff a National Juvenile
Justice Collaboration office and to form and staff five local community
collaborations.

The local collaborations would be formed to deal with

status offender issues and have the responsibility of offering programs
in the areas of advocacy, capacity building, and direct services.

The

local collaborations would also help develop a process of collaboration
which would be useful in delivery of services in the future.
1

status offenders are youth who have been adjudicated as delinquent on
the basis of acts which are offenses because of their status as minors but
which would not be offenses or crimes if committed by adults.
2
National voluntary agencies participating throughout the collaboration
were American National Red Cross, Association of Junior Leagues, Boy's Clubs
of America, Boy Scouts of America, Camp Fire Girls, Girl Scouts of the U.S.A.,
Girls' Clubs of America, National Jewish Welfare Board, National Council for
Homemaker-Home Health Aide Services, National Council of Jewish Women,
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Salvation Army, Travelers Aid
Association of America, YMCA of the USA, and YWCA of the USA.
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General Findings
The evaluation of the program goals concluded that all local collaborations were successful in achieving the organizational development and
program planning as called for in the proposal.

The level of success in

the actual implementation of the planned programs and the degree of
development of a collaborative process varied from site to site.

The

achievement of successful organizational and planning capacities by the
local collaborations reflects the quality of management which the project
received from the national level.

The national collaboration also offered

organizational and program assistance to the locals with varying success
but did not implement adequate capacity building and advocacy programs
for the collaborating national agencies.
It is difficult to summarize the success of the process goals at
each site.

Most of the seven local, the regional and the national collabor-

ations demonstrated real progress toward building the trust necessary for
an inter-agency collaborative work style.

All collaborations were successful

in some areas, and all encountered problems in other areas.

How Were the Collaborations Successful?
This summary of findings for specific areas should be seen as highlights
of the total process, which is presented in detail in the body of the
evaluation report.

The project was evaluated by the extent to which it

was successful in its three major program tasks:
1.

building collaboration organizations

2.

planning and implementing programs

3.

affecting member organizations

The extent to which the National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Project
was successful in developing of the collaboration process at each site was
also evaluated.
Building Collaboration Organizations
The collaborations were highly successful in developing the membership
of local youth serving agencies affiliated with the original national
collaboration.

In the five local sites 90 percent of National Assembly
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affiliates participated.

In addition, 65 other non-profit agencies also

participated in the local sites.

All sites except Spokane sought the

inclusion of public agencies, with 76 agencies participating at the four
sites.

The Connecticut collaboration which was the only regional structure

was especially active in this regard having 51 active public agencies.
A key element in each of the local collaborations was the relation to
the public agency responsible for service to deinstitutionalize status
offenders.

Such local collaboration site was able to involve the public

agency in their area as an active member of the collaboration.

The

collaboration was thus the vehicle for a beginning relationship between
a large number of the voluntary youth service agencies and the public
agencies dealing with community care for status offenders.

The public

agency recipients of the DSO Grants were extremely supportive of the
collaborations and were often a resource for collaboration staff in the
process of implementation.

They viewed the effort as long overdue and

generally gave the collaboration more support and respect than they would
offer individual agencies.

The collaborations thus were able to establish

themselves by activating a large number of the youth service agencies and
achieving cooperative working relationships with the public sector.
Another area of concern to the evaluation was the degree of participation in the collaboration.

This was evaluated in terms of:

1.

recognition by participants of a common community problem.

2.

formal commitment to participation in the collaboration,

3.

allocation of some organizational resource to work on collaboration

goals.
4.

participation in activity related to collaboration goals.

Of these measures the allocating resources and the participation in work
related to the collaboration goals were the most significant index of
participation.
The level of participation according to these measures was a minimum

of 4,082 recorded days of work representing a salary figure of $378,411.
This minimum figure takes into account the contribution of only the
National Assembly affiliates and thus was undercounted in two sites.
does not include the participation of the many fine non-affiliates and
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public representatives.

This participation occurred during a period when

almost none of the affiliates had staff increases and some in fact absorbed
budget and staff cuts.
The evaluation also considered the level of agency participation and
the priority assigned to its work and index of participation.

Forty-one

percent of all affiliate representatives were executive directors ranging
from a high of 58 percent (Spartanburg) to a low of 14 percent (national
collaboration).
Planning and Implementing Programs
Three aspects of program planning and implementation were evaluated:
a) the nature of the community needs assessments, b) the nature of the
planning process and the plan itself, and c) the implementation process.
All collaborations performed needs assessment studies using statistics
and youth surveys.
sites.

An inventory of resources was completed by four of the

These assessments were accomplished in a very short time and under

the press of deadline and show the results of such compression.

It was the

view of the locals that the national collaboration did not assist the local
assessment process.

The difficulty with needs assessments is a good

illustration of the problem of compressing the time allowed for the
development process in order to meet task goals of the grant.

The fact

that the decision by LEAA to wait for one collaboration (Tucson) to be in
place before the others started meant that Tucson was rushed and the other
sites had a six month delay in starting.

Thus the needs assessment at

each site, a sensitive area in need of careful procedures, was not fully

developed.

The national collaboration, under the press of project manage-

ment, developed only a very general needs assessment.

The Tucson

collaboration, recognizing the value of a needs assessment, has now

developed and implemented a complete document for future planning.
The planning process which resulted in the phased action plan
represented another area of stress between planning procedures and the
need to achieve project milestones.

It was perhaps the most difficult

of all the collaboration tasks with the most time spent in the attempt
to produce it, the most committee activity--and the most frustration.
The locals consistently reported frustration at so little help being
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available from the national office and the national reported frustration
at the difficulty of the pressure of compressed time lines and increasing
responsibilities and demands.

A basic pattern in all the collaborations

(local and national) was the rush to get established, meet deadlines and
plan as well as possible as they went along.

For better or for worse,

each collaboration inherited a whole system of previously existing relationships and problems.
lines and milestones.

This affected the ability to respond to common time
The plans were produced with a varying degree of

completeness and satisfaction and resulted from a great deal of effort,
but clearly lacked sufficient time and organization to have served as a
fully functioning planning instrument.
Programs were able to be implemented in all sites with over 1,000
status offenders and children at risk served.

More than 2,900 community

leaders and youth program staff for both public and non-profit agencies
attended capacity building training sessions.

Innumerable others received

informational communication or in-depth planning instruments from three

sites.

In addition, all sites used public relations and media coverage.

Four of the five local sites were able to implement programs which were
collaborative in operation; these represented from 20 to 40 percent of

all programs, excluding collaboration meetings or committees.
Cost efficiency was arrived at by dividing program cost by days of
program contact per person to determine cost per person per day.

In

almost all cases costs were lower than the cost -of similar service reported

by the DSO Grantee of the public sector.
The five local collaborations and the national collaboration in the
project then was able to plan and implement 116 different programs in
14-18 months in widely scattered communities.

The fact that planning had

to be rushed and sometimes altered in mid-stream should not detract from
the very significant accomplishment in this area.
Affecting Member Organizations
One notable program effect was the participation of agencies in the
program.

Clearly agencies which have been involved in status offender

planning and programs have increased their experience, knowledge and
expertise.

The evaluation also attempted to evaluate the actual change

within participating agencies using before and after measures.
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The

outcomes from this analysis were limited due to the difficulty in obtaining
sufficient material and the great variation of local factors.

The fact

that the evaluation was not funded to compare the five sites to sites
without the collaboration was another limit on our ability to generalize
about organizational changes.
One measure which allowed documentation was changes in attitudes of
board members of the collaborating agencies.

The evaluation showed that

three of the five sites increased in their positive attitudes about nonprofit agencies mixing status offenders with other children. These
individuals were the decision makers of their communities, and thus their
attitudes were significant.
Data from national organizations indicated considerable use of resources

to develop programs and program material to use for direct service to
status offenders and children at risk at other than collaboration sites
either during the term of the project or before it began in the Fall of
1976.

Incomplete and non-comparable data precluded further conclusions

regarding the direct effect of the project in this area.

This was also

true in regard to training programs operated by the national organizations.
Some excellent staff training by national appeared to be offered, but it
was not documentable by the evaluation.
Building the Collaborative Process
The collaborations were all successful in getting o¥ganizational
representatives working together on the problem of status offenders and
other children at risk.

In the second interview of organizational represen-

tatives, 41 percent reported that the collaborations had been most successful
in getting people together and 82 percent said that they would involve their
organizations in the collaboration again.

Some conclusions concerning

factors that affected the success in building collaborations were:
1.

Geographical boundaries should be well defined and similar to
organizational regions.

2.

Collaborations are facilitated in areas where previous collaboration has been satisfying to participants.

3.

Competing inter-organizational groups working on the same problems
or issues should be consulted and included in the collaboration
if possible. It may be necessary either to compromise with such
groups or to allocate some control to them for a better use of
community resources.
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4.

Unequal power among members may lead to unequal input of ideals;
the group process must allow for input for all members.

5.

The interpersonal skills, attitudes and work roles of staff
coordinators must be clearly defined.

6.

The lay leadership is extremely important in continuity, role
perspective and loyalty.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION
The Program
In late 1974, the staff and several members of the National Assembly
of National Voluntary Health and Welfare Organizations made juvenile

.
.
. 1
JUStlce
a program emp h as1s.

An ad hoc task force on juvenile justice was

formed to determine ways in which this emphasis could be advanced in member
organizations both nationally and locally.

Some of the member agencies of

the Assembly were already involved in a National Coalition for Youth which
met regularly in Washington.

That group had worked for the passage of the

Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act of 1974.

Further, some Assembly

member organizations had already placed high national priority on

juvenile justice.

2

After several months of meetings, the juvenile justice task force
applied for a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
under the first phase of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, which was devoted primarily to the deinstitutionalization of status
3
offenders.
The major proportion of the deinstitutionalization funds went
to public agencies in local communities to develop alternatives to
1

Members of the National Assembly are listed in Appendix A, Table 1.

2

The Auxiliary Appendixes {Volume II) contain additional tables,

research rationale, research procedures and instruments, additional program

information and the bibliography. It may be obtained by writing to the
National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration, 345 East 46th Street,
New York, New York, 10017.
3

status offenders are youth who have been adjudicated as delinquent on
the basis of acts which are offenses because of their status as minors
but which would not be offenses or crimes if committed by adults.

1

institutionalization of status offenders in detention or correction centers.

Recipients of the public grant are ·referred to as the Deinstitutionalization
of Status Offender (DSO) Grantees.

The purpose of the grants was to remove

status offenders from institutions and to provide some demonstration of
how they could be served in local communities rather than in institutions.
The Juvenile Justice Task Force suggested also funding non-profit
community based youth serving agencies also on the following assumptions:
1.

Non-profit agencies can provide valuable services to status offenders.
If status offenders are to be served in local communities, then local
non-profit youth serving agencies should also be experimenting with
ways to increase services to such youth.

2.

Non-profit agencies can be valuable and powerful advocates for
status offenders. If status offenders are to be served in local
communities, then there must be a major effort to educate citizens,

to change laws and to urge public service agencies to understand
and accept status offenders in the community.
3.

Services and advocacy provided by a collaborative effort are more
effective than each agency providing a separate effort. Local
services to youth are often fragmentary with a great deal of duplication in some areas and gaps in service in other areas.

All

local providers of service to a specific client group must work
together to meet the needH of the cl i_ents i_n a more complete way.
Police, probation, schools, social agencies, and public recreation
must be aware of and supportive to each other!s programs to serve

status offenders.
4.

Non-profit agencies can develop the capacity to work with status
offenders. Status offenders have not been a traditional client
group of most non-profit local affiliates of National Assembly
agencies.

However, non-profit agencies will be in the community

long after LEAA monies are gone. If these agencies have a commitment to working collaboratively with each other and with the local
public agencies and have increased their ability to provide needed
services, then the money is well spent.

Based on these assumptions, the National Assembly's Juvenile Justice
Task Force developed a proposal for a program grant:
To develop the capacity of the national voluntary organizations and
their local affiliates to serve status offenders and to develop, through
collaboration, community-based services for status offenders as an
alternative to detention/correction institutions.4

The basic method of the program was to bring together organizations
with common values of service to youth in order to work together more

4

Program Proposal, p. 11.
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effectively and without duplication of effort to deinstitutionalize status
offenders.

The process to develop the common, cooperative effort called

for the organizations to work together with mutual exchange of information
and ideas, sharing of resources and expertise, respect for each others'

efforts and programs and a cooperative offering of needed services.

A

formal organization of these youth organizations would be formed and
termed a collaboration.
A national collaboration was established to manage the program, work
with the national organizations and assist in the development of local
5
collaborations at five sites around the country.
The national collaboration
was composed of 15 member organizations of the National Assembly whose
representatives were the national task force.

The task force and the staff

which was hired to assist in implementing the program formed the working
parts of the collaboration.
Each local collaboration was a formal organization of a core of local

affiliates of the National Assembly organizations, other public and private
youth-serving agencies and the DSO Grantee.

They were developed with

assistance from the national collaboration.

The separate organizations

were to work together through the collaborations and separately tn develop
needed services for status offenders in the community.

The local collaborations were implemented by staff coordinators and set
up offices.

The organizational linkages, diagramed in Figure 1, indicate

that the efforts of all organizations and staff are directed to the ultimate
presence of community services to enable status offenders to be deinstitutiona-

lized.

In October, 1975, LEAA funded the National Assembly's juvenile

justice program collaboration proposal for two years.

The sites selected

were Oakland, Spartanburg, Spokane, Tucson and a Connecticut region

encompassing Danbury, Torrington and Waterbury.

The Goals of the Juvenile Justice Program Collaborations
Four goals were identified as the program became operationalized.
Three of themwere program goals and one was a process goal.
5

Each of the cities also included a public agency that had received
one of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO) Grants from
LEAA.
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FIGURE 1
THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATION PROGRAM
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The program goals for both the national and local collaborations were
to:
1.

Develop a viable collaborative organization of non-profit youth
serving agencies.

2.

Plan and implement needed programs and services.

3.

a.

Programs that would increase the capacity of member agencies
to serve status offenders.

b.

Programs that would enable the collaborations as organizations
and its members separately to serve as advocates for status
offenders.

c.

Direct services and programs for status offenders in the
community.

Increase the capacity of member organizations to serve status
offenders and other children at risk in the community.

The process goal was to develop a real collaborative style of operation
among the non-profit agencies and between the public and non-profit
agencies that would lead to future unified delivery of services.
Program and process goals are diagramed in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2
RELATIONSHIP OF PROGRAMS AND GOALS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS
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The Evaluation
The evaluation used two major methodologies.

The first was descriptive

analysis of both the development of the collaborative process and the
collaboration programs.

This entailed three procedures:

a)

monitoring the

group process using the methods developed in small group research,
b)

analyzing the collaborations' organizational procedures and programs

using accepted criteria of human service programs, and c)

describing

program activity and participants.
The second methodology was a quasi-experimental design to measure the
effect of the program on a)
collaboration,

b)

commitment of the local organizations to the

the change in capacity of local organizations to serve

status offenders and children at risk,

and c)

the degree of success in

the service goals of the collaboration--advocacy and direct service.

The

procedures used were interviewing organizational representatives, content
analyses of organizational media, analysis of organizational records such

as budget and board minutes, and measures of board attitudes.

Measures

of these three factors were taken at the beginning of the program in

5

Fall, 1976, and again in Fall, 1977.
6
the evaluation.

Figure 3 diagrams the rationale of

FIGURE 3

METHODOLOGIES USED IN EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS
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General Findings
Program Development and Outcomes
The national collaboration had four major tasks:
program grant,

to manage the entire

to provide assistance to the local collaborations,

to staff

the national collaboration's development of its own program goals, and to
increase the service of member organizations to status offenders and other
children at risk.
The evaluation shows that the national collaboration was effective in
managing the project.

The collaboration's assistance to the local collaborations

6

See Auxiliary Appendixes B and C for a complete discussion of research
rationale and data instruments.
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was hampered by a shortage of staff and was more successful in some tasks
than others and more successful in some sites than others.

It was more

successful in assisting organizational development than in assisting
program development, and it was more successful in Tucson, Spartanburg
and Spokane than in Connecticut and Oakland.
The development of the national collaboration's own programs, while
recognized as important by the national staff, was of considerably lower
priority to them in comparison with the necessity of helping the local
7
collaborations become operational.
The National Assembly organizations who participated in the national
collaboration reported growth in their services to status offenders around

the country in addition to the five sites.

Since 1972, some of the

national organizations have developed sound program materials and technical

assistance for their locals to use with children at risk.

During the

course of the evaluation, most of the national organizations showed increases

in communications about status offenders to their local affiliates around
the country and many showed increases in their national advocacy activities.

The local collaborations had three major tasks:
working organization to work for status offenders,
programs and services for status offenders,

of members to status offenders.

to develop a viable,
to plan and implement

and to increase the services

In general, the collaborations were very

successful in organizing local youth serving agencies around the issue of
local service to status offenders.

Most were successful in planning

capacity building, advocacy and direct service programs.

The success in

implementing programs varied somewhat according to the start-up time, the
nature of the site and the difficulties of organization.

The programs

are continuing to be implemented since the cessation of data collection.
The local affiliates of National Assembly organizations increased
their capacity to serve status offenders and other children at risk.

Many

were educating their boards and membership and training staff for future
direct services.

Many also donated part of their own facilities and staff

in implementing the collaboration programs and some reported more status

offenders in their regular programs than a year earlier.
7

This task is a major priority in a proposal to continue the project
for two additional years.
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Process Development and Outcomes

In the process analysis, we found that the collaborations were successful, using a number of techniques.

The most successful technique was local

staff persons encouraging the involvement of the collaboration members in
all aspects of the program with the goals well defined around a specific
problem, and with some consensus on goals, roles and methods.

Collabora-

tions that emphasized direct service to young people convicted of status
offenses worked better if the collaborations had
zations or

mnre homogeneous organi-

had smaller numbers of service deliverers involved.
Design of the Report

The remainder of this report will examine

in detail the results of the

evaluation of the National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration in three
program areas and one process area.

1.
2.

The program areas are:

The manner in which local collaborations were organized.
The extent to which the collaboration planned and implemented
needed programs and service in

a)
b)
c)
3.

capacity building programs
advocacy programs
direct services for status offenders.

The extent to which member organizations increased their capacity
to serve status offenders and other children at risk.

The program areas are the heart of the evaluation for the purpose of
program accountability for LEAA, and is the subject of Chapter 2.
The process area is the nature of the collaboration process that
developed and the situational and process factors that affected the
collaborations.

This is the major interest of non-profit organizations

in terms of developing inter-organizational collaborations of service

agencies in the future.

In Chapter 3 we examine the process of small

groups and describe each of the collaborations.
In Chapter 4 we look at the program and process together and indicate
factors that affected the success of the collaboration and its program.
This chapter includes the major scientific interest of the evaluation, the
hypothesis that the group process affects the successful attainment of
program goals.

Chapter 4 also indicates some of the difficulties of the
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evaluation process and suggests changes in methodology that would be
helpful in further studies, and aspects of the problem in which further
research would prove fruitful.
The appendix of this report contains tables referred to in the text.
A separate volume of auxiliary appendixes includes the full research
rationale, research instruments, additional data tables, the full
bibliography, and persons involved in the programs and the evaluation.
How to Read this Report
There are several ways to read this report.

Readers who are short of

time will wish to read the attached Executive Summary and Chapter 4.

Those

interested in the organizational procedures of the collaborations and in the
development and implementation of programs and services to status offenders

and children at risk will wish to read Chapter 2.

Those interested in the

development of the collaboration process and its effect on program will
wish to read the introduction of Chapter 3 and all of Chapter 4.
Readers interested in the development of a specific collaboration
will find a section of Chapter 3 which relates to the particular site, in
addition to the introduction to the chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
EVALUATION OF THE COLLABORATION PROGRAM
Introduction
The major program method of the Juvenile Justice Collaboration Program funded by LEAA was to form a national juvenile justice collaboration
which would then form collaborative organizations at five sites around
the country.

Representatives of 16 national organizations from the

National Assembly formed the national task force.

They, and the staff

they hired to implement the program nationally and locally, comprised
the working body of the national collaboration.

The national task

force and the national staff persons worked with local organizations
involved in service to youth to form the local collaborations.

The

local collaborations then hired staff coordinators and began to plan
and implement programs to serve status offenders to the community

and thereby avoid their institutionalization.
The Sites
The five sites were Spartanburg, South Carolina;

Tuc~on,

Arizona;

Oakland, California; Spokane, Washington,and the State of Connecticut.
The sites were chosen because

a)

they were recipients of the LEAA

public Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Grants (DSO Grants);
b)

they represented different sections of the country;

c)

they

represented variation in size and cultural diversity.

Spartanburg is a city of 46,000 in rural South Carolina.

While

it has been a traditional southern regional center, it is currently
experiencing rapid economic and industrial growth.

Tucson is a major metropolitan area in the southwestern United

States.

The Tucson collaboration encompasses all of Pima County, with

a population of about half a million.
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It has grown to this size from

about 50,000 in the 1940's so that a majority of residents are migrants
into the area.

Oakland is an industrial suburb of San Francisco with a population
of 360,000.

The population has been slowly declining, with an increas-

ing proportion of minority residents, and increasing unemployment.
Spokane is a city of 174,000 in eastern Washington.
regional center for about 200 miles.
traditional city until the 1960's.

It is the

It had been a relatively old
During that decade, the population

increased nearly 40% with younger, more educated, more politically
liberal population.
In Connecticut, three towns in the eastern region were eventually
selected for delivery of service since the voluntary organizations

are not organized on a state basis.
is in southeastern Connecticut.

Danbury,with a population of 57,000,

It is a growing town and becoming

a suburb for New York middle management personnel.

Waterbury, with a

population of 113,000, is an industrial city which is currently economically depressed.

It has high unemployment especially among youth.

Torrington is a town of 32,000 located in rural northeastern Connecticut.
While it is a mannfRcturing town it retains much of the rural culture.

The Goals
The program goals are diagramed in Figure 1, page 4.

They were:

1.

To form collaboration organizations of National Assembly
affiliates and other youth serving agencies.

2.

To plan or implement
a.

programs to develop members' capacities to serve status

offenders
b.

programs or services that will increase community advocacy

c.

programs or services that meet the direct service needs of

for status offenders
status offenders.
3.

To cause change in member organizations in their capacity to
serve status offenders.

The General Findings
It is the conclusion of the evaluation that all of the program
goals were achieved to some extent.

After the early preorganizational

tasks (including LEAA' s insistence that one site be organized prior to
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sign off), only 14 months remained for the achievement of the three
program goals.

The most successfully achieved goals are those which

occurred earliest.

A continual monitoring of the later tasks is

necessary to report the results completely.
The building of collaboration, the first goal, was very successful.

A total of 62 affiliates, 65 other non-profit youth serving organizations
and 76 public organizations were involved in the seven sites.

One

national, one state, one regional and four local offices were established
with support personnel and facilities.

A documented total of 12 years

of 7-hour person work days was contributed by members of these organizations in formal planning and program activities and an estimated addi-

tional 10 to 12 years in other collaboration activity.
The member organizations were committed to work for status offenders.

For two-thirds of the participants the collaboration and/or work with
status offenders was a high priority in their work.
The planning and implementing of programs was also highly successful.

A total of 116 programs were planned, 62% of which had been imple-

mented or were in operation by the end of the data collection.

More

than 1,000 status offenders and other youth at risk were served in a
variety of programs.

A total of c2, 770 persons, primarily youth work

professionals, participated in capacity building programs.
Over 3,600 community leaders and youth work professionals had
sustained informational and educational contact about status offenders

and innumerable additional people had short term media contact of
some kind.
Some of the programs were not as successful as others but the
total effect was to initiate public awareness, educate and train
people who work with youth, and create some local community services

for youth.
The building of member organizations' capacity to serve status
offenders in their own programs showed fewer results in the short time
after the implementation of programs.

The national organizations,

many of which have had status offenders as a priority for a longer
period of time,

showed the greatest increase in capacity since the

beginning of the grant.

The local agencies showed some increase in some
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areas at some sites.

The remainder of this chapter details the degree to which the
collaborations were successful in achieving these three program goals.
In the first section, we will set the stage for the evaluation program
by describing early tasks and the evaluation methods.

In the second

section, we will present the detailed evaluation of each of the three
program goals.
Setting the Stage for the Program Evaluation
Before discussing the degree to which program goals were achieved,
we need to set the stage for both the program and the evaluation of
the program.

This section will describe the early tasks involved in

the collaboration and briefly describe the methods used in evaluating
the program.
Early Developmental Tasks
Three early tasks preceded the local collaboration program activities
and established the work style of the national collaboration.

These

tasks were the local site selection, the national work plan and local
organizational development.
Site Selection.

The task force and the staff developed criteria

for the selection of the five local collaboration sites, modifying somewhat the criteria in the program proposal.
by several realities.

Site selection was limited

First, local collaborations had to be in sites

where the members of the National Assembly had sufficient numbers of
local affiliates with which to build a collaboration.

In addition,

the LEAA insisted that the collaboration site be a location with a
recipient of the public DSO Grant.

There was apparently also some

political maneuvering among national organizations over locations
of sites.

Finally, the -national organizations wanted some geographical,

demographic and cultural diversity among the sites.
The national task force and staff also developed a set of criteria
for site selection based on the nature of the various systems to be
involved:

the DSO Grantee, other state and local public agencies, the

nature of the voluntary organizations, and the needs of the community.
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With the data all in, the national task force selected six sites by
vote.

The practical realities appear to have been more important in

the selection than the service system criteria.

In the six sites selected, local affiliates of members of the
National Assembly's Juvenile Justice Task Force members were contacted
to inform them of the collaboration program and arrange for a visit
by a team from the task force.

One of the affiliates was selected to

organize the visit, to invite appropriate persons and organizations to

a meeting and to convene that meeting.

The purpose of the meeting was

to discuss the project and elicit interest from local affiliates.
From the six sites five were selected, leaving the sixth site quite

hostile.
National Work Plan.

The national staff had three functions in

developing the local collaborations:
assistance and fiscal management.

organizational development, program

In addition, they had these same

functions for the national collaboration.

There is no evidence of an

explicit plan that adequately defined the jobs to be done, specified
priorities or allocated adequate personnel to the various functions.
¥or instance, plans were either explicated retrospectively to fit what

had already developed or developed later to solve problems resulting
from unplanned developments.

For instance, job descriptions of local

staff persons were developed long after they had been hired.

Job

differentiation at the National Assembly office was developed late in
the first year.

Additional personnel were hired as they were needed.

For organizational development, the program proposal said that
national staff should spend one or two weeks at each site to help local
organizations develop structure and help committees organize.

staff spent the time in Tucson, the first site to organize.

National

The other

sites started developing on their own in most cases with the bulk of
the staff input at a later stage in their development or with less time
at each visit because of the growing press of management matters on

the national collaboration.
Some assistance in organizational development was offered at staff
meetings with local staff from all five sites meeting together several
times and all local staff and chairpeople twice.

Other guidelines

were offered by letters and phone calls to chairpersons and staff
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outlining the committees and tasks of the collaboration, giving guidance
in selection of personnel and further explaining the nature of the
collaboration program.
All of the local coordinators except Tucson perceived a lack of
structural guidelines for organizational development.

The four later

sites had more trouble than Tucson in their early stages.

Several

problems developed during this time that continued to plague the local
collaborations:

definition of membership, voting relationships between

affiliates and non-affiliates, the staff-chair role relationships, the
national-local staff relationships

including the supervisory role,

and the degree of freedom of the local collaborations from national
control of program.
For program assistance, the program said that national task force
members, who were staff persons with expertise in their own organizations,

were to assist the locals in organizational development and in program
materials.

Technical assistance panels were to be organized and available

on call from the local sites.

Teams of national task force members

available for site visits from time to time.

were

However, no workable plan

for using the expertise of national organization's staff persons in

program assistance was developed.

At a later stage of the program,

a technical assistance procedure was developed on paper.

It involved

primarily a file of material with bibliographic and program references
and possible program personnel.

Most of the program personnel were

consultants rather than local or national National Assembly affiliate
staff.
Other program assistance was offered by national staff by phone
calls, on-site program assistance and some program assistance at staff

meetings.

Since the national staff were not themselves program special-

ists, most of this program assistance was of greater use in managing

organizations than in developing programs.

When the local coordinators

were asked about problems, their most mentioned problem related to lack
of knowledge of programs and their difficulty in getting assistance from
the national staff.
The program proposal specified few guidelines for fiscal management.
However, the resulting contract and the LEAA program monitor set down
the criteria.

The national staff hired a full time fiscal officer.
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In

addition the project director spent a great deal of time in fiscal and
organizational management.

The written guidelines for fiscal policy and

procedures were much more explicit than those on organizational development or program.

The time spent ori fiscal management during staff

meetings was greater and the manner of presentations more creative than

those on organizational development or program.
This degree of emphasis appears to reflect both the values of LEAA
and the personal style of the project director.
Several early organizational and program problems of the local
collaboration resulted from a lack of attention to needs at crucial points
in their development.

This will be illustrated in Chapter 3.

Several

of the national collaboration's problems were also due to the absence of
a plan which outlined program priorities.

Attention to change of role was

needed by the national task force as it changed functions and the absence
of clear program plans for the national collaboration illustrate the
problem.
In reality, the original two national staff, even when augmented
by two additional staff persons, were not sufficient for the proposed
tasks of the program.

The lack of a rational plan

m~rely

meant that

tasks not well attended to were a result of the selection of staff
rather than a rational allocation of resources.

Local Organizational Development.

Before LEAA would sign off on the

total program, they required that one site be organized and a viable plan
developed.

Tucson was selected for the test because it was felt that the

inter-organizational climate, the judicial stance around status offenders

and the nature of the city would facilitate a rapid development.
8
The organizing process was similar in all sites.
Following the site
visit, a temporary chairperson called another meeting or two to discuss

the extent of interest of local organizations and to give further
explanations, if necessary, to potential members.
local organizations were eager to participate.

In all sites, the

In most sites, they

began the organizational process after hearing of their selection from
New York, even before LEAA gave clearance to begin the other sites.
8

The specific sections of Chapter 3 describe minor variations in the

organizing process at each site.
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The first committees dealt with membership, statement of purpose and
selection of personnel.

A national staff person returned several times

to most sites or advised the temporary chairpersons by phone.

A national

staff person was present for final screening and hiring of the coordinators.
Summary of Early Development Tasks.

Even with the problems noted,

each collaboration developed a working organization with office and staff
within three to eight months of the first meeting, a remarkably short time
for organizational development.
Two problems that limited the success of the total program are
related.

First, only a short period of time was allowed to develop

relationships, build new collaborative organizations, and to plan and
implement services to status offenders.

LEAA's insistence on the one

trial site without extending the life of the project deprived the other
four sites of the time necessary to mount the program approved in the
original proposal.

The national task force might well have insisted on

a written extension for the complete program when LEAA insisted on the
trial site.

At a later date an extension was asked for and received but

by that time the rushing of decisions and processes had already created
problems.
The second problem was a lack of adequate planning.

With LEAA's

stipulation of immediately organizing one site before the others could
begin, the time for advanced planning was severely limited.
The Evaluation Method
The National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force issued a
request for proposal for the evaluation in June,l976, and signed the
contract in September, 1976, nine months after the project began.

This

left no opportunity for pretesting the early national organizational or
collaborative process nor for any systematic monitoring of organizational

procedures.

A major reason for the delay was LEAA's ambivalance about

evaluating this program.

Originally, LEAA exempted the National

Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration from its evaluation of the other
DSO programs, even though the national task force had requested its inclusion.

After the grant was announced, LEAA demanded that an evaluation

be purchased with- program money even though the program money had already
been allocated.
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The complete rationale for the evaluation, the research instruments
and procedures are included in Auxiliary Appendixes B and C.

At this

point we will outline the program goals and briefly outline the major
methodologies, the research personnel, the development of research
procedures and instruments,and the data gathering techniques used.
Program Goals.

To determine the proper methodology, it was necessary

to clarify which aspects of the program were to be evaluated.
Three aspects of human services can be evaluated:
program throughput and program outcomes.

program input,

Evaluation of program input

would include the assessment of external resources that are used such as

funding, source of staff expertise and participation of external organizations.

Evaluation of program throughput would assess what goes on

inside the organization, including the background for planning, the plans
themselves, the intervention logics, the program operations and insti-

tutional development and maintenance,

Evaluation of program outcomes

includes independent tests to determine the causal relationships between
the program and the desired outcomes.
In this case, complete evaluation of all three aspects of human
service programs was not considered feasible or essential.

The national

collaboration's decision was that a thorough assessment of the program
throughputs, or the organizational development, planning and operations,
would be most useful to future program planners.

A complete test of the

effect of the program on the deinstitutionalization of status offenders
was considered too costly and complex.
However, an attempt to measure the organizational outcome was judged

to be worthwhile.

This included an analysis of youth who participate in

direct service programs.

This analysis included demographic and offense

records on the youth and some case and program data.

In addition it

included some outcome data from some programs.

The national collaboration also agreed to the evaluation of a
second aspect of the organizational development, the process of the group
formation and activity.

Figure 4 shows the structure of the program in

relation to the above discussion.
The program throughputs were a)

We evaluated three program through-puts
to organize collaboration of youth

serving organizations around the issue of community services to status

offenders,b)

to develop a collaborative process that will increase
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FIGURE 4
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items evaluated.

inter-organizational cooperation, and c)

to plan and implement programs

that will enable status offenders to be served in the community.

The

programs are capacity building, advocacy and direct service.

The program outcome evaluated was the change from Fall, 1976, to
Fallc,l977, in the capacity of the National Assembly affiliates to serve
status offenders.

The definition of the goals, the operational indicators

for these goals and the criteria for evaluation are included at the
beginning of each of the evaluation sections.
Major methodologies.

Two major methodologies or research logics

were used in the evaluation:

descriptive analysis of the through-put

goals and quasi-experimental analysis of one outcome goal.

The descrip-

tive analysis treated the collaborations as service planning and delivery
systems rather than as organizational structures.

This kind of analysis

required much data, gathered with a variety of techniques.

The analysis

also required a variety of techniques, including analysis of causal
factors within each collaboration and comparison among collaborations,
descriptive case history of organizational activity, and systems analysis
of progress toward goals.
The quasi-experimental methodology was used to evaluate organizational
change, the outcome goal.

Organizational data were gathered in the Fall of
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1976 and again in the Fall of 1977.

Analysis varied from a simple com-

parison of percentages to a more complicated test of probability used on
the attitude scales.

Figure 3 in Chapter 1 diagrams the methodology.

Research Personnel.

The evaluation was directed by a sociologist

with extensive background in research methods and evaluation of human
service programs.

In September and October, 1976, a research team was

formed, including a social scientist in each of the local sites and a
social agency executive with expertise in human service organizations to

be part of a research team.

The remainder of the research team consisted

of four graduate students, three in social work and one in criminal
justice.

The research. staff at the Center for Applied Urban Research at

the University of Nebraska at Omaha provided additional research support.
Dr. Richard Hall, an expert in inter-organizational relationships from the
University of Minnesota, was a consultant.

The research team gathered in

Omaha in early November, 1976, along with the local program coordinators
and the national staff personnel to work out details of the evaluation.
Development of Research Procedures and Instruments.

Before the

first Omaha Conference, a library search was initiated to discover previous
research, theories to guide the evaluation and instruments that might
have already been validated.

Working papers were developed and prelimi-

nary work on the attitude questions began.
At the conference, the researchers and the program people worked
together for one day, with the program people identifying what they
would like to know about their programs, what interference they would
object to and discussing the delicate relationships in their collaboration.
The researchers met after that and wrote and sequenced questions
for the interview schedule, worked on the group process analysis and
selected and revised the attitude questions.

They also worked together

doing a process observation to assure greater reliability.
The ongoing staff interviews and the procedures for analysis of
organizational data were developed from theories of leadership styles,
9

The local researchers were responsible for much of the local data.
They are identified in Auxiliary Appendix E; the details of the 1976
Omaha planning conference and a subsequent 1977 Omaha planning conference
can be found in Auxiliary Appendix C.

21

role behavior and organizational structure at a later date.

Procedures

for enhancing the response from organizations to our request for such
items as budgets and board minutes were revised every six months as

we repeatedly failed to receive these data.

10

The research proposal called for evaluation of program outcomes.
However, the national task force felt the time was too short for outcome to be apparent.

Therefore, we substituted evaluation of through-

puts or program plans and implementation procedures.

Our criteria were

developed from program theories.
Data Gathering Techniques.
in the evaluation.

Six data gathering techniques were used

First, the local researchers interviewed participants

in the local collaboration at the beginning and again at the end of the
program.

Because of the lateness of getting the evaluation contract,

"before" interviews with representatives of the national collaboration

were not possible.
Second, continuous running records of the collaborations were

gathered to monitor the organizational factors and procedures.

Third,

organizational data from one program year before the collaboration
started were collected in order to establish the organizational capacity

and organizational services to status offenders during a base period.
These data were collected again after six months to determine change.
Fourth, longitudinal analysis of staff activities was performed
by developing a log for local staff to keep their daily activity.
Fifth, the local staff persons were interviewed four times during the
study period to determine their perceptions of their jobs, their interactions with their collaboration's members and their perceptions of the
National Assembly office.

Finally, an attitude scale about status

offenders was developed to determine the attitudes of local affiliates'
boards of directors.

These scales were administered by the local field

researchers at the beginning of the collaborations and again in Fall,
1977.

10

Our solution and recommendation are included in Auxiliary Appendix
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c.

Did the Collaborations Achieve Their Program Goals?
In this section we will evaluate what the collaboration actually
did.

There will be a sub-section corresponding to each program goal:

building collaboration organizations to coordinate services for status
offenders, planning and implementing programs and affecting the capacity
of member organizations to serve status offenders.

Building Collaboration Organizations
In the program proposal, the objectives of the collaborations as
organizations were to:

••• develop and make operational in five project sites a
collaboration of the 14 participating national voluntary
agencies and other voluntary agencies ..••. develop a
formal working relationship between the collaboration and
the local action Grantee ..... to work together via a
collaborative mechanism.
There were two criteria for evaluating the degree to which collaborative organizations were developed:

a)

did National Assembly

affiliates join with other youth serving agencies in a collaboration?
and b)

to what extent did they participate in the work of the

collaborations?

The following sections

report the nature of the

collaboration's membership and the degree of participation.
Nature of Membership.

The collaborations were highly successful

in attracting the membership of local youth serving agencies affiliated
with the National Assembly organizations.
seen in Table 1, Appendix A.

The membership by site is

In all sites, 90% of National Assembly

affiliates joined the collaborations.
It is difficult to evaluate membership of affiliates in Oakland
and Connecticut, as both of these sites cover large areas with several

branches of the affiliates.

For instance, two different Girl Scout

Councils are involved in the Connecticut region.

The collaborations varied on their inclusions of non-profit
agencies that were not members of the National Assembly.
are included in all sites.
were non-voting members.

A total of 65

In most collaboration sites, these agencies
They were not included in the national collabo-

ration.
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The collaborations also varied on their inclusion of public youth
serving agencies.

Oakland, Spartanburg, Tucson and Connecticut actively

sought public agency participation.
were active at the four

A total of 76 public agencies

sites, as compared with only 23 National Assembly

affiliates.
The Spokane collaboration made a decision not to include public
agencies.

However, the Spokane DSO Grantee is a public-private youth

planning council which created Youth Alternatives as the operational unit
for the grant.
A public agency in each collaboration site which had received a DSO
Grant to provide community services for deinstitutionalizing status offenders

was a principal participant of each collaboration.
DSO Grantees in the five sites varied.

The nature of the

In Tucson it was the Juvenile

Court; in Oakland, the probation department; in Spartanburg, the Youth
Bureau, in Connecticut, the Department of Children and Youth Services;
and in Spokane it was Youth Alternatives as mentioned above.

The LEAA stipulated that the public and private programs complement
and not duplicate each other.

For this reason a working relationship was

essential and the collaborations were natural vehicles for coordination.

In each of the local sites, the DSO Grantee was active in the
collaboration.

Both the national collaboration and LEAA required a

written Working Agreement between the DSO Grantee and the collaboration
specifying the mechanisms of the relationship.

Most of the collabora-

tions served as vehicles for a beginning relationship between this part
of the public youth service sector and the private sector.

The presence

of the DSO Grantee in the collaboration served two major functions.

First,

it gave the private sector a realistic perspective on the particular

client population--status offenders.

The DSO Grantee was less likely

to romanticize possible programs, more in touch with status offenders
and other children at risk and more practical.

Second, some coordinators

used the DSO Grantee as an ally to get the tasks of the collaboration
under way.

Because most of the local coordinators had had more previous

experience in public agencies than in non-profit youth serving agencies,

they were often frustrated with the committee process of the non-profit
agencies and used the public agencies to help define the task and push
toward the goal.
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Most of the DSO Grantees wanted the collaborations in their cities.
They recognized the benefits of having the extra money, extra interest
in developing alternatives to institutionalization for status offenders
and extra staff.

The Grantees generally respected the collaborations,

but were somewhat less respectful of the local individual agencies.
They recognized that the collaborations had something to offer which they,
with their more rigid mandate, could not.

Most Grantees worked hard

to move the collaborations toward their own goals, using them as resources
to fulfill their goals.
Degree of Participation.

The literature on inter-organizational

relationship and community organization suggests that the relationships
can range from loose informal interaction to hierarchical coordinating

councils.

The collaborations defined in the program proposal fell into

a middle range between these two extremes, without the power of a
hierarchical council such as United Hay, but with more formal structure
11
than either a coalition or merely informal interaction.
The program
proposal said, "it requires shared decision making, and subsequently some

reduction in individual agency prerogatives.

It requires a process of

give and take with different participants making different kind of
.
.,12
contr1'b ut1ons.

The criteria of collaboration participation used in the evaluation
of successful collaboration are:

1.

Recognition by participants of a common community problem or need.

2.

A formal commitment or contract to participate in collaboration

goal activity.
3.

Allocation of organizational resources to work on collaboration

goals.
4.

Participation in activity related to collaboration goals.

5.

Participation in shared decision making process.

The fifth criterion, the decision making process, will be discussed
11

Klonglan, et al., "Models for Developing Interorganizational Cooperation,"
from Voluntarism and America's Future (Hashington, D.C.: Center for A
Volun-tary SoCiety, 1972), pp. 53-62.
12

Project proposal for National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration
(New York: National Assembly, October, 1974), p. 8.
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in Chapter 3.

In this section we will describe the degree to which the

other criteria were met in each site.

The time sequence of the criteria

is diagramed in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5
INDICES OF PARTICIPATION IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAl COLLAEORATION
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Participation in a collaborative organization requires

of a common problem or need.

recogn~tion

In the first interview, collaboration members

at each site were asked, "From your knowledge of youth and the community,
what would you say are the THREE most important problems with youth
here?

(accept more than three if volunteered)."

shown in Table 3, Appendix A.

The responses are

Most of the responses to the open-ended

question related either to services for status offenders or to causal
factors related to status offenders.
Tucson had the greatest consensus on any one problem with 69% of
respondents reporting school and education as problems.
and Waterbury respondents had 65% consensus on a problem.
had the most total consensus.

Both Spartanburg
Spartanburg

Sixty-nine percent of all responses

were on the three most mentioned problems.

Torrington had least con-

sensus on the three most mentioned problems.

A formal commitment to the collaboration indicates the formal
participation.

The program plan called for a formal letter of commit-

ment, with the intent that it be based on official board decision.
data on this measure were incomplete.
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The

Some coordinators were conscientious

in pursuing the letter and some were not.

It was apparent to the evaluators

that many organizations which produced a formal letter of commitment were
inactive and many which produced no letter were very active.
The degree to which an organization allocates its own resources for
collaboration goal related activity indicates participation in a collaboration.

This measure represents a key factor in inter-organizational

collaboration.

Since many National Assembly affiliates had declining

incomes, any new activity reduced the activity toward organizational
goals.

This is especially true in organizations with few professional

staff.

We measured the allocation of resources in three ways:

1.

The number of days spent in collaboration activity;

2.

The amount of salary that this represents;

3.

The amount of in-kind contribution to the collaboration.

We measured the days in formal activity in two ways.

In the

interviews, we asked all respondents approximately how much time they
spent each month in collaboration activity.

We also counted the attend-

ance recorded on board and meeting minutes.

In most cases the latter

numbers were greater than the former.

data.

Table 4 ln Appendix A shows these

We estimated each collaboration meeting at one half working day

including travel, preparation and follow up.

National collaboration

meetings were one full day.

The time of other formal meetings was taken

from collaboration records.

A total of 2,623 working days were recorded

in formal collaboration meetings of all members.

This is the equivalent

of 12 working person-years at an average of 220 working days per year.
We consider this an under-recorded amount since records from Connecticut
were incomplete and some sites had no records of subcommittee meetings.

We had additional recorded or estimated activity from the affiliates
because of the organizational analysis.

An additional 2,136 days or

9.7 years can be documented or closely estimated.

Both Oakland and

Connecticut are under represented in this figure since some of the

estimates were from calendars and logs of the coordinators.

The

additional participation of non-affiliates is completely unreported.
In summary, the national task force reported the most days of
participation with an average of 142 per member agency.

National

activity covered a period of two and one half years while the local
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collaboration activity covered from 15 to 21 months.

Tucson reported

the most local participation with an average of 84 days per affiliate
(Table 4, Appendix A).

Spartanburg and Spokane, for which data were more

consistent, reported an average of 48 and 47 days per agency, respectively.
The amount of staff salary represented by the participation of
affiliates in collaboration activity was calculated (Table 4, Appendix A).
Locally, the mean salary for professionals in each agency was used.
was applied to volunteers from that agency also.

It

Nationally the median

figure for all National Assembly organizations by organizational rank
was used.

This figure was taken from a survey of national organizations

by the National Assembly.

A total of $378,411 is the estimated figure

allocated by National Assembly affiliates to collaboration work.
Seventy-four percent of this total was from the national organizations.
The Tucson collaboration reported the greatest salary allocation of the
local organizations, with Spokane and Spartanburg similar.
Reported "in-kind" contributions from all affiliates to all collaborations was $2,145.

We believe that this item was under-reported.

Several items of which we are aware were not reported.

In addition,

unmeaRnrable under-reported items should not be overlooked.

For

instance, several National Assembly affiliates used their own contacts
with funding sources to gain grants for the "match" that LEAA required.
The degree to which organizational members participate in collaboration Eoal related activity is a fourth measure of degree of commitment to
the collaboration.

The number of days of staff time given to the colla-

boration reported above is an indicator of collaboration goal related
activity as well as of allocating own organizational resources.
additional measures were used:

Two

the organizational status of the

collaboration representatives and the priority of collaboration work
in the portfolio of the organizational representatives.
The status of organizational representatives is shown in Table 4,
Appendix A.

Forty-one percent of all affiliate representatives were

executive directors.

The Spartanburg collaboration had most, where 58%

of their representatives were executive directors, and the national
13
collaboration had least, where only 14%were executives,
58% were other

.

13

nivision heads on the national level were considered to be the
same level of influence and power as executive Directors of local
collaborating agencies.
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staff persons and 13%wereboard members.

The Spokane collaboration

reported the largest percentage of board members, 43%, beaause their
members decided to include one board member from each affiliate.
The priority of the work in the collaboration for the representatives is also in Table 4, Appendix A.

Collaboration work,had the lowest

priority among national collaboration representatives.
it among their list of the top 10 priorities.

Only 41% reported

Ninety-two percent of

the Connecticut representatives reported the collaboration among their
top 10 priorities.

Only 34% of Tucson representatives reported the

collaboration among their top 10 priorities.

Both the national and the

Tucson representatives reported in the interviews that the collaboration
had been a higher priority previously, especially during the planning
stages.

Summary of Collaboration Building.

At all sites, the collaborations

organized collaboratively with formal commitments to work on the problem
of local service to status offenders.

Oakland and Connecticut collabo-

rations had the lowest active participation from affiliates and from the
DSO Grantees.

Spartanburg and Connecticut had the most representation

from other public.

Most active participation in work toward collaboration

was reported by the national collaboration and the Tucson and Spartanburg
collaborations.

The most active when average number of professional

staff per agency is included was Tucson.
Planning and Implementing Programs
The actual work of the collaborations, once organized, was to plan
and implement community based programs and services based on the service

needs and the characteristics of young people charged with status offenses
in each community, and the strengths of the local member agencies.

The

programs were to be developed collaboratively with input from the local
DSO Grantee and other youth-serving agencies (public and private) to
avoid duplication and to gain the support of possible users of the program.
It was also hoped that by participating in planning and implementing
programs and services for status offenders, the National Assembly affiliates
would gain experience and therefore increase their capacities to serve

status offenders in the future.
Four aspects of the collaboration planning and program implementation
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were evaluated:
b)

a)

the nature of the community needs assessments,

the nature of the planning process, c)

the plan itself, and d)

the

program implementation.
Needs Assessment.

An essential ingredient in the program plan for

each collaboration was a needs assessment,
were particularly helpful.

At this point the DSO Grantees

A wide variety of techniques was used at the

different sites (Table 5, Appendix A).
The program proposal perceived the needs assessment as a joint publicprivate activity not only to determine service gaps and devise programs
to fill them, but also as a means of educating and involving agency
leaders in the needs and problems of status offenders.

The criteria

for evaluating the needs assessment are:

1.

The degree to which service inventory and service gaps in the
community were determined.

2.

Participation of affiliates in the process.

3.

The degree to which gaps in service of the affiliates themselves
were identified.

Nearly all collaborations gathered area demographic data on population characteristics

and statistics on the number and nature of the

status offender population.

Three of the five used some youth input--

two were previously completed youth surveys.

Four used community input

either in the form of assessment of community facilities or interviews

of community youth work professionals.

Four completed inventories of

affiliate resources, programs and/or needs, two had brainstorming sessions

with input from the affiliates and one collaboration analyzed 100

juvenile

cases to assess their needs.
The national collaboration needs assessment procedures were limited.

However, a great deal of preliminary documentation of overall needs of
status offenders went into the preparation of the program proposal.
All of the local collaborations documented the service needs of
status offenders in their communities.

Spokane and Connecticut had the

most complete inventory of community resources.

Tucsonappearedto have had the most input of affiliates in their
needs assessment procedures, Oakland and Spartanburg the least.
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There was little organized agency self-assessment.

While a self-

assessment document was used in Tucson and national, both the return rate

and the quality of the response was poor.
Several problems were apparent from evaluating the needs assessment
procedures.

First, the press of time did not allow for adequate needs

assessment.

If time had been allowed, this procedure could have been a

factor educating and sensitizing the local organizations as well as the
community.

The Tucson collaboration recognized the weakness of its

procedures and has since developed and implemented a complete document
for use in future planning.

It presents location and type of community

service which will enable planners to recognize gaps in services.

Since the beginning of the program, the National Camp Fire Girls
have developed a technical assistance package for local communities on
how to determine needs for new programs.

They suggest a 6-8 month time

period and the extensive use of staff and volunteers.

In contrast, the

local collaborations had only a few weeks and had several other program
priorities at the same time.

Second, there was a general lack of knowledge on the part of local
coordinators and organizational representatives about procedures for
needs assessment.

Technical assistance, including some well produced

guidelines and training, might have helped.

While there was some on-site

assistance from national staff in this area, four of the five coordinators

reported in the second interview that they had requested assistance on
how to do needs assessment but had received none.

Third, a major part of the program proposal was for national and
local organizations to assess what they needed to better serve status

offenders.

Hostility usually greeted any mention that organizations

needed to be assessed.
weaknesses.

The organizations appeared to be loath to admit

The national collaboration soon gave up when its members

said that they would do needs assessment for their own use and not bring
it back to the· collaboration.
The Planning Process.

Following the needs assessment, the collabo-

rations were to develop a plan of action, or phased-action plan, for

the remainder of the grant.

The plan was called the phased action plan.

Each collaboration was to develop programs that would fill gaps in services
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identified in the community and organizational needs assessments.

The

plan was to be developed collaboratively with a sharing of information,
resources

and program expertise.

The planning process was perhaps the most difficult of the local
collaboration tasks.

The most time was reported spent on this task by

members, the most committee activity, the most frustration and the
least satisfaction.

Most of the participants had never developed a program

plan with national intervention for behavioral change included.

Most

had not planned for program evaluation and most lacked experience in
procedures such as short-term staffing procedures and grants accounting.
The planning process was different in each collaboration and depended
to a large extent on the selected perception and interests of the staff.
In structure, most local collaborations had program planning committees

that worked with the needs assessment material to develop the over all
program.
In practice, the process did not work so eollabotatively or efficiently.
One coordinator, described the development process as:
they should do and manipulated them to do it.

"I decided what

I had three committees;

I staffed each meeting; I asked for a think piece or product; I gave

assignments and provided information.''
In another site, because of shortness of time, the collaboration

members submitted program ideas, some a lit.tle vague, and the coordinator
and chairperson fitted the various ideas into a plan.
Another site circulated a list of programs for participants to
indicate program areas to which they might respond.

Few of the plans

were developed through a collaborative process with members hashing out
the details of the plan that fitted their own agencies participation
patterns.

The national collaboration planning around program was different
at each stage.

Program planning during the early stage when the program

proposal was being developed appears to have been by collaborative
effort.

After the program proposal was accepted, planning appeared to

have been by the executive committee which, at that time kept no minutes.
In later program planning, the staff decided what areas of program
needed decisions, and prepared position papers for a committee.

The

committee decisions followed fairly regularly the points of the position
papers.
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The local DSO Grantee had a great deal of input into program planning.
This was one of the mandates from LEAA.

Most clearly recognized the

direct service needs and the local gaps in services to status offenders.
However, in at least two sites, some competition appears to have developed

between the Grantees and their programs and other collaboration programs.
In these sites, the collaborations had to approach planning for direct
services in a round-about way so that the Grantee would approve and
therefore refer clients to the program.
There were two major problems with the process of developing the
program plan.

First, the push of time precluded a collaborative

working out of the details.

This problem was exacerbated by the previous

step, the lack of time for an adequate needs assessment.

short

As time became

and the local coordinators received pressure from the national

staff, the tendency was to write the program plan to appease national
rather than to develop a collaborative document.
The second problem was the lack of program
the coordinators.

expertise available to

It is at this crucial point that pre-arranged assistance

from the national staff and task force would have contributed to better
programs.

Several coordinators turned to outside sources for their

expertise.

Those sources were not necessarily familiar with how non-

profit organizations operate.

The results were program plans to which

the National Assembly affiliates could not easily relate.
The Plans.

The phased action plans were evaluated on the basis of

the following criteria:
1.

Are the priorities suggested by the needs assessment study?

2.

Are all program areas included in the plan?

3.

Do the programs have a rational intervention plan?

Tables 5 and 6, Appendix A, show the data on the phased action plans.
The local program priorities varied in the degree to which programs
related directly to needs assessment.

Program priorities were identified

by percent of program budget allocated and other resources allocated for
implementation.

Both Tucson and Spokane collaborations' plans closely

reflected needs assessments and collaboration members' perceptions of
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problems.

The Spokane collaboration felt that the community services

were good but not well known, utilized or coordinated.

Spokane gave

highest priority to community education and better use of resources,
including volunteers.

Spokane also set fewer priorities so that the

impact would be greater.
Spartanburg and Connecticut's priorities seemed to be direct services

to youth.

They conformed well to their youth needs assessment.

However in

both of these sites the actual numbers of status offenders appeared not
to warrant this priority.

In both sites collaboration members cited

community attitudes as one of the three top priorities, which wouldindicate that capacity building and advocacy should have had high
priority.
Oakland's needs assessment study was judged least complete of all
sites.

Even so, the direct service plans failed to deal with priorities

found in the needs assessment.

The national had no needs assessment so

its program plans cannot be evaluated on this measure.

All of the local program plans included capacity building, advocacy
and direct services in their program plans.

largest proportion of the program budgets.

Direct service used the

However, since much of the

capacity building and advocacy was directed by the coordinator, part of
the administrative costs were program-related.

The national collaboration did not have a program plan and allocated
14
few resources for program.
The program proposal had suggested three
national conferences of agency executives.

In addition, the participation

of agency staff in local site visits was a capacity building activity.
Some national staff work with individual agencies also could be considered
capacity building.
program plan.

Neither of the latter two activities was part of a

The national advocacy plan was developed in the middle

of the second year.
In addition to capacity building, advocacy and direct service programs,
most of the collaborations developed at least one program for facilitating
the collaborative process.

These programs ranged in extent from an

assertiveness session at one site to a two day retreat of the national

collaboration.

In future collaboration programs some programs of this

sort should be included as essential.
14

The continuation proposal contains capacity building and advocacy

elements.
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There was little chance to evaluate the program intervention rationale.
The phased action plans were not specific.
descriptions were included.

In many cases only brief

Tucson's direct service programs, which we

examined, included several very good interventions and several that were
not as good.

Some programs from other sites included more detailed

descriptions in their progress reports, written after the program.
some cases the intervention rationaleswereclear and very good.

In

However,

it is not clear whether this was a pre-planned intervention.
In summary, the plans required a great deal of effort from many
dedicated people.

Because of the extreme pressure from national staff

and LEAA to get them in, they were less collaboratively produced and less
consistent than they might have been.

This was a primary factor in the

program implementation.

Program Implementation.

In spite of the short time available,

programs were implemented at all sites.

More than one thousand status

offenders and other children at risk were served, some in long range
training programs and some in short term, one session programs.

Appendix A, summarizes these data.

Table 7,

Details on each site can be found in

Tables 1 through 5 in Auxiliary Appendix A.
More than 2,900 community leaders and youth program staff from both
public and non-profit agencies attended training sessions offered by the
six collaborations.

More than 2,600 persons have received long term advocacy·, informational
communication or an in depth planning instrument,from three sites.

This

wasinaddition to the extensive T.V. impact in Tucson, the bumper stickers
in several sites, radio and T.V. interviews and on-going public relations
in newspapers.

We used two criteria from the program proposal to evaluate the
implementation:

1.

The programs should be collaborative. The program planners
believed collaborative implementation would increase the contact
with and knowledge about people from other youth serving
agencies. This would then encourage them to implement other
human services collaboratively.

2.

The implementation should increase capacity of National Assembly
affiliates. The program planners hoped to give National Assembly
affiliates experience in serving a different client group in
order to enable them to further serve the group. They hoped that
affiliates would offer the programs through their own agencies.
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In addition, implemented programs should serve enough people to be
cost-efficient, be implemented according to the time planned and should
take advantage of existing community resources.

Table 7 in Appendix A

shows the data.
The degree of collaboration in implementation varied from zero in
Spokane to 36% of the programs in Tucson.

The other three were 32% in

Connecticut, 30% in Spartanburg and 19% in Oakland.

Had we included

the collaboration staff or committees in the count, the percentage would
have been higher.
The percent of programs implemented by local affiliates varied from
none in Spokane to 21% and 32% in Spartanburg and Tucson.

The other two

collaborations implemented 15% of their programs through the affiliates.
We measured cost-efficiency by dividing program cost by days of
program contact per person to determine cost per person per day.
time units were reduced to the percentage of a day.

All

Costs for direct

services varied from $2.87 in Spartanburg to $41.54 per site in Tucson.

16

Generally, the lower the cost, the less therapeutic the intervention.
The costs were much lower than most interventions reported by the public

DSO Grantee.

Weassumedthat some of the staff and equipment costs were

absorbed by the implementing body.

If the implementer was an affiliate

of the National Assembly, thiswasanother measure of their participation
in the collaboration.
Capacity building costs varied less, from an average of $3.93 in
Spokane to $15.82 in Oakland.
Advocacy costs per contact were too varied in both content and audience

for us to generalize.
of time and resources.

There was a great amount of public media donation
The advocacy programs were also supported strongly

by the National Council of Jewish Women and the Junior Leagues both
locally and nationally and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency
nationally.
The delay in implementation rates varied from only 15% of Spartanburg programs
implemented within two months of projected schedules to 52% in Spokane
and Connecticut and Tucson implemented 42% of programs on schedule and
Oakland implemented 33% of programs on schedule.
16

Closely related are

Cost efficiency rates and the method used to determine them are
presented in Table 7, Appendix A, and Tables 1 through 5, Auxiliary
Appendix A.
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cancellation rates, or percent of planned programs cancelled.
from none in Tucson to 30% in Spartanburg.

They varied

Table 7, Appendix A, shows

these data.
We measured use of existing resources in implementation as the percent

of programs implemented by community agencies including National Assembly
affiliates.

Connecticut implemented 63% of programs in community

agencies with Tucson a close second with 61%.

Oakland implemented

only 10% of programs outside of the collaboration.
In summary Tucson's programs were implemented closest to all our
criteria except cost.

1ihen the quality of the program was included, we

perceived that the cost was quite in line.

These criteria werenot affected

by the fact that Tucson began the programs earlier.

Connecticut's

measures of implementationwerehigh but will probably develop little
expertise or capacity of the affiliates to serve status offenders when
the grant project is completed.
Summary of Planning and Program Implementation.

We would suggest

that planning and implementing 116 different programs in seven different
communities in 14-18 months has been a remarkable feat.

The facts that

the planning was rushed and the programs less than perfect were not
surprising.

What has occurred is that numbers of people who have never

planned and implemented programs "from scratch" are now a little more
experienced.

There are also 1,029 youths who received service, 2,930

adult youth workers who received training and innumerable persons more

aware of the issue of status offenders.
the planning and implementation:

Two sets of factors affected

organizational factors and program

factors.

Three inter-related organizational factors affected the planning and
implementation:

the press of time, the incompatability of goals and

the absence of immediate on-site program assistance from the non-profit
perspective.

The local staff had two major directives.

One was the directive to

work with local organizations,mold them into a coherent body and plan
programs with them.

The amount of effort, time and skill involved in

building a new organization that can function effectively appears to
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have been minimized.

The other directive was to develop, plan and implement

new programs for status offenders.

Most human service organizations spend

many months developing and planning a few new programs.
were to plan many new programs in a few months.

The collaborations

These two directives

were incompatible in the timeallottedfor the program.
or both of the directives required the staff to a)

Success in either

work with committees

from the different youth-serving sectors (especially the National Assembly
affiliates), develop an organization and set up an office; b)

develop

expertise in program planning, intervention logics, program evaluation;

and c)

become acquainted with the body of knowledge about status offenders

and the effectiveness of past programs.

These three different activities

were to culminate in a plan of action within four months of the staff's
hiring.

When the push came, both LEAA and the national collaboration

opted for programs over collaboration and quantit7 over quality programs because
the alternative was no programs-at all to show for the two-year grant.
Program Factors.
seem warranted.

From the analysis of the programs, several conclusions

First, therewaslittle indication in organizational

records or interviews of how the collaboration priorities were set or

resources allocated.

The absence of clear priorities, set with the

explicit consent of members, resulted in some programatic confusion.

Second, program outcomes were not clearly explicated by the program
proposal itself.

For instance, was the desired outcome increased direct

service by affiliates in the community or increased direct services in

the community?
Third, the structure for implementing especially the direct service
programs was important to the nature of the outcome.

structural arrangements for implementing programs:

There were three

the collaboration

as a direct service agency; the collaboration as a general granting

agency, and the collaboration as a coordinator of funding which meets
project priorities.

The more involved the affiliates were with the

implementation, the more their capacity was increased.

The Oakland

collaboration was an example of the collaboration as a direct service

agency under the first coordinator.
category.

Spokane also appeared to fit this

The Connecticut collaboration illustrated the collaboration

as a granting agency with central staff monitoring and evaluating the
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programs.

Tucson and Spartanburg collaborations illustrated the collabora-

tion as a coordinator of funding.
Affecting the Capacity of Member Organizations
a major goal of the program was to develop the capacity of community
based non-profit agencies to serve status offenders.

Many of these

organizations have traditionally been involved primarily with "good
kids." The very idea of a sexually promiscuous girl in the Girl Scouts
or Camp Fire Girls seems ludicrous to many.
At this point, we could have used only the program participation
of affiliates from the previous section as our measure of organizational

capacity building.

The rationale would have been sound.

It is logical

that if an organization collaborates to develop and implement a work-study
program for youth referred by the courts, that organization will be
better able to serve the same kind of youth in the future.
However, we wanted a separate measure of capacity, one that could
be used in other communities to test their capacity to serve status offenders

and children at risk.

We wanted independent indicators of organizational

capacity so that before and after measures could be made and any change
over a period of time could be recognized.

If base measures were taken,

we could monitor change over any period of time.

It also meant we could

compare organizational capacity of cities that had the LEAA collaboration
grant with that of cities with no grant.
First we had to define organizational capacity in a way that definition
could be operationalized.

The rationale and definitions are described

in Auxiliary Appendix B.

Briefly, the organizational capacity to serve

any client group consists of the following elements:
1.

The client group must be defined and recognized as a legitimate
group for the agency.

2.

The resources for meeting the needs must be allocated--board
time, staff time, training, space, program materials developed.

3.

The organization must be able to attract the clients--that is,
a.
b.

4.

be perceived by the client group or those making decisions
for the client group as able to provide service; and
be accessible to the client group geographically, in time,
psychologically and culturally.

It must be organized to deliver the service.
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This means that capacity to serve is not merely the delivery of
service to a client group.

Delivery of services to a new client group is

an end product that requires internal organizational change in a number
of ways.
We developed the following indicators as measures of capacity to
serve status offenders.

The procedures and measures can be seen in

Auxiliary Appendix C.
1.

Board attitudes toward the client group and the client needs.
developed an attitude scale with 23 i terns.

\~e

2.

The presence of a policy statement with specific reference to
status offenders, children at risk, problem youth.

3.

The allocation of board time for discussion of status offenders.

4.

Sensitizing the larger membership to the client group.

5.

The allocation of funds, staff time or other resources for
planning and implementation ·of programs/services for status
offenders and children at risk.

6.

Training of board/staff/members to understand or work with status
offenders and children at risk.

7.

Direct experiences in working with status offenders and children
at risk.

8.

Location of program units accessible to client population.

9.

Service to status offenders.

10.

Numbers of other children at risk served.

We measured the organizational capacity in Fall, 1976, and again
in Fall, 1977.

Since both the National and Tucson collaborations began

before the evaluation, their datawerenot comparable.

We did not measure

the Connecticut organization because the membership was so fluid and the
staff support available to the National Assembly affiliates there was
less consistent.

The data are presented in the following section:

first we will

describe changes in the internal organizational indicators--or the

capacity to serve from the first time of measurement to the second.
measures used correspond to items one through eight above.

The

Second, we

will describe changes in actual program/services delivered from the first
time of the measurement to the time of the second.
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These will be considered

under two headings:

external advocacy and direct services to status

offenders.
Changes in Internal Organizational Capacity to Serve Status Offenders
and Children at Risk.

The board attitudes were measured by administering

an attitude scale to boards of directors of local National Assembly
affiliates near the beginning of the program, except for Tucson which was
well under way in the Fall of 1976.
The attitude statement fell into three categories:

personal social

distance, attitudes about the punishment of status offenders, and general
attitudes on the rights of children.

Several general attitude items on

status offenders and the offenses were also included.
The attitude scales were administered at organizational board
meetings by the local researchers in Fall, 1976, and again in Fall, 1977.
While we tried to standardize the procedures there was some variation,

notably in Spokane, where some attitude scales were left for the executive
director to administer.

The 1977 Connecticut scales were less comparable

because of the self-selective nature of their agreement to be retested.
We analyzed the board as a unit even though there was turnover in
membership.

The rationale is that a board will tend to use education and

selective recruitment to gain attitudinal consensus (Table 7 Auxiliary
Appendix A).

We also analyzed individuals who had taken the scale at

both times.
Several findings from the attitude scalesweresuggestive of future
directions of board education.

First, in both Fall, 1976, and Fall, 1977,

the attitudes of boards of directors toward status offenders were
ambivalent.

On the one hand, more than 90% of all respondents said status

offenders need help, not punishment.

On the other hand nearly half the

respondents said that failure to punish status offenders encourages them
to be bad.

Table 8, Appendix A, shows this distribution by site.

Second, the most negative change in attitudes occurred in items

related to punishment as a lesson to teach status offenders and detention
of status offenders to protect society.

Table 9, Appendix A, shows either

little change or a negative change on the two detention items.
Third, board attitudes that changed most consistently from Fall,
1976, to Fall, 1977, were those related to personal social distance.
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Table 10 shows the distribution of those agreeing to personal relationships
with status offenders from time to time.
Even with this general analysis, it appeared that there was some
change of attitude toward status offenders during the year.

The difference

between sites with and without the collaboration would be revealing.

The

summary item for capacity building showed that three of the five sites
increased in their positive attitudes about non-profit agencies mixing
status offenders with other children.

These board members are the people

who make the decisions and hence these attitudes are significant.
Of the sites, Spartanburg began as the most negative and had the
highest percentage change in many items.

If we discount Connecticut

because of self selection, Spokane had most items with a positive change.
There was a positive change of 13 of the 20 items.
A policy decision by the local board indicated that status offenders
and other children at riskwereproper clients or members; or that the
organization should make an effort to serve such youth.
considered a necessary capacity building effort.

This was

This indicator was

collected from board minutes, program goals, annual meetings and other
running records of organizations.
indicate

The data in Table 12, Appendix A,

that four organizations in Spartanburg, three in Spokane, one

in Oakland and one in Tucson had such policies toward status offenders.
Of the 15 members of the national collaboration, eight reported policy
statements in 1974 and 12 had policy statements in 1976.

Some of the

organizational literature suggests that national organizations are better

able than locals to make unpopular policy statements because they are
further removed from the membership.

This indicates that many national

organizations had already begun building their capacity to serve status
offenders before the collaboration grant, and that perhaps the grant
proposal was a result of the policy rather than vice-versa.
The allocation of board time was determined through an item analysis
of board minutes in the base year compared with the collaboration year
(Table 12, Appendix A).

In the local sites board minutes of member

organizations of the Spartanburg collaboration showed the most increase.
All of the organizations showed

offenders.

increase in discussion about status

The average increase was 10% over the base year.
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Of the six national organizations which released board minutes for
this report, only one showed an increase in discussion of status offenders.

However the data indicated that all had had substantial board discussion
during the base year.

These six were among the seven most active members

in the national collaboration.
Efforts to sensitize the larger membership to the client group was
measured by the amount of information that related in any way to status
offenders and children at risk in regular communication to members and
special communication to members.

We did a content analysis of these

data where they were available.
We found only a small number of local organizations had begun to
involve their members in the work with status offenders.

Many of their

local publications and communications were directly related only to program
"how-to's."

Some had no regular local communications to members.

Oakland

and Spartanburg had the most change in the number of message inches in
their communication related to status offenders or status offenses.

Spartanburg impact is greater since 50% of the organizations showed such
a change.
All of the national organizations for whom we had these data showed
an increase in communication to members in regular publications.

The

average increase was seven percent over the base year.

Many of the national organizations with Washington offices also
sent out regular or periodic communication to members.

Of the 12 for

whom we have this data 10 had an increase in messages about status offenders
and children at risk.

These messages tended to be informational about

the politics surrounding allocation of Federal money and the delivery of
programs/services to status offenders and children at risk.

The section

on advocacy will discuss this in more detail.
There was no new formal allocation of organizational resources for

programs and services to status offenders reported by local organizations.
This is not surprising since more than half of the organizations for which
we have data had a decline in membership from the base year to Fall, 1977.
Approximately one-third reported a decline in real income.

During a time

of financial reverse, organizations seldom increase allocation of funds
for other than institutional maintenance.
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Data from national organizations indicated considerable use of resources

to develop programs, program material and other technical assistance for
use in programs with status offenders and children at risk.
these materials can be seen in Appendix A, Table 15.

Lists of

Some of the best

materials we have seen are those from the YMCA, the Boys Clubs of America,
the Girls Clubs, the National Council of Jewish Women and the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency.

While some of this material was developed

before the grant, the continuation is certainly a result of the continuing
support of the collaboration.
Some of the most active national organizations reported a decline in
resources allocated for direct service to status offenders.

Five of those

for whom we had data reported a decrease in staff to work with youth
especially problem youth.
were expiring.

Grant monies for four of the five programs

Only one had any plans for the incorporation of the new

emphasis into the regular budget.
Some resources were allocated informally for work with status offenders.
As Table 12, Appendix A, indicates 38 percent of all local affiliates were
involved in implementing collaboration programs.

Much of the implementation

cost of buildings and staff were in-kind donations from the implementing

organization.

The average cost of implementing these programs was far

less than the cost of putting on the programs.

Table 7 in Appendix A

shows the implementation figures.
Another informal indicator of, allocation of resources was the enormous

allocation of staff time in the collaborations discussed in a previous
section.

The training of board members, staff, and members to work with status
offenders was measured in three ways: a)
members in collaboration programs, b2
staff spoke and c)

participation of staff/board/

meetings to which the collaboration

other training provided by the organization.

Table 12, Appendix A,shows the days of staff/board/member training
by the collaborations.

Tucson started its program too early for us to

collect this data, however, they reported considerable attendance at such
training.

Spokane trained the largest number of local affiliates to deal

with status offenders.

Both Oakland and Connecticut changed staff during

the study period, so the data were incomplete and not comparable.
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Data to measure change in location of program units were not

easily accessible.

We wanted to determine any change in the number

of program units in high impact areas locally.
do not appear to keep records in this way.

Local organizations

This indicates that

planning for the location of new units is not done on the basis of
where the need might be.

Since the data are sketchy, the conclusions

appear to be that density of status offenders and children at risk
is not an important consideration in placing program units.

Nationally, new units to serve status offenders and other children at risk had begun around the country in other than collaboration
sites.

Some groups, such as the Camp Fire Girls and the Girl Scouts

reported efforts to locate new program units in the inner city, in
childrens' institutions, and in ethnic neighborhoods.

However, the

record keeping procedures on numbers and locations do not indicate

the degree of any change which may have occurred.
Changes in Indirect Services--Advocacy.

We have considered

advocacy a service because the program output of several of the most
active participants in the collaboration is advocacy rather than direct

service.

This is true of the Junior Leagues and the National Council

of Jewish Women as well as the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
We measured advocacy activity two ways:

the amount of regular

communication to members on external societal change toward a more
positive stance on status offenders and children at risk, and any
new advocacies program specifically related to external societal change.

Table 15, Appendix A summarizes the data.
The collaboration staff spoke at board and other meetings of many
local affiliates which we consider staff/board training.

Three staff

members at Spartanburg, Spokane and Tucson reported speaking to a total
of 16 such meetings.

The other two staff persons were new when we

gathered these data.

National staff reported little of this formal

activity, but did report meeting individually with some executives and
other staff persons of member organizations to increase their participation
in the collaboration and to discuss change in their own organizations.

The local organizations reported little other training related to
juvenile justice activities.

National organizations reported quite a bit
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of this activity,

The Boy Scouts, Boys' Clubs, YMCA and 4-H were performing

joint staff training with a juvenile justice emphasis.

Campfire Girls

reported a national training program with one session related to juvenile
justice programs.

The Girls' Clubs had four regional juvenile justice

workshops to train staff.
in Washington.

The Salvation Army ran a corrections conference

The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has run

seminars and workshops around the country.

Several excellent ongoing

training programs such as the one by the YMCA were being dispersed into
regional offices because funding had expired.

Unfortunately, none of the

national organizations had hard data on numbers and geographical distribution of staff training in these programs except the Junior Leagues, who
reported that 205 local Junior Leagues attended five day training seminars
funded by LEAA in 1973.
Direct experience with status offenders was gained by participating
in implementing collaboration programs.

The experience varied in both

depth and variety.

In Oakland the experience was limited to two direct

service programs.

In Spartanburg while 67% of affiliates were involved

in implementation, they were involved in only two programs and only one
in Spokane.
Tucson collaboration affiliates gained the-most experiences in a
variety of ways: writing, grants accounting, program planning, implementa-

tion and evaluation.

Six direct service programs were let by contract to

affiliates in that site.
The regular communication to members of local o-rganizations show

practically no advocacy-related messages in either Fall, 1976, or Fall,
1977.

In Spartanburg, where the Junior League has a girls' home, there

were messages both years primarily related to that facility.

The

Junior Leagues in both Tucson and Spokane also had messages both years
somewhat related to social change.
The national organizations showed advocacy eommunicationS in both the
base and current years.

There was an increase in 10 national organizations

and a decrease in two organizations.

The latter included one of the

most active and involved organizations.

No new advocacy activity was reported at collaboration sites by local
affiliates from Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977.
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Nationally, the Junior Leagues

and the National Council of Jewish Women reported an increase in advocacy
activity at other local sites around the country.

There was little

evidence of formal advocacy activity among national direct service
organizations.

Much non-formal advocacy activity was reported by national organizations.

Some of them, such as the YMCA, were active in getting youth-

related legislation passed.

The YWCAwasactively seeking to get its locals

involved in legislative concerns for systems change.
Several of the national advocacy organizations developed special
programs in the recent past.

The Junior Leagues produced a film, which

was shown on national television and is available for local information

and education.

The National Council of Jewish Women published a book

reporting a national survey on the juvenile justice system and its
detrimental impact on youth.

The National Council of Crime and Delinquency

sponsored an advertising campaign about status offenders.

It also

published a newsletter relating directly to legislation, research and
other activity in the juvenile justice field.
While much of this activity preceded the Juvenile Justice Program
Collaboration grant, the national organizations have continued to deepen
their awareness and educate their locals.

Our perception is that

gradually they are taking status offenders as a legitimate, on-going
concern.

Change

in Direct Service Programs for Status Offenders and Other

Children at Risk.

In the introduction to the section on organizational

change, we suggested that in order to serve a client group, the organization must be both accessible to that particular group and organized to
serve it.

Since most of the collaborations have only been in operation

for 14-18 months, we cannot reasonably expect direct services to have
changed very much.

Organizations must plan and budget far in advance of

a few months for this change to occur.

The evaluation should continue

to gather measurements on this variable for several years to determine

long term change in client/member services.

Other important factors are

the number of adjudicated status offenders in the site and the nature of
other services.
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We measured change in direct services in three ways.

Table 13,

Appendix A, shows the data from these measures by site:
1.

The number of status offenders and children at risk served by
affiliates while implementing collaboration direct service
programs.

2.

The change in number of status offenders and children at risk
served in own programs.

3.

Any new program reported as started or planned with status
offenders and children at risk and/or new monies received for
service to these clients.

The numbers of status offenders and children at risk served in
collaboration programs by local affiliates cannot be consistently reported
here.

Organizations in Tucson, whose program started several months early,

served a total of 127 status offenders and children at risk in eight
different affiliates.

Seven Spartanburg affiliates served 73 youth and

six Oakland affiliates served 113 youth.

In other sites, the affiliates

were not involved in implementing direct service programs at the close
of data collection.
The implementation of the direct service programs by the affiliates
required a great deal of input of the organization's own resources.

executive reporteda match of thousands of dollars.

One

It is certainly true

that expenditures for buildings, recreational equipment, and executive,

financial, secretarial and other staff time were not reimbursed.

The

average cost per day of the service to each youth excluding salary to the
youth was lower than cost per day services reported by DSO Grantees in
several sites.
Many organizations reported a change in services to status offenders

in their own programs over the year.

This may represent only a change in

definition in the minds of respondents.
represents an increase in sensitizing

However, at the very least, it
program people.

Many of the national organizations mentioned new programs around

the country specifically related to status offenders.
on the services

did not reflect the change.

The actual data

Table 15, Appendix A,

shows some of the reported new program units to serve status offenders

and children at risk reported in the national interviews and program data.
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Locally, new monies have been generated to serve status offenders.
Tucsonreported$96,000 from CETA and other new sources to support some
of the collaboration programs.

Spartanburg raported $4,650 in new money.

Nationally, several organizations received money from an LEAA
prevention grant to continue the efforts by non-profit agencies toward
developing alternatives to correctional institutions for young people
convicted of status offenses and other children at risk.

National

organization data indicated other national programs under way.

Some of

the national organizations are making services for status offenders or
children at risk a national priority.

The National Council of Homemaker

Health Aide Service has a new priority of family stability.
justice programs have become a high

Juvenile

priority for the Girls' Clubs.

The Boys' Clubs are giving emphasis to alcohol programs.
Summary of Affecting Member Organizatio.ns.

Organizational change,

especially in local areas, is a slow process and cannot be expected to
show immediate results.
the future.

Our data indicated a very positive prognosis for

Locally, the affiliates were becoming aware of status offenders

and the need to serve them in the community.

They were involved in the

collaboration; theywerebecoming more sensitized and trained in dealing
with status offenders; and theywere justbeginning to sensitize their
board and members.

Those who have had unrecognized children at risk in

their programs were more aware and better able to work with them.

For some

this awareness will be translated into more and better direct services

for children at risk.

Only another measure at a future time will deter-

mine the long-term impact on the organizations.

The national organizations have been involved with the collaboration
for a longer period.

Some of them have been involved with status offenders

since the early 1970's.

The quality of the programs and program material

indicate this continuing commitment.

Some of the national organizations

have become more involved with children at risk as a direct result of the
collaboration.

Some of them have refined their programs or added new

emphasis as a direct result of their participation in the collaboration.
In examining the usual trends of national organizational priorities, it was
quite apparent that some of the nationals have committed more resources

and for a longer period of time than usual.
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The growing involvement, continuing participation and deepening
commitment was difficult to document consistently because of the limited
time and funds allotted for this evaluation, the inconsistent record
keeping of the organizations, and the organizational nature of the nationals.
However, the indicators that we had

point to substantial growth in

capacity of many national organizations to serve children at risk.
Summary and Conclusion:

Did the Collaboration Achieve the Program Goals?

In summary, the collaboration did a commendable
time.

job in a short

In fewer than two years one national and five local organizations

were founded, staffed and operationalized.

More than 60 local affiliates

committed themselves to deinstitutionalize status offenders and to other
children at risk; for most organizations, these were new client groups.

Many of the local agencies had never heard of a status offender
nor had some of them more than a nodding acquaintance with each other.
Few had ever collaborated in program delivery.

In both rounds of inter-

views, a large proportion of representatives stated that the major
effectiveness of the collaboration was getting them together.

Many of

the organizations found themselves working with public youth serving
organizations for the first time.

The local collaborations, in a short time, demonstrated the kinds
of programs that non-profit organizations can deliver for problem youth.
Many different services to youth were planned and implemented at a
relatively low cost.

Some were excellent, some not so good; most of

them add to our knowledge of the types of programs that are most effective
for non-profit organizations to offer for status offenders and other
problem youth.
The organizations in the collaborations committed themselves to the
issues of deinstitutionalization of status offenders in a variety of
ways.

Most spent enormous amounts of time in the collaboration; many

got their staff persons and board members involved in training for work
with status offenders and other children at risk; some began the education process of their boards and members; some served status offenders

and other children at risk in their regular programs; some collaborated
with other agencies to try new programs.

It is too soon to comment on

the permanence of any new approaches but the prognosis for the future
is bright.
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CHAPTER 3
EVALUATION OF THE COLLABORATION PROCESS
It is difficult to develop a new service delivery modality in an
already established community.

It is even more difficult if the new

service proposes to develop support from existing organizations with

which it will be in competition.
is that some background

The basic hypothesis of this chapter

demographic, and historical factors affected

the nature of inter-organizational relationships both directly and
indirectly.

Background factors indirectly affected the collaboration

structure and that change affected the collaboration process.

Background

factors directly affected participation in the collaboration and the
process which evolved.
Figure 6 diagrams the relationship between these three oets of

factors and the outcomes of the collaboration.
The evaluation of the collaboration process is presented in eight
sections.

In the first section we will define the factors in Figure 6

FIGURE 6
FACTORS INFLUENCING COLLABORATION PROCESS

background
factors

I--

I--

collaboration
structure

interorganizational
process

I--
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process

outcomes

and describe how they were measured.

Section 2 summarizes the key

factors and draws some conclusions about collaboration.

Sections 3

through 8 illustrate the model in the six collaborations using data
from each.

Definitions and Evaluation Procedures
Background Factors
Three sets of background factors were important to the evaluation:
key demographic variables, the nature of the social structure and the
history of the collaboration itself.
Demographic Factors,

Seven general demographic characteristics of

each collaboration site were important to this evaluation:

the size of

the city, the source of income, the economic health, the percentage of

youth, the racial mix, the urban-suburban mix and the geographical
location.

In addition, data on the number and type of offenses of the

status offenders of the area were essential for background.

Most of

the demographic data were gathered from the 1970 census, the mid-decade
estimates and area respondents.

Social Structure.

The nature of the social structure relevant to

understanding the collaborations included the nature of roles and status
in the community, how traditional these roles were, who held power and

influence and how change occurred in the recent past.

These factors

suggested where the local National Assembly affiliates fit in the social
structure, how they perceived their relationships with their national
organizations, their economic situation and their history of interaction.

These data were gathered in interviews with participants and from insights
of the local field researchers.
Collaboration History.

The history of the collaboration process

included identification of which party arranged the first meeting, which
organizations attended, how the chairperson was selected, previous

inter-organizational relations and key events in the early history of
their collaboration.

These data were gathered from interviews with the

chairperson and from collaboration records.
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Structural Factors
Decisions regarding membership,

priority, roles of chairpersons and

staff, staff-member relationships, and relationships to the national
collaboration staff were considered keys to understanding the social
structure of each local collaboration.
Membership.

Data on decisions regarding who could join and the

status of organizational representatives were collected from records of

the collaborations.
Priority and Role of Chairperson.

Roles and priority of chairpersons

were determined in interviews at each site early in the study period,
Fall, 1976, from the structured observations of collaboration meetings
and from interviews with coordinators.
were of two general types:

Chairpersons' role perceptions

as managing and decision making or as presiding

over a forum for input of ideas and joint decisions.

Priority and Role of Staff.

The priority and roles of coordinators

were determined in interviews with staff people throughout the study
period, daily logs kept by local staff and structured observation.
Staf_f-Memp".E__Boe_l"ction_s_hips.

The staff-member relationships were

determined from the two member interviews, the four staff interviews

and from the relationships apparent in the observations.
National-Local Relationships.

The relationships of the local staff

and members to the national staff and members were determined by the
staff interviews and by analysis of communications between the national
and local collaborations.

The assessment included perception of super-

visory roles and relationships and perception of program control.
Process Factors
Three major process factors were observed:

inter-personal communi-

cations processes, the decision making processes and the presence and
interaction of power persons or groups.

The data for this analysis were

obtained from the structured observation of process, interviews with

members and analysis of the minutes of collaboration meetings.
Communication Process.

Analysis of the communication process was

based on insight from experimental research on communication materials. 17

17

Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-oriented Groups," Group

Dynamics Research and Theory, (White Plains:
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Row, Peterson, 1953), pp. 493-506.

The primary interests were the flow of communication during the meetings,,
from members to chair and staff and the nature of the communication's

content.

The process observation produced these data.

Decision Making Process.

The decision making process was analyzed

from the perspective of who made the inputs, whether decisions were
made collaboratively, the relative weight of public and non-profit
agency representatives and the staff roles in decision making.
were from the process observations

The data

and the interviews and analyses of

meeting minutes.

Power Sub-Groups.

The activity of influential persons or subgroups

was analyzed from the perspective of their role in setting priorities,
in program decisions, in conflicts or crises and in implementing programs.
Data were gathered from collaboration records, the interviews and process
observation.

Process Outcomes
Several outcomes could be recognized from the process.

In the second

interview (Fall, 1977) we asked collaboration members what they considered
the most successful activity of the collaboration, how effective they
thought the collaboration was, and whether they would involve their
organization again, knowing what they knew then.
used as measures of process outcome.

Responses to these were

The ultimate outcome will be the

nature of future inter-organizational collaboration and of future work

toward collaboration goals.

Summary and Conclusj_on

Most of the seven local and the regional and national collaborations
demonstrated real progress toward building an organizational structure

for inter-agency cooperation and developing the trust necessary for an
inter-agency collaborative work style at the end of their 14 to 24-month
initiation period.

All collaborations were successful in some areas,

and all encountered problems in other areas.
The process of collaboration development was not a high priority of
the national collaboration project directors.

Practically no national staff

time was spent to develop the national collaborative process or in programs
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or staff training that would facilitate the local process development.
Furthermore, the emphasis from national staff persons and LEAA on program
goals and time lines was often at the expense of process.

The national

staff had little choice in this because of the nature of the project
monitoring, the six months lost, and because of special conditions of

LEAA's insistence on one site becoming operational before funding the
other sites and LEAA's emphasis on getting direct services into the
community immediately.
Nevertheless, should the non-profit service sector choose to develop
inter-organizational mechanisms for delivery of services in the future,

several factors that appear to have affected the direction of the interorganizational collaborations and their relative success as organizations

should be considered.

Some of the factors summarized here will be discussed

in more detail in Chapter 4.
1.

When geographical boundaries are well defined and recognizable
and fairly contiguous with organizational boundaries, potential
membership is more consistently identified. The problems in
Oakland and Connecticut illustrate this statement.

2.

When recent history has been one of satisfying inter-agency
cooperation, a collaboration can begin its goal activity sooner.
Tucson, and Connecticut State are illustrations of this state-

ment. Spartanburg and Oakland illustrate the need to build
trust before moving toward goal activity.
3.

When organizations belong to an already viable inter-organizational
body with similar goals and similar memberships, competition and
divided loyalties may be detrimental to the collaboration. This
issue must be openly addressed rather than avoided as in Spokane
and Tucson where conflict eventually emerged. It may be that a
compromise of tasks to avoid overlap or an allocation of control

over funds and staff to an already established collaborative
organization might accomplish program goals more effectively.
4.

When an organization in a collaboration has considerably more
power or resources than other organizations, the least powerful

tend to go along with the powerful or to let the powerful
organization do the work.

This was true in Spokane and, to some

extent, Danbury, Torrington and Spartanburg.
5.

When working with the non-profit sector if staff persons do not
understand and respect how voluntary organizations work and how
to staff committees, they cannot enable the organization to
reach their full potential. Few of the staff persons of the
collaboration project showed a real respect for the nature of
the voluntary sector and the importance of enabling organizations
who are donating time and resources to make their own decisions

about programs.
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6.

When hiring staff persons as coordinators of inter-agency
collaborations, committees should clearly define their own roles
and the expectations of the staff. There are three general
roles: that of facilitator or enabler, that of professional
expert in the program, and that of executive director with
organizational management priorities. The Spokane Coordinator
tended to be an enabler; Tucson and Spartanburg coordinators
and the National Associate Director functioned as professional
experts who sometimes slid into an expert-advocate role. The
first Connecticut and first Oakland coordinators and the
National Director were primarily executive directors with
management priorities. This is a crucial decision and will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

7.

When communication at meetings is too strongly controlled and
too centralized, tasks are facilitated, but people are less
likely to risk their own ideas.

8.

When selecting the leaders of a collaboration, it is crucial
that they have characteristics which will foster trust. Most
functional collaborations appear to have: a) continuous
leadership, b) leaders who work actively outside of meetings,
c) leaders who preside over meetings rather than controlling
the content, d)

leaders who are organizational representatives

rather than individuals and e) leaders who are volunteers rather
than staff. Lay leaders are better able to commit themselves
to the collaboration without having conflicts with their own jobs.
9.

When hiring staff of inter-organizational collaborations, the
issue of professional support must be addressed. A local
collaboration staff person is in an isolated structural situation.

Neither the national staff nor the local collaboration have a
vested interest in this position. The staff person is expendable.
Relationships are based on role rather than on personal interaction.

Neither local or national organizational support can

tolerate failure of the role to be fulfilled.
10.

When organizing interorganizational collaboration, the issue of

control and supervision of staff activities must be addressed.
This is particularly true when the funds are provided by sources
other than the collaborating organizations. This is a key
structural issue and will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 4.
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The National Collaboration

18

The national collaboration was composed of members of the 15 participating national voluntary agencies.

The working body was the national task

force composed of representatives of the organizations.

A legislative

consultant who had been involved in writing the proposal was also a
member.

The task force met monthly with project staff to oversee the

management and the implementation of the project goals and to facilitate
the achievement of the goals which related to the national level.
Before getting into the actual process actions and decisions of the group
it will be useful to fill in some of the background and direction.
The task force was originally constituted in late 1974 by the
executives of the National Assembly to develop collaborative program
models and directions in the area of youth service.

As part of this

activity the interagency project for status offenders was developed and
then funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

The task

force, with some change of membership but a basic continuity of leadership,
then began to focus its attention on the implementation of this project.
Organizational Structure
As in the original form, the membership of this group was made up of
a representative from each participating national voluntary agency.
The typical representative was a staff member from the national staff of
the agency and even in cases where the representative was a volunteer,

he was still from the national level.

In some cases members were

previously known to each other from participation at national meetings
or workshops as well as previous service on the original task force.

The

participation at the national level thus brought together people very
knowledgeable about their own agencies, generally well informed of
activities of other agencies

throughout the country and clearly a part of

the upper management of the voluntary social service sector.
In view of the scope of national organizations and the work responsibilities of many task force members there was rarely day to day contact
18

Because the national task force was in operation before the evaluation began, the data gathered were in a different form from those from the
other collaborations. Therefore, this section is not paralled to the other
sections of this chapter.
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between task force members and committee work was often compressed.

The

travel schedules of some members made it at least as likely that they
would meet en route than in New York where most were based.

This

movement and travel was occasionally functional when it corresponded to
the need for some activity in a local site but it generally made long
term and continuous planning and interaction difficult.

The dynamics

involved in this situation were obviously very different from those which
took place in the local collaborations where there seems to have been
more day to day interaction within a more narrowly defined setting.
While task force members came from similar social structures, some
significant

differences must also be noted.

The collaborating national

agencies varied in size, importance, service interest and delivery.

Some

agencies were hierarchical in structure; others were semi-autonomous

confederations.

Task force members thus represented organizations and

held positions which varied greatly in importance, scope, power and
responsibility.

These differences notwithstanding the group was

essentially homogeneous with universally accepted styles of discussion,
presentation, committee procedure and language.
From this background several patterns of work and behavior were
established early in the project and carried on consistently throughout
the life of the grant.

These patterns were organizational participation,

chair function, staff function and role conflict.
Organizational Participation.

There was a consistent record of

attendance on the part of many representatives as well as an active
participation in discussion of the issues of the meetings.

The familiarity

with the various issues of the grant and the consistent interest and concern in their outcomes reflect the continuing involvement of the task
force members.

This was also exemplified in the willingness of members

to make presentations at various sites.

Chair Function,

The chair person of the task force was a major

influence in setting the style of presentation and both the content
and flow of discussion.

He was a major source of authority and stability

both in and for the task force, having served the same function for the
original group which developed the project.

Meetings were run by the

chair in a very enabling and involving style which consistently sought
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out opinions and generally attempted to diffuse conflict by allowing all
sides full expression.

The chair worked very closely with the staff in

attempting to develop the consensus necessary for task achievement.

With

his style and representing as he did a very major national agency, the
chairman was a major source of authority, stability and continuity for
the group.
Staff Function.

The staff of the project was professional in its

ability to present issues and deal with complicated management tasks.
It was always prepared for meetings and generally well informed regarding
the various issues of the grant.

Staff was usually in the position of

explaining and presenting information regarding the various sites and
issues and seeking task force approval for directions and actions.
Because of the nature of the project, multiple sites with many agencies,
the presentations were often complicated and decisions were often needed
on pressing matters.

There was a constant tension between full disclosure/

discussion and the need to get decisions made and tasks accomplished.
Role Conflict.

The pattern of the staff reporting complicated

information and the task force feeling itself in a very reactive position

was an issue of continuing concern throughout the life of the grant.

The

project director was at times the point of this tension holding the twin
responsibilities of task accomplishment and the involvement of the group
in the collaborative process.

The task force had not been fully reconsti-

tuted, in the movement from planning the grant to overseeing the implementation; with a clear delineation of staff and board roles, this fact increased
the tension.

In addition, some task force members felt that the director's

style was excessively centralized and controlling.
Tasks of the Collaboration
The national collaboration started long before the evaluation.
Therefore, we did not monitor first hand the ongoing task development
until late in the first year.
affect the total project:

Several collaboration tasks continued to

the site development, the relationship with

LEAA, the development of priorities, the national phased action plan, the
match, crisis management and the issue of continuation.

Site Development.

The initial activity of the task force and of the

project itself was concerned with the establishment of collaborative
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structures in the five sites.

This attention to sites was necessary but

was the beginning of a continuing pattern of being overwhelmed by the
responsibility of implementing the sites and managing them to the exclusion
of the development of national capacity building and advocacy.

It is of

particular importance to note that the conditions demanded by LEAA called
for the establishment of a collaboration in one local site (Tucson)
before funds could be released for work in the other cities.

This

decision,which came from the administrator of LEAA and which was accepted
by the original task force when it was involved in grant negotiations,had
a major impact upon both the task force and the staff and most certainly
upon their working relationship in the critical first six months of the
project.
Relationship with LEAA.

The special condition of LEAA was in some

ways a point of unity for both staff and task force in that it put them
together in the role of attempting to deal with the funding source, answer
various objections and continue making progress.

The initial relations

with the LEAA project monitor were extremely difficult and this also
tended to help foster a unity within the task force and between task force
members and staff as they formed a common front.

This pattern was

repeated several times during the process of the grant.

As issues of

conflict with the government emerged, the task force and staff would
join ranks and work diligently to attain the most positive outcome and
protect the project.

This was an area of real group strength, demonstrating

an awareness of the government funding process and also a very strong
commitment to the integrity of the proposal and the value of the work
being undertaken.

It is significant that over the course of two years

all major obstacles were removed and very harmonious and enabling relations
were established between the project and LEAA.

It also indicated a basic

pattern within the task force, namely that whatever differences existed
within the group or with the staff, the overriding interest in continuing
and supporting the project always evidenced itself at times of crisis.
Development of Priorities.

Another effect of the special condition

calling for the collaboration establishment in Tucson before releasing
funds for other sites was much less positive and served to reinforce a
tendency manifested very early in the group's operations.
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This was the

conflict between the tasks of the grant and the process of collaboration.
The special condition established by LEAA called for some specific tasks
to be accomplished quickly and the group and staff began to focus very
directly on this implementation task for Tucson somewhat to the exclusion
of national collaboration issues and their own efforts at collaboration.
The staff, in addition to the massive logistics of initiating five complicated local collaborations from a New York office, had the burden of getting
one site fully operational before money would be available for the four
others.

This context does much to explain the previously mentioned

tension between the national collaboration staff and some members of the
task force concerning the role of each group.

There was an agreement in

principle that the staff person was responsible for day to day functions
and that the task force should concern itself with major directions and
issues, but there was a consistsnt lack of agreement of the part of some
about the line between the two.

The staff person was most conscientious

of the need for task accomplishment, and while the task force members
were aware of this need, they also wanted to be involved in the process.
This gap was never really closed, although it never reached the point of
causing major fracture.

The group always responded to major issues but

there was a constant tension.

At the planning retreat held more than a

year after the grant, issues were still being raised about "process"

involvement and the respective roles of the task force and the staff.
Only after some of this discussion was a job description for the national
collaboration director developed.
National Phased Action Plan.

(See Auxiliary Appendix E.)
The initial concern about the logistics

of implementing the collaborations in the local sites, dealing with LEAA
and establishing working relationships with staff regarding project
activity set the pattern for the national collaboration's function and
concerns over the following year.

As a result, almost no attention was

paid to the national phased action plan.

When the plan was considered in

1977, the discussion was very general, with the time considerably, and
typically, shortened by pressing local site business.
previously, there were many reasons for this.

As mentioned

In addition the very

structure of the task force must also be examined.

Though all task force

members represented national agencies, these agencies were of very different
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size and style and the degree of influence of members within these
agencies varied widely.

The ability of individual task force members

to influence their own agencies was not a constant and therefore it
was difficult to deliver a national plan which could be specifically
implemented.

From the point of view of the internal task force structure,

there were also limits to the development of a strong effective national
plan.

There was also the question of impetus and direction.

was accountable to the national

If the local

the local coordinators to the national

project director, and the national staff to the task force, then to whom
was the task force accountable?

Not only was there a question of the

capacity of the task force to deliver and implement an effective national
plan but there was also the question of staff's ability to push for it.
None of the leverage that existed in the local collaborations existed on
the national level.

The competing issues, varying degrees of influence

and limited leverage accounted for the minimal effort regarding a national
plan, which contrasts strongly with the major successes of the national
task force in many other areas.

The Match.

This grant was awarded under the provision of a ten

percent match which was to be used to draw down the awarded funds.

The

project was initially successful in raising money from foundations but

ran into difficulty in raising the full amount.

The first task force

approach to the problem was to increase its efforts with foundations,
enlisting executives to make presentations and at one point using a consultant.

When matters became critical, staff and task force members were

able to elicit pledges from the National Assembly organizations for the
amounts needed and used these pledges for a match from a foundation.

This

accomplishment is evidence of the major commitment of the national colla-

boration to the project and is a demonstration of the strength of the
collaborative effort.

It was another demonstration of the task force

and staff's abilities to deal successfully with crises and cooperate to
overcome major obstacles.

The fact that this particular issue revolved

around money and that staff and task force members were able to gain the
assistance of the Assembly staff and agencies in a time of budget cuts,
decreased membership and falling contributions cannot be overstressed:

it

was a critical accomplishment on the part of the project management.
Crisis Management.

The ability to respond to crises was also evident

in actions taken by the task force with regard to site difficulties
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throughout the life of the grant and in particular in the case of difficulties in Oakland.

The discussion regarding an attempted reconstruction

of the Oakland collaboration evidenced a real sensitivity to the negatives
of outside intervention as well as a willingness to offer whatever support
services might be effectively used in reconstructing the local site.
Several task force members attended a reorganization meeting in Oakland.
In this situation as in other crisis

incidents, the task force was able

to unite, discuss possible alternatives and take (or approve) determined
united action to meet the situation.
local sites except Tucson.

This activity occurred in all the

This unity was less apparent during more

ordinary discussions, a fact of which all members were aware but resisted

directly confronting.

(An attempt at "catharsis" during a two-day planning

session was limited to only very general statements.)
Continuation.

The national task force, on the basis of work by the

national collaboration staff, prepared a proposal for continuation of
the project.

The continuation would allow local coordinators to continue

in these positions, though it would provide only a small amount of
service money.

The national office would also be continued.

The

development of the proposal and its presentation to LEAA was another
significant accomplishment on the part of the national task force and
staff and would clearly have a major impact on the future of the collaborations.

The task force itself was the proposal as an opportunity to

reconstitute itself in a different form with project management and oversight, being just one committee of a larger task force agenda.
Summary of the National Collaboration Process
Therewereobviously many areas of accomplishment:

site development,

governmental relationships, the match, crisis management and continuation.
Therewe~ealso

some areas of weakness:

problems of priorities and

national plans for capacity building and advocacy.
enormous responsibilities assigned this group.

One is struck by the

It appeared that the structure

of the task force was too narrow to deal effectively with the many
necessary tasks assigned.

This limitation had much to do with some of

the limitations of the collaboration program.

These areas should not

detract from the very significant accomplishments of the national task
force and staff in implementing the project.
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The Tucson Collaboration
Background Factors
The Tucson metropolitan area, which accounts for most of the
approximately 500,000 people in Pima County, is located in south central
Arizona.

It is the second largest city in the state and is about 120

miles from Phoenix.

It is only 70 miles north of the Mexican boarder.

Tucson, like many cities of the sun belt, has had tremendous growth in
the last few years.

The 1975 population estimate shows a 26% increase

over the 1970 population.
Tucson has moved from a small dusty regional "cow town" with a

population of under 50,000 in the 1940's to a major metropolitan center.
The earlier growth developed around the new electronic industries,
attracting a wide range of professional persons.

A major university has

also attracted professionals.
The most recent growth is stimulated by the advantage of the sun
belt for retirement, and the service industries have grown to accommodate
the needs for new service.

culture.

Tucson has also become a center of the youth

A 1973 estimate reports that 30% of the population is between

ages of 10 and 25; 53% of the population is under 30.
Tucson has a relatively stable economy.
6% in late 1977, is not excessive.

The unemployment rate,

However, a large Mexican American

population, estimated at 19% in 1975, the uncounted numbers of illegal
aliens in the labor force, and the Indian population of about 3% do
not benefit from the status of the economy.

Many of these people live

in squalid conditions with high unemployment, especially among the youth.
The school drop out rate is high among the minorities, assuring the continuation of this cycle.
The cities and counties of Arizona are struggling to keep pace with
the ever-increasing population.

There is much opposition to deficit

financing, and the state as a whole, including Pima County, tends to
forego increasing social services in order to keep the state on a "pay
as you go" basis.

The State of Arizona has a very conservative laissez-faire political
stance of non-interference into local affairs.

It has lost Federal

funding rather than accept Federal standards in several recent instances.
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Politically Tucson is reported to be somewhat more progressive.

In

addition, since most of Tucson's population is newly arrived, there are

few old traditions.

This means that society is more open, and social

power is less concentrated in old structures.

It also means that personal

influence and expertise can be more readily developed.
This is exemplified by the nature of the Juvenile Court.

Despite

the conservative political stance in the state, the Pima County Juvenile
Court was already in the process of deinstitutionalizing status offenders
before the Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act required
deinstitutionalization.

The Pima County Juvenile Court was given the public DSO grant.
set up mobile diversion units for crisis intervention.

It

When status

offenders were apprehended, they were taken to the mobile diversion units
and from there were referred to other services.
the other services.

It was a very expensive program to run because of the

need for 24-hour coverage.
in 1975.

The court contracted out

Pima County reported 2,942 status offenders

The largest group was 1,716 runaways, with incorrigibles,

moral infractions and substance abuse (alcohol and tobacco) accounting
for about 350 each.
The National Assembly affiliates are fairly healthy in Tucson.
Seven of the nine for whom we have data report an increase in budget
above the cost of living increase from 1976 to 1977.

None reported a

decrease in United Way funding and only one reported a decrease from
other funding sources.

The Pima County affiliates have good relationships with the national
task force.

About five (42%) knew the name of the national task force

representatives.

Another three (25%) knew the regional representatives.

Table 17 in Appendix A shows these data.

Six of twelve representatives

reported that they had received some or much communication from their
national affiliate about the collaboration.

The other six report having

received little such communication (Table 18, Appendix A).
There appears to be underlying competition among Pima County
affiliates.

Even while they work together there seems to be a lack of

complete openness and trust.

Agencies and concerned citizens were already relating to each other

in Tucson before the collaboration began.
operating.

Three organizations were

The Coalition for the Community Treatment of Children was a
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rather loose organization of individuals and agencies founded to advocate
for change.

The Metropolitan Youth Council (MYC) is a youth planning

agency funded by the city and the county to coordinate service to youth.
All youth programs were to be planned through the MYC in order to avoid
duplication and to centralize accountability.

The Pima County Court

Foundation, a non-public advocate for the court, was also in operation.

To some extent the collaboration was in competition with each of these
groups although initially they were all very much involved.
Relatively little public-private interaction history was apparent
except for the Juvenile Court.

In fact, only recently have the public

schools demonstrated any interest in involvement with

~nyone

on the

issue of status offenders and other children at risk.
In January, 1976, the Coalition for the Community Treatment of Children
along with the Youth Development, Inc. (formerly, Youth Services Bureau)
sent letters to interested persons to attend a meeting.

The meeting was

held in February where the National Director explained the program and
indicated that Tucson was one of the cities under consideration.

Many in

the group felt that planning was already occurring through the Coalition
and without program money the activity would be a duplication of Coalition
activity.
In late March, Tucson was informed that it had been selected as a
site and a second meeting was called.

The National Director returned

to help the local group develop plans for participation.
steering committee was held March 31st.

The first

Officers were elected and committees

appointed to draw up a job description, draft a statement of purpose and to
screen and interview applicants for the job of coordinator.
The National Director returned in late April to outline the stages
of development and LEAA requirements and to formalize the statement of
purpose and the steering committee.

He returned in early June to

finalize the hiring of the local coordinator and to assist with the program planning work groups.

During the latter part of June the National

Director helped the steering committee establish priorities,

formulate

a timetable, and obtain approval of the phased action plan by the collaboration.

In early July another national staff person assisted with

revisions of the phased action plan, and it was sent to the national

collaboration Office.
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Structural Factors
The crucial decision on delineating qualifications for voting members
and officers was made during the first steering committee meeting.
Objections were raised when a non-affiliate representative and a concerned
individual were nominated for office.

The decision was that officers

would berepresentativesof National Assembly affiliates and that all
affiliates and representatives from the various operating coalitions
would comprise the steering committee.
Priority and Role of Chairperson.

The chairperson was a represen-

tative from the National Council of Jewish \-/omen.
committed to the collaboration and its goals.

She was strongly

Her priorities were to

insure the collaboration would be permanent so that the spirit of the
collaboration remained after the project period expired.
The chairperson's formal meeting role was primarily that of a presider.
She moved the meeting along, referred to speakers, summed up points and
called the questions.

She reported a major concern to keep the procedure

open so that people did not feel they were being manipulated.
her leadership extended far beyond this formal role.

However,

She worked

extensively with the staff to prepare for meetings; she attended and
participated in most sub-committee meetings.

She recognized the issues

and persons most likely to cause open conflict and she directed the meetings
in a way that minimized that conflict.
Priority and Role of Staff.

Our first interview with the Tucson

coordinator occurred after the phased action plan had been written.

At

that time the coordinator's priority was to push training for agency

personnel.

He felt that the agencies and the city as a whole would benefit

from such training.

The staff role was a strong management role with control over the
details of planning and managing the program.

While he was instrumental

in the direction ofthe program, he was also responsive to the members and

involved them as much as possible in all phases of the collaboration.
When questioned about work plans, he reported both long and short
term work tasks in mind.
tion tasks.

He specifically mentioned meetings and administra-

Table 19, Appendix A, shows that he reported about 41% of

his time in appointment/phone calls, 35% in study/administrative/paper
work and 17% in meetings.

Table 20, Appendix~ shows that 69% of Tucson's
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members reported frequent contact with the coordinator.
Staff-Member Relationships.

The chairperson had an excellent

relationship with the coordinator.

They worked closely together setting

up the agenda, the work to be done and doing some guidance about likely
problems.

Many of the members also had good relationships with staff.

They generally felt he was doing an excellent job.

However, about 20%

of representatives reported that he was "one-sided,'' "controlling" or

"going along with the influential affiliates."

Even persons reporting

that the coordinator was doing a good job appeared guarded when discussing
their relationships with him.

This guarded caution toward the coordinator

characterized, to some extent the collaboration's relationship to the

DSO Grantee.
The data support
leader.

the contention that the staff person was a strong

He tended to do considerable staff work on his ideas and present

them to the committee for their support.

However, many of these ideas

appear to have initiated in discussions at steering committee meetings

and discussions with individual members.

Once developed, he became an

advocate for them reporting on them at meetings, answering questions and
overcoming objections.

The conflicts in the Tucson collaboration tended to be over position
boundaries rather than role definitions as in some other collaborations.
We could say they were over "turf."

For instance, on some issues the

Tucson collaboration addressed, members who were very active in one of

the other inter-organizational coalitions felt that the collaboration
was intruding unnecessarily in their field.

Some of the "turf" problems

were a result of the emphasis by national that the local collaborations
needed to find future support.

This emphasis, of necessity, raised the

question of competition for scarce resources.

The several conflict issues

seldom came into the open but did hinder the full development of interorganizational trust.

National-Local Relationships.

The Pima County collaboration staff

person had few problems in his relationship with national during the
early organizational phase.
helpful and understanding.

He felt national collaboration staff had been
He did feel at a later time that several

technical assistance requests had been responded to inadequately and some
technical assistance that he did not wish was foisted upon him.
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He also felt that in the latter part of the program, communications were
overly slow.
Therewasno indication of dissatisfaction of collaboration members
with the relationship with national other than the complaint of the time
pressure in the project beginning.
Process Factors

The meetings were mostly smoothly run and informational.

Reports on

the activities of the sub-committees and staff were made with questions
asked from the floor.
without focus.

Some meetings however were very disorganized and

These often dealt with new approaches, searching for

solutions to problems, etc.

The National Assembly affiliates had good participation.
Grantee representatives kept their participation at a minimum.
about their participation there were two responses:

The DSO
When asked

they did not wish to

overly influence the direction of the collaboration and there were some
personal political problems involved.
Communication Process.

centralized in Tucson.

The communication process tended to be fairly

The staff person and the chair person represented

about 48% of the actions at formal meetings, (Table 22, Appendix A).

A

large percentage of the chairperson's actions were related to running the
meeting.

The staff person 1 s acts were primarily reporting committee

activity, other collaboration activity, answering questions on reports,
explaining issues, etc.

There was good participation from most of the

other collaboration participants.

However seldom were more than one or

two remarks made without their being directed to the coordinator for
A sub-pattern was seen when a report was given by someone other

response.

than the coordinator.
the report.

Questions were directed at that person following

At the end of that period the communication reversed back to

a central pattern.

Decision Haking Process.
process.

Tucson followed a formal decision making

Table 21 in Appendix A shows that a relatively low percentage

of decisions were made at steering committee meetings.

The agenda items

were more usually reports of progress not followed by formal vote.

A

higher percentage of decisions were made in the sub-committee, but that,

too was relatively low.

It appears that many decisions were made by

staff, either based on previous discussion, on staff expertise or on
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behind-the-scenes power blocs and then fully developed upon presentation
to the steering committee.
Power Sub-Groups.

There are several indications that there were

informal behind-the-scenes power blocs in the Tucson area.

The interviews

indicate some hostilities over the perception that the staff was more
favorable to one group or the other.

Some of the persons most critical

appear to have gradually become less active.
Process Outcomes

In general, the process outcomes of Tucsonwerepositive.

About 79%

of the respondents in the second interview felt that the collaboration was
very effective or moderately effective. Table

23 in Appendix A shows

these data.
There was not as much concensus about what the collaboration had done
best.

An equal number, 33%, said that the collaboration was most effective

in its advocacy program and in getting people together,

Table 23,

Appendix A,shows the distribution.
A remarkable 100% of the representatives reported that they would
involve their agencies again, knowing what they did at the end of the study
period.
Conclusions About the Pima County Collaboration Process
The Pima County collaboration appeared to have developed a process
that was basically satisfying to participants who continued and fruitful
in programatic outcome.

It also evolved into a strong organization

which developed and implemented successful programs.

Several factors

appear to have affected these outcomes.
First there was agreement between the national staff and the local
collaboration over structure.

The presence of a national staff person at

key points during the early organizational stages virtually assured this
agreement.

The compatibility avoided a large conflict area present in the

other collaborations.
Second, the Tucson agencies had a history of inter-organizational

relationship.

This means that the initial task getting to know each

other was unnecessary.

Third, because of the rush to get Tucson opera-

tional so that the other sites could begin, the collaboration moved
swiftly past its land marks.

Each land mark was successfully reached in
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aminimum oftime providing a great deal of satisfaction which was increased
by the amount of recognition given by national.
Fourth, the collaboration had consistent and interested leadership from
its chairperson and agreement between the chairperson and staff over their
roles and priorities.

The major problem in the Tucson collaboration appeared to be the
collaborative relationships among the members and the failure to encourage
continuing trustful relationships.

Whether this will hamper future working

relationships remains to be seen.
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The Oakland Collaboration
Background Factors
Oakland, a city of just over 361,000 in the San Francisco Bay area
just east of San Francisco, is spread over a fairly large area.

This

fact, with the proximity of San Francisco as a central city and the
proportion of the population who live in single family housing, gives
Oakland the appearance of a large urban sprawl, crisscrossed by super
highways and dependent upon the automobile.
The Bay Area increased in size following World War II.

This rapid

growth included a high proportion of blacks and Mexican Americans who
moved from agricultural occupations to take advantage of the growing
number of industrial jobs available.
The rapid growth without time for assimilation led to the division
of Oakland into ethnic areas.
population started to decline.
increased.

In the SO's and 60's Oakland's total
During this time the minority proportion

As with many large industrial cities during the era, parts

of Oakland have become "ghettoized."

In 1970, 35% of Oakland's population

was black and 8% was Mexican American.

The Oakland Community is heterogeneous and relatively non-traditional.
There appear to be diverse power structures; a person with prestige and
power in one area does not necessarily have power in another area.

Several different cultural patterns exist side by side with an apparent
outward tolerance.

In the late 60's the Bay Area gained the reputation of being a haven
for the contraculture.

Some of the social experimentation remains and

appears to have engendered a generally innovative climate.

In 1975, there were 3,200 identified status offenders in Alameda
County.

Since the County was too large for the small program grant to

have an impact, the Oakland collaboration narrowed its focus to East
Oakland.

East Oakland has the highest concentration of minorities, 51%
non-white and 37% with Spanish surname. 19 It has a high percentage of
old housing in poor condition, high unemployment, a high percentage of
19
nescription based on a 1969 planning brochure of East Oakland.
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persons on welfare and a high percentage of persons below the poverty
level.
In 1976, the Department of Probation received the DSO Grant.

Their

proposal was to offer family counseling to status offenders and operate
two houses where young people are brought by the police.
The local National Assembly affiliates in Oakland have been hard
pressed in the last few years.

The cost of living in the Bay Area has

risen faster than contributions to United Way and other non-profit
funding.

Six of the eleven responding organizations said that they had

had a reduction in United Way funds in the past year.
funds from other sources had also been reduced.

Four said that

The total budget of 4

of the 11 agencies either decreased or increased less than the cost of
living during the period of the program.
The method of obtaining funds from either the

United Way, public

programs or other sources appeared to be highly political in Oakland
with various power blocs competing for the scarce resources on which their
survival depends.

The tradition of "charity" was not as strong here as

elsewhere but, the tradition against the use of government funds for
non-profit human services is also not as strong.

Some long-standing

resentments over past inequities, funding slights and other incidents
appear to exist among the Oakland agencies' inter-organizational
relationships.
The local affiliates of National Assembly organizations did not
appear isolated from their national representatives.

Table 17 indicates

that 8 of 11 affiliates (73%) knew the name of the national task force
member at the time of the first interview.
The non-profit agencies in Oakland were not a unified group and did
not appear to have a history of inter-agency cooperation.
contributing factors are a)

Apparent

the urban sprawl, b) the heterogeneous nature

of the area, and c) the fact that Oakland is not an independent city so
far as the agencies go, but is a part of the Bay area region in planning,

program and relationships.
Into this fiercely competitive atmosphere, a letter came in late

1976 to the local Camp FireGirls explaining the project and asking the
Camp FireGirls' Executive Director to call a meeting of the National
Assembly affiliates and other appropriate youth serving agencies.
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Approximately 50 persons attended, to whom the National Director
explained the program.

A representative from the Oakland Manpower Office,

who asked many questions about the nature of the funding and the time
line, was selected temporary chairperson.

In mid-March a second meeting was attended by about 25 persons.
During the next four or five meetings the group discussed a range of issues
including program needs and priorities~ money, levels of trust, etc.

They also discussed the possibility of forming a collaboration with or
without the money.
The group formed task forces to further plan programs, incorporation
and funding.

The small groups met two or three times a week with full

meetings about once a month.

Papers were drawn up for incorporating

the group about the same time that a search for staff began.

The group,

however, has not incorporated at this time.

The group made two crucial decisions in the early stage.

One was

to incorporate for the purpose of becoming a political power in Oakland.
This decision follows the guideline of grass roots organization popularized
20
by Alinsky.
The second was an informal decision that staff representatives were most appropriate members, somewhat excluding volunteers.

In advertising for staff, the position called for an executive
director.

The job advertisment called for a person who can organize,

plan, develop and administer a comprehensive youth service and needs program

in Alameda County.

21

The staff person was hired to direct a program of

service rather than to coordinate services by members.
During the summer, the chairperson gave up the chair and went onto

the personnel committee.

The second chairperson, a member of the Boy

Scouts' staff, took over in late August and the coordinator was hired.
The staff person was without an office or secretary for several
months.

It was difficult to reach her by phone even though she had space

at the Boy Scouts office.

These months appear to have slowed the progress

of collaboration somewhat, with apparently waning enthusiasm and commitment, and a lack of direction.

20

Saul D. Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals (New York:

Vintage Books,

1969).
21

A copy of the job description can be found in Auxiliary Appendix E.
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To overcome this, in November the coordinator proposed a program

development seminar to deal with resources and attack the problem of lack
of commitment to the collaboration.

After some conflict with national

staff who she felt handled the project review less seriously and promptly
than necessary, the seminar was presented and revitalized the collaboration.
Structural Factors
Early in its history, the Oakland collaboration limited membership
to staff.

There were some non-staff persons involved, however, from the

Junior League, the National Council of Jewish Women and the Camp Fire
Girls.

The early members felt that it was the staff that got things

done in social agencies, and volunteers or board members tended to muddy
the water.

Other early members included representatives from the Oakland

Manpower Department, Oakland Public Schools, Oakland Police Department,
and County Probation Department, who was the DSO Grantee.

Half of the

participants in the Oakland collaboration were line staff rather than
executive directors, and this presented a problem.

These staff people

were really unable to commit their agencies.
Priority and Role of Chairperson.

The first chairperson of the Oakland

collaboration thought that the collaboration's major goal was to become a
political power so that the major public agencies, including the DSO Grantee,
could be forced to improve their service for youth in East Oakland.
The second chairperson, the only leader observed, also stressed the
politicizing of the traditional agencies as a primary goal.

He felt this

would be a valuable contribution to increasing the public service sector's

accountability.
The second chairperson was designated president of the board rather
than chairperson.

He perceived his job as direction, with the executive

director implementing the decisions.

However, he appears to have taken

little task responsibility outside of the meeting.

The coordinator would

occasionally push him to take a more active role in collaboration business
but generally he deferred to her opinions and decisions.

In some areas,

the chairperson would request that the coordinator represent the group at
some meeting or on a board.

As the collaboration progressed the chair-

person appears to have given even less leadership and the coordinator was
making most of the decisions.
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Priority and Role of Staff.

The coordinator's major priority at the

beginning was "the political education" of the local affiliates.
also saw the need to educate the group to real collaboration.
they really did not understand it.

She

She felt

She perceived a major organizational

task was to reduce committee work so that she could do the work herself.
The coordinator perceived herself as the director of a program.
She intended to educate the local collaboration members out of their
notions, which she considered naive.

She saw herself as the major source

of the program planning and the collaboration as the implementation agency
with herself as director.

A diagram

illustrates her role definition.

developed by the staff person

It is a series of circles one within the

other with the coordinator in the center.

The diagram is included in

Auxiliary Appendix E.
The coordinator's perception of her role is not inconsistent with the

job for which she was hired.

The job calls for an executive director to

organize, develop and administer a comprehensive youth service and needs

program for status offenders.
The Oakland staff person's operating style was more that of an
independent professional than that of a coordinator.

She tended to develop

position papers and program decisions rather than enable the collaboration
to discuss such issues.

The data from the daily log shown in Table 19,

Appendix A support this analysis.

An average of only 25% of her time was

spent in telephone calls and appointments and 26% was spent in study,
paper work and administration.

The coordinator and chairperson had some conflict of role definition
for several months after the coordinator was hired.

During that time the

collaboration office was housed in the Boy Scouts office where the chairperson was employed.

The staff person felt the chair was using her as an

employee rather than as the director of the collaboration.
Staff-Member Relationships.

There was conflict between the coordinator

and many of the Oakland collaboration members over proper staff role.
Many of them expected her to follow their recommendations.
to lead them and to make her o\vn decisions.

She expected

At several meetings, the

issue of staff role arose, usually with an implicit criticism of the staff.
She would explain the incompatibility of their perception of the job and
her perception of the job.
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One of the areas of conflict was her lack of preparation for meetings
and the follow-up work required.

Consequently a number of conflicting

situations arose, such as the members wanting to see the budget and staff
person not having it available, or, conflict ridden discussions over

elements of the phased action plan developed by the staff person.

Much

of the conflict was spearheaded by representatives of two of the affiliates.
These representatives were relatively inactive and were viewed by some

of the others as deviant and troublesome.
This unsatisfactory situation was relayed to the juvenile justice
task force in New York by local members and a decision was made by the
national collaboration that failure was imminent unless they intervened.
A meeting was held on September, 1977, at which four national task force
members and two national staff persons tried to clarify the issue and
reexamine priorities.

Following this meeting with some behind-the-scenes

agreements, and with the help of national staff, the executive committee
was re-constituted with a new chairperson.

Shortly thereafter, the

coordinator temporarily put the program implementation at a disadvantage
at a time when full-time effort was most necessary.

It was felt that

the alternative of no staff at all would have been even more detrimental.

National-Local Relationships.
national-local relationship.

One final structural issue was the

A great deal of conflict existed in the

Oakland collaboration about the supervisory role of the national collaboration
with regard to both staff supervision and program supervision.

The

coordinator felt that the supervision was unnecessary, cumbersome and

belittling.

She also felt that national staff supervision of program was

not responsive to the local problems and needs.

A time-lapse problem

was perceived, where national staff appeared slow to recognize the need for
immediate program decisions.

The coordinator's perception of her role and her ideas which developed
in the phased action plan led to a crisis in Oakland.

The plan outlined a

separate direct service agency to be placed in East Oakland, with additional
staff hired to implement all of the program.

This was contrary to the

philosophy of the program and the national task force and staff intervened.
They felt hampered at every turn by the need to have national collaboration approval for every move.

This surfaced when an early workshop

was planned to get members together and improve communication.
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The

collaboration, led by the coordinator,planned the workshop with an outside
consultant, and then felt that approval from New York was excessively
slow.
A similar reaction to the phased action plan occurred.

After months

of hard work, the finished plan was not immediately accepted and the
implementation could not begin.

Part of the delay was caused by the

coordinator's failure to respond to questions or to begin implementing
programs that had been approved.

At the second interview, the collabora-

tion representatives reported that one of their major problems had been
with the coordinator.
Process Factors

The definition
Table 22

of roles was a problem reflected in the group process.

Appendix A, indicates that the chair and coordinator together

accounted for about half of the action.

With the new coordinator and chair-

person, the percent declined to 27% of the few meetings we observed.
DSO Grantee accounted for 12% of the action when present.
finding is the activity level of the affiliates.

The

One interesting

The three most influential

affiliates and all other affiliates together account for a large percentage
of acts.

Most meetings were lively with discussion of those present.

Much of this discussion, however, was conflict-related and from time to

time a lot of it was destructive to the collaboration process.
Communication Processe

The communication pr-ocess was usually

centralized in the Oakland collaboration meetings.

The direction was

from the chairperson to the floor and back, or from the staff person to
the floor and back.

There was good participation by most participants

but very little discussion among them.

Only occasionally were more than

two or three remarks made from the floor without the chair or staff
participating.

The chair tended to move the meetings, while the staff

responded to substantive questions.
Decision Making Process.

The decision making process appeared to have

been by consensus rather than formal action especially with the first
chairperson and coordinator.

Examination of the substanne of discussions

and decisions revealed that many decisions were related to petty matters

such as days on which to have meetings, and little of programatic importance
was decided in meetings.

Table 21 in Appendix A shows that only 24%

of items discussed were followed by formal decisions.
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The direction in which decisions went appeared to have been controlled
by the staff.

The programs developed by the program committees were

based on position papers developed by the staff.
of these sub-committees.

She chaired at least one

At the board meetings, reports were given and

while details were discussed, the nature of the program appeared not to
have been discussed.
and low-energy.

Many of the meetings were reported as lack-luster

This could have been because few important decisions

were discussed.

Power Sub-Groups.

Two changing sub-groups appeared to affect the

life of the Oakland collaboration.

In the formation days a difference in

perspective arose between some of the minority persons and the representa-

tives of the old line traditional affiliates.

The minorities, who were

the first and second chairpersons, and the staff perceived organizational

development from a grass roots perspective.

The notion of advice and

direction from New York seemed ridiculous to them.

The political realities

of East Oakland were the important issue to them and their highest
priority.

These persons appear to have controlled the early collaboration

patterns and expectations.

As the program got underway, the conflict between the grass roots
persons and the influential affiliates surfaced, often around the role
of the staff.

However, the coordinator blamed the national staff for much

of the problem and appears to have galvanized both groups against the
national collaboration.
At another level a competition between some of the affiliates
remained, probably related to past history.

Different blocs emerged around

different issues.
Process Outcomes

The process outcomes in Oakland were not outstanding.

Asked

during the second interview how effective they thought the collaboration
was, 82% (14) said not very effective and 18% (3) said moderately effective.
Table 23, Appendix A, shows the distribution in other sites.
During the first interview, 16 of 18 respondents thought the
collaboration was beginning to move and would become effective soon,

This change indicates that in late Fall, 1976, there was more hope for
the Oakland collaboration than in late Fall, 1977.
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When asked what they thought the collaboration had done best, 44%
responded, "getting people together," 19% said planning programs and 19%
said they didn't know.

The distribution can be seen in Table 23,

When asked if they would involve their organization again,
surprising 94% (16)said yes and 6% (1) didn't know.

a

However, most per-

ceived that only 50 to 60 percent of other members would participate
again.

This is a good sign of continuing verbal commitment despite

disappointment.
Conclusions About the Oakland Collaboration Process
Several factors
be noted.

that affected the Oakland collaboration process can

First, many of the problems of the Oakland collaboration struc-

ture apparently could have been avoided with more direction from national
staff early in the organizational stages.

For six months while priorities,

roles, patterns of interaction, job description and organizational

perspectives

were being developed, there was little interaction with

national collaboration.

The interaction which did occur was neither

prepared for, acted on or reported locally.

The six months between the

organizational meeting and the hiring of the staff person allowed these
patterns to set.
Second, the contradictory priorities from the national staff were

more explicitly perceived in Oakland than elsewhere.

The meeting at which

the national task force and staff intervened openly addressed the question.
Oakland members had thought collaboration was the priority.

They felt

now that the national collaboration had switched signals from collaboration
to direct services.

This confusion supports the hypothesis that inter-

organizational collaboration, especially if the time is limited, works

better around a single clearly defined goal or issue.
Third, there appeared to be no payoffs in the program for the Oakland
National Assembly affiliates, and so commitment waned.

Few of them had

programs in East Oakland; they were to get little of the program money
and little else either.
slow.

Development of the phased action plan was very

When it was finished, participants appeared drained.

Commitment to

the collaboration fell sharply as summer approached and the necessity
for mounting their own summer programs and the prospect of vacations
increased.
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Fourth, the Oakland collaboration felt that the national collaboration
was putting them into a competitive position with other collaborations.
They interpreted the message from New York to mean that more program funds
would go to the collaboration with the phased action plan in first.

This

was contrary to fostering inter-organizational trust.

Finally,the choice of East Oakland as the impact area was problematic.
Although the most pressing problems were found there, the affiliates had
no vested interest in the area.

Consequently the collaboration had to

learn about the community and establish ties with other local activities
as well as to develop a direct services project.
With all of the problems
remained committed to change.

Oakland has had, most of the affiliates
They continued to serve youth in East

Oakland, they were interacting with each other and they were becoming
more aware of youth at risk at the end of the study period.

With more

realistic goals and structure, Oakland may very well overcome some of the
other situational factors which plague them.
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The Spartanburg Collaboration

Background Factors
Spartanburg County sits in the northwestern part of South Carolina
at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains exactly midway between New York
and New Orleans.

The City of Spartanburg is a regional center for the

County and is intersected by two Interstate Highways, I-85 and I-26.

The

estimated 1977 population was 46,485 within the City and 73,638 people
within the urban area.

The County has an estimated population of 192,100.

The Greenville-Spartanburg SMSA is the retail trade center of northwestern South Carolina.

The cities of Spartanburg and Greenville (30 miles

to the east) are rapidly growing toward each other and are expected to
meet in the 1980's.
The Spartanburg area is presently experiencing relatively rapid
economic and industrial growth, although a decade or two ago the area
was characterized as economically depressed.

These events are stimulating

social changes which conflict with traditional behavior patterns.

As

new industries have moved into the area, they have also sent in large
numbers of management level personnel who have become involved in civic

affairs.

They do not share the traditional southern cultural patterns,

which occasionally places them in conflict with the traditional power
structure.

While much of the work force and political structure is

composed of long-time residents and products of the traditional southern
social structure, these newer elements are characterized by higher educa-

tional levels and active political participation.
increasing and this trend is likely to continue.

Their influence is
These seeds of social

change are not reflected in the Census data from 1970.

For example, in

1970, only 1.5% of the population was of foreign stock but local respondents
note that this percentage in increasing.

The educational attainment of Spartanburg County residents is low.
In 1970, 64% of the population 25 years of age or older had not finished
high school and 40% had not attended school past the 9th grade.

In

1970, 14% of families were below the poverty line with a mean family
income of $2,111.
assistance.

Of these, 12% were receiving some form of public

At the same time, the median family income for all families
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in the County was $7,924, and the mean family income was $8,908.

These

statistics reflect the fact that there is an economic bifurcation with
a substantial number of families earning rather high incomes (the management levels and retailers), and a substantial work force of relatively
uneducated and unskilled or semiskilled workers earning relatively low
family incomes.

The unemployment rate is presently at about 5%,

although it jumped to 9.4% in 1975 when the energy crisis and economic
depression in the textile market resulted in major layoffs in that
industry.
A substantial number of young people drop out of school before
completing the twelfth grade and subsequently many of them become problems
to the juvenile justice system.
Culturally, Spartanburg has a traditional deep South social structure.
The social values of politeness, non-conflict and surface friendliness are
operative and geniune.

Educated and well-traveled, the Spartanburg professionals and others
tend to be defensive about their cultures.

While they recognize the

problems of a traditional society in 20th-Century America, they also
appreciate the advantages of group consensus, warm relationships and

pleasant inter-personal relations.

Many of them are working hard within

the structure to achieve social change.

While most relationships are friendly on the surface, Spartanburg
respondents indicate that society is fiercely competitive.

This is

indicated in inter-scholastic basketball where traditional rivalries
amount to near hatred.

The National Assembly affiliates are highly visible and influential
in Spartanburg.

The reported membership/client contacts of about 53,000

represent about 28% of the County's total population.

(This does not

include the 300,000 contacts reported by the Salvation Army).
Many of the most influential people in town belong to the Junior
League and/or the YMCA.

The YMCA is a complete gymnastic and recreational

facility and is well used by upper middle class residents.

There are also

two country clubs which cater to the affluent.
Reported salaries of staff members of the affiliates averaged about
$9.600.

This was relatively lower than salaries at other sites.

Budgets

of five of the six affiliates indicated a decrease in income or an increase

rate less than that of the cost of living.
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Spartanburg has no history of inter-organizational cooperation among
the affiliates.

There had been the usual competition for scarce financial

resources from United Hay.

Several incidents were reported which indicated

some resentment and bitterness at perceived past slights and injustices

by the United Hay.
Previous public-private cooperation did not extend much beyond the
presence of Scout troops in the schools, a few referrals for recreation to

the YMCA and referrals to the Junior League's Girls' Home.

Previous

grass roots non profit cooperation was virtually non-existent.
Into this atmosphere in early 1976, a letter arrived to the executive
director of the YMCA from his national office.

It was addressed to the

previous executive who had retired and already had been replaced.

It

explained the project and asked him to call a meeting of National Assembly
affiliate representatives and other pertinent youth serving agencies to
meet with a site visitation team from New York.
One respondent reported

that the meeting was horrendous.

The site

team was not there long enough to deal with southern customs; they called
the "friendliness" shallow; they called the group racist because there
were no blacks.

(Nor were there any in some other collaboration sites.)

After letters of apologies, a second site visit and a summer visit by
the National Director to help with the hiring procedures, the Spartanburg
collaboration was under way.
The local Spartanburg affiliates felt isolated from their national
organizations.

Of the 11 persons responding 45% (5) knew no one in the

national or regional offices.

Hhen asked if they had been contacted by

their national organization about the collaboration, 62% (8) said they had
had no contact, 8% (1) said they had had some contact and 31% (4) said
they had had much contact.

One additional member said his regional staff

person would not agree to let him join.

Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix A

show these data.
Structural Factors
By late June, the group was feeling a sense of movement.
executive was temporary chairman.

The YMCA

The first committees dealt with external

structure, personnel search, public relations, finding an office and

equal opportunity.

The Spartanburg group had received some assistance

from national staff and task force members on the statement of purpose,
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a job description, letters of commitment and the phased action plan.
In early July, the first chairperson went to Europe and a member
of the Junior League became chairperson.

She was a replacement for a

previous Junior League representative anc appeared to have assumed the
role of chairperson without the vote of the members.

The new chairperson

felt the press of time and ran the meetings in a task oriented manner.
Priority and Role of Chairperson.

The perception of the role of

chairperson and the chairperson's own program priorities were sources

both of direction and of tension for collaboration.

The original chair-

person was a strong leader but with a non-directive style.
behind the scenes to gain acceptance for his ideas.

He worked

He appeared to have

clearly understood the dual goals of program and process.
The second chairperson appeared to have perceived the program goals
as the top priority of the Spartanburg collaboration.

She had worked

intimately with status offenders, recognized the need for service and saw
this as an opportunity for Spartanburg to increase services.

She also

perceived, quite accurately, that to reach the program goals, as stated
in the proposal in the limited time, a strong task-oriented leader was
necessary.

She also appeared to want to strengthen existing programs

and services, an_d seemed uninterested in innovative new service.
This chairperson saw her role as to initiate, direct and coordinate

the collaboration; the coordinator was to provide staff support to implement
board decisions.
As the search for coordinator accelerated, the new chairperson
reappointed the personnel committee, omitting some previous members and

thereby causing hard feelings.

She also appears to have made other

executive decisions to facilitate progress toward the goal with which some
other collaboration members and staff people disagreed with.

The leader-

ship style of the second chairperson and the disagreement over chair and
staff roles and procedures ultimately led to a crisis in the collaboration.
At least two meetings were spent in discussion about the staff role and
job description; the coordinator was excluded from one of these.

Eventually

the conflict was so destructive that the national collaboration intervened.
The National Director and several national task force members went to
Spartanburg to facilitate some local decisions about leadership.

Several

weeks of negotiation, another national staff visit and a great deal of
conflict followed until finally the Spartanburg chairperson resigned.
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The Spartanburg collaboration was virtually without a formal chairperson for about three months.

During that time committees continued to

meet, and an overview of status offender case files was being performed as

part of the needs assessment, but little other progress was made.
After the second chairperson was hired and then resigned, the collaboration looked around the community for "someone of equal status 11 to

become chair.

After two more months they found a person connected with the

University of South Carolina who had been involved with status offenders.
Several meetings were spent in discussions about a new leader and

the massive amount of work required to direct the project.

At one time

they considered a chairperson and vice-chair who would share the work.

The

vice-chair role as they described it was really that of a staff coordinator.
There was also indication that some decisions were made behind the scenes.

The vice-chairperson, a non-affiliate member of the collaboration and
a public participant, became chairperson during the interim between the
second and third chairperson.
well together.

He and the collaboration coordinator worked

During this time the phased action plan was written and

finalized, primarily by them.
The third chairperson took the chair in June but in late October
resigned because of health.

During her short term of office she appeared

to be in control of the meetings and to direct the interaction.
was very effective in terms of both style and position.

She

She delegated

responsibilities and followed up to see if they were being handled.

As

an outsider selected by the collaboration, she had no vested interest in
any agency but truly cared about children and the goals of the collaboration.
The authority of leaders in the collaboration appeared to come from
sources outside of the collaboration rather than from inside.

They were

looking for persons with status in the community not expertise on inter-

personal skill within the collaboration.

This is typical in traditional

societies.

Priority and Role of Staff.

One source of tension in Spartanburg

was conflict over perception of staff role.

The original coordinator

perceived the staff role as that of facilitator.

She expected the committees

to make decisions and she would do the staff work--especially the implementation.
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Her original priorities for the program were to enable some structured
change to occur especially in the realms of racism and service to youth
and to enable the local organizations to redefine the roles of non-profit
organization in the field of human service and in relationships to each
other.
The coordinator's work style indicates that either her real priority
was program or that she was blocked in dealing with the organizational
change and collaboration.

About 50% of her time was reportedly spent

dealing with program (Table 19, Appendix A).

The log data also indicate

that she spent more time than average in phone calls and appointments and
this is reflected in the perception of the committee members when asked
how often they related to her (Table 20, Appendix A).
In Spartanburg, no outsider is allowed to criticize the system.
One must raise consciousness and stimulate the local citizens to suggest

the needed changes and then help implement them.

The multiplicity of

goals and the limited time did not allow this process to develop.

The

coordinator tried but found the initial reticence of the members to suggest
innovative or major changes frustrating.

The pressure from the national

collaboration to "produce" was also difficult to ienore.

While the coordinator and the committee appeared to agree on the role
of coordinator, they did not agree on the role of the committee.

The

coordinator wanted planning decisions to be hashed out together in the
collaboration even at the risk of confrontation and conflict.

Instead,

she felt that the committee was waiting for her to be the leader.

Added

to this was the strong task oriented second chairperson whose priorities

did not include the collaborative process.
This conflict between the staff and other collaboration members was
resolved three ways.

First, the committees were gradually rearranged

and the chairperson resigned.

In the new arrangement, the coordinator

functioned as expert and the chairperson ran the meetings, Second, work

style was changed.

The coordinator gradually changed from the facilitating

iole to a more central position, spending more time with other experts in

the community in the planning and implementation of direct service programs.
The data suggest

that without the DSO Grantee

and the Appalachian

Council of Government representative, very little would have occurred in

the Spartanburg collaboration.

Third, staff priorities changed.
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The

coordinator gradually placed a higher priority on direct service program
implementation.
National-Local Relationships.

The relationship of the Spartanburg

coordinator with national collaboration staff appeared to change over
time and as the coordinator shifted roles.

Originally she perceived the

national staff as a source of support and expertise as she proceeded in
her job.

Several perceived failures

of both support and expertise in

the necessary time, amount and form precipitated a search for alternative
local support.

As she developed her own expertise, supervision from the

national staff was tolerated with some diffused hostility.
Process Factors

The group process data indicate that when the second chairperson
resigned the coordinator was more active in the meetings.

The observations

also indicate that in the later stage, the coordinator presented reports
and information, brought program models and details into the meetings and,
regularly made outside decisions for implementation on the b.asis of her

own knowledge without referring back to committee.
Table 22-, Appendix A, indicates that Spartanburg meetings were active,

and that there was good participation by the DSO Grantee and other public
agencies.

This activity increased when the second chairperson resigned

because not only was the DSO Grantee active but the acting chairperson
was
the

~ith

the Appalachian Council of Governments.

The analysis shows that

executive committee meetings were consistently dominated by the chair-

person, the coordinator and the DSO Grantee.
Communication Process.

The communication process in Spartanburg was

centralized when the second chairperson was in control.

Someone would

speak, the chair would respond, another speaker, the chair, another speaker,

the chair, etc.

The break in this pattern came when someone reported.

Then there would be some give and take around the issue before the pattern
resumed.

When the interim chairperson took over the pattern changed somewhat.
The chairperson did not respond to every response.
communication pattern developed.
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However no decentralized

Decision Making Process.

In the early months, decisions appeared

to be made by vote with the second chairperson running things by Roberts
Rules of Order.

The decisions brought to a vote seem to have been developed

outside of the collaboration, reportedly by the chair and one powerful
sub-group.

Issues would appear that had not been discussed either in the

executive committee or with the coordinator.

It is possible that many

of the decisions brought to a vote were the results of the manipulations
of the various power blocs behind the scenes.

In later months the

decisions appeared to have been engineered by the coordinator toward her
program goals.

On issues that she had given up, she did not push very much

and so no formal decisions were made on those issues.

Table 21, Appendix A,

shows that formal decisions followed discussion of issues only 25% of
the mite in the sub-committee and 35% of the time in the executive
committee.

Power Sub-Groups.

Differences in perspective between two well-defined

sub-groups, each led by a powerful affiliate, appeared to be behind much of
the dissention in the Spartanburg collaboration.

It appears that one was

oriented to change without upset and the other was oriented toward better
services without substantial change.

Neither are very radical views.

It is not surprising that the coordinator tended to ally herself with
the latter.
Despite the conflict, tension and problems the collaboration was
relatively successful in its process goals.

At the time of the second

interview, 29% of members felt the collaboration was very effective 50%
thought i t moderately effective and 21% thought it not at all effective.
There was a general consensus about what the collaboration did best.

About

64% (9) thought direct service was the highest accomplishment and 29% (4)
thought getting people together was the greatest achievement (Table 23,
Appendix A) .
The collaboration members reported strongly that they would involve
their organizations again knowing what they knew at the end of the study
period.

Seventy-nine percent (11) said yes, 14% (2) said not in the same

way and one non-affiliate said no.
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Conclusions About the Spartanburg Collaboration Process
Institutional change did not yet come to Spartanburg.
was no doubt that several important things had occurred.

However, there
Certainly

National Assembly affiliatesweregetting to know each other and beginning
to trust each other.

The public agencies were working with non-profit

agencies in a respectful relationship.
Spartanburg presented a good opportunity to test interagency cooperation because it was small enough for the impact to be felt, and had no
previous history of interorganizational cooperation.

Five factors were

important in understanding the Spartanburg collaboration.
in Spartanburg was lack of consensus on role and procedure.

A major factor
More consensus

could have been achieved had the time been longer, had leadership been
more carefully chosen and had the explanatory materials on priorities
been clearer.

A second factor was the direct intervention into the process by the
national collaboration.
not occurred.

We do not know what would have happened had this

A third factor was the suspicion and bias Spartanburg

leadership has against Federal intervention into local issues.

There were

those who reo;ented LEAA telling them what their children needed.
A fourth factor was the coordinator's change of roles.

The change was

quite functional for delivery of services to status offenders.

The process,

however, caused her to go to other sources for technical assistance that
were not necessarily most functional for inter-organization cooperation or

capacity building.

Had the national staff or the national task force

provided technical assistance on process and program, the programs could

have been more easily understood by the local affiliates, and more readily
planned and implemented.
A final factor was the interaction of the public representatives in
the collaboration.

The coordinator apparently felt more support from them

than from most of the non-profit agencies and perceived more rewards from

developing and implementing direct service programs with them.
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The Spokane Collaboration
Background Factors
Spokane, a city of 173,698 in an SMSA of 305,600 on the eastern
edge of Washington, is the regional center for an area 200 miles north
into Canada and for eastern Washington, western Montana and northern
Idaho.

Through the mid-1950's Spokane had a relatively stable popula-

tion.

Since 1950 the population has grown 47%; about 11% from 1950 to

1960, 39% from 1960 to 1970 and 6% from 1970 to 1975.

The growth includes

a high proportion of young people who moved into the area because of the
beauty of the natural surroundings and the outdoor recreational opportunities, and some increase in the older population.

The economy of Spokane reflects its status as a regional center.

The

regional university and medical services are located there; seven railroads

converge on Spokane; about 27% of the work force is employed in retail
and wholesale establishments and another large proportion of workers is
employed in service industries.

There are few large industries other than

Kaiser Aluminum, but some electronic industry and tourism contribute to

a healthy economy.

About 9% of the population was below the poverty line in 1970 and
in October 1977 about 5% of the work force was unemployed.
Spokane and its area has a relatively stable society partially because
of its isolated geographical situation, pratially because of the nature of
its population.

It was settled in the late 1800's by Northern European

farmers, workers on the seven railroads and a sizable Mormon group.

Wealthy

farmers from the area and Air Force personnel retire to Spokane which at
one time established the third highest percentage of persons over 65
among the nation's cities.

The geographical isolation, the values of an agricultural population
and the percentage of retired persons combined to give Spokane society an
insular quality.

The political situation tends to be conservative with

several visible right wing organizations.

There is a general suspicion of

the Eastern folk, especially government and governmental interference.
Social patterns are stable or slow to change.
"kids still drag
in Spokane."

One respondent reported that

up Riverside and meet at the drive-in on a Saturday night

The conservative patterns, however~ appear to be changing

slowly with the population influx.
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Social status and influence appear to be concentrated in the heart of
the old familiar businesses and several larger religious institutions.

This

is changing somewhat because recent arrivals are young professionals who
bring their own prestige.
Spokane is the only collaboration site with a non-public DSO Grantee,
the Spokane Area Youth Committee (SAYC), a planning, coordinating and
service assessment body of community leaders from both public and private
sectors including a city councilman, the Chairman of the Board of County
Commissioners, the Chief of Police, the Superintendent of the Spokane
Schools, a Superior Court Judge and the Episcopal Bishop.

Since SAYC is a

planning body, it incorporated the second organization Youth Alternatives,
to implement the DSO program.

The program developed by Youth Alternatives

was primarily crisis intervention by program staff and referral services

to community agencies for status offenders.

In 1976, Spokane reported

898 status offenders, about 76% of whom were runaways, 13% uncontrollable
and 3% truant.
Spokane has an active volunteer population.
affiliates appeared to be financially healthy.
lncrea,;e frum Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977.

The National Assembly
All seven showed a budget

Five of the increases were

significantly larger than the cost of living increase.

The affiliates

appeared to have active relationships with their regional or national
offices.

Ten of the fourteen respondents knew the regional program person

or the national juvenile justice task force representative.

Eight reported

that they had received some or much communication from their national

offices about the collaboration.
It appeared originally

to both the site selection committee and the

evaluation that Spokane had a well developed pattern of inter-organizational
relations.
ment.

On more careful consideration, this was not an accurate assess-

The inter-organizational relationships were built around persons

rather than around organizations.

There are a great number of interlocking

board memberships which manifest themselves in split loyalties, interorganizational gossip and competition for individuals, but apparently little
inter-organizational cooperation.

Even the Spokane Area Youth Committee,

the inter-organizational planning body, considered its participants as
influential citizens, not as organizational representatives.

Because of

this, considerable jealousy and hostility between organizations was
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recorded in the interviews.

A considerable amount of inter-organizational hostility, bitterness
and jealousy in Spokane is reported in reference to United Way.

These

feelings appeared to have institutionalized inter-organizational suspicion,
reserve and lack of trust while preserving, on the surface,personal
relationships.
The relationships between public and private agencies appeared to
have been minimal, with some purchase of services from private agencies by
the public agencies.

The Spokane Area Youth Committee attempted inter-

systems planning by including both public agencies and private citizens.
The first communication to Spokane from the national collaboration was
in mid-February, 1976.

On March 4th, eighteen representatives of Spokane

agencies met to begin the collaborative process.

In early March the

National Director and national task force members made an initial site

visit and the local agencies committed themselves to the program.

A

representative from the Junior League assumed the role of chairperson at

the second meeting.
committees:

Tbe Spokane collaboration immediately formed five

steering, personnel, finance, nominating and program

development.

By late April, when the collaboration was informed of its

inclusion in the final selection, a statement of purpose had already
been developed.
From late April through August, the collaboration met at least monthly.
Officers were selected, the program development committee developed,
goals and objectives formulated and personnel committee began the search
for a staff person.

The chairperson reported that direction from the

national collaboration was primarily through "numerous phone calls 11

between national staff and the chairperson.

With the search for staff,

the chairperson resigned and the nominating committee had difficulty
replacing her.

A volunteer from the YMCA assumed the temporary chair role.

In late August, a member of the national staff returned to Spokane to
interview the final candidate for collaboration coordinator, and on

September 1 the position was filled.

The collaboration office was set up

in the SAYC office in an open area with no privacy or sense of work space.
By late summer, some uncertainty, frustration and dissatisfaction was

growing in the collaboration primarily around the leadership.

The

National Director spent two days in early October working with the Spokane
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staff person, the new chairperson and the collaboration to help the process.
The dissatisfaction continued and there was a noticable rise in behind-thescenes gossip, 'backbiting' and criticism.

at the collaboration meetings.

There was also open confrontation

The local executives were loathe to take

responsibility to reshape the collaboration at this point for fear that it
would appear to be a power play.
In early November the chairperson of the national collaboration
spent a day in Spokane working with the local agency executives.

He

worked toward getting them to take responsibility for the leadership of
the collaboration and to restructure the roles and tasks.

He discussed

with them various strategies that could be used for this necessary reorganization.

Following his visit, the entire executive committee resigned

with many rumors running through the various inter-locking boards.
In early December the National Director spent three days in Spokane
working with the coordinator and the collaboration members.

He worked to

diffuse the feelings of the group about the resignations and restructuring
and to plan strategies for the future.

An all day workshop had been

scheduled while he was there to develop program plans and priorities.
In the following weeks, the executives of the collaboration agencies
began the restructuring.

After a reluctant beginning the group discussed

extensively the pros and cons of the options.

They made several important

decisions about the structure of the collaboration.

There appeared to be

no schism between the affiliates and the non-affiliates at this meeting
and the beginning of rebuilding appeared to have occurred.

During the

remainder of December, the one major decision was that the executive of

the affiliates should comprise the program committee.

Reconstituted

committees worked hard at developing the phased action plan even though the
nominating committee had not named the new executive committee.

This

leaderless situation lasted until February when the collaboration voted
on an executive committee with a rotating chairperson.

Structural Factors

At the second meeting, when the first chairperson took office, two
crucial decisions on membership were made.

First, it was decided that the

collaboration should be composed of only non-profit organizations;
second, that agency staff should bow out and only committed volunteers
should participate in the collaboration.
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By the middle of May, however, it

became apparent to the volunteers that they could not make decisions that
affected their agency's programs without staff participation and so the
staff coordinator was invited back.

The first chairperson then appointed

both staff and volunteers to the collaboration committees.
In the reorganization meeting of the collaboration of December 9, 1976,
several structural decisions were made.

First, the program committee was

to be composed of the executive directors; second, the executive committee

would have six persons (plus the chairperson) at least half of whom would
be volunteers with decision making power--presidents or vice presidents of
boards; third, the chairperson should have leadership skills; fourth, the
chairperson should be a volunteer; fifth, the SAYC, Youth Alternatives and
United Way were to be non-voting members on the executive committee and

the program committee.
A major structural factor in Spokane was the relationship between the
Spokane DSO Grantee, the SAYC, the DSO program organization, Youth Alternatives, and the collaboration.

In the early months of the collaboration,

apparently before either collaboration staff or local agency staff were
involved, a working agreement was developed outlining the structure of the
relationship between the three groups called the Interlock.

This agreement

established a council through which, they would operate for "division of
labor, sharing of resources and other matters that would
avoid duplication" (Appendix E).
The crucial structure of the agreement was that the collaboration
would be housed in SAYC offices with the SAYC contracting to provide space,
secretarial, telephone, bookkeeping and payroll services as well as
supervisory support such as monitoring programs, community and agency
assessment and evaluation.

In late summer the Director of SAYC, who drew up the agreement, was
replaced.

The new administration of SAYC did not want the relationship

and in November withdrew from the Interlock.
developed after that.

No alternative relationship

The Spokane coordinator reported several attempts

to develop a working relationship to no avail.
Priority and Role of Chairperson.

The priority of the first chair-

person, a member of the Junior League, was to enable the groups to work
together.

She was really committed to collaboration and a firm believer in

the power of volunteers.

Much of the early work of the collaboration was
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because of her dedicated work.

She was without staff and with support

from the national office at a distance.

Though she was not observed

by the evaluation it is reported that she functioned in the role of
organizer and manager, allotting tasks and committee roles, keeping
records, and maintaining contact with the national office.

An interim chairperson took over when the first chairperson resigned.
He functioned through the development of job description and the hiring
of the coordinator and appointment of a permanent chair.
The third chairperson was a representative of a non-affiliate youth
serving agency.

His priority was to "get things rolling" toward results.

By the time he was appointed, the collaboration had been in operation
for seven months with little to show except the coordinator, a statement

of purpose and several operating committees.

He perceived the role of chairperson as directing the meeting with
the staff doing the work.

He felt that the collaboration should "be run

like you run your business; the volunteers just don't understand."

felt the pressure from national to produce but without direction.

He

He

also felt the pressure from SAYC was causing the collaboration to be
less independent.

tion members.

The chairperson had li.ttl e support from the collabora-

Although the affiliates had been unwilling to take leader-

ship themselves, they were critical of the leadership of the chairperson,
his style of operation, his style of operation, his interaction with them
and his role activities.

The general discontent with the leadership was

the issue about which the national collaboration intervened; the entire
executive committee then resigned.
Following the resignation of the executive committee, the collabora-

tion was without leadership for about three months because no one would
take the chair.
chairperson.

The collaboration finally voted to have a rotating

The second chairperson, who had been the interim chair-

person following the original chairperson, had continued to provide a
good deal of the leadership.
Priority and Role of Staff.

The Spokane coordinator was interviewed

by the evaluation team immediately after she was hired.

Her highest

priorities at that time were to attend meetings get to know people,

and develop some workshops.
via a newsletter.

She also mentioned developing communication

By the middle of October, she was aware of the problems
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of organizational structure and the problems of leadership in the collaboration and these became immediate priorities.

The coordinator's work style was to develop the supportive work for
the collaboration.
the operation.

She was aware of the jobs necessary to facilitate

She took care of administrative detail and worked toward

developing relationships with collaboration members.

She appears not

to have pushed her own ideas but to have enabled collaboration members
to develop theirs.

Table 19, Appendix A, shows that the coordinator

spent an average of 39% of her work time in administration/study/paperwork and 57% in meetings and personal interactions.
The staff person's role relationships with collaboration members
was to work behind the scenes to change the organizational structure; she

worked with collaboration members so that they could develop their own
ideas.
The role and style of the coordinator, combined with her inexperience,

affected the collaboration.

Many collaboration members reported that the

leadership was "weak" even in the fall of 1977, though the collaboration
programs had been planned and implemented as they wished.

The collabora-

tion perceived the coordinator's role as a leadership position rather

than a staffing position, even though the collaboration members were
loathe to give up any of their own power.
The staff-member relationships were generally good.

With the staff

in the background, there was little conflict around her ideas, or person
or her job performance.
National-Local Relationships.
ship was without conflict.
ask for help when needed.

The staff-national supervisory relation-

The staff person appeared to accept supervision,
While she expressed dissatisfaction with lack

of technical assistance and support from the national collaboration whe
generally did not become emotionally involved with the national-local
issues.

Process Factors

Most meetings in the Spokane collaboration were smooth and informational except for those prior to the restructuring sub-committee would
report on their activities and the progress of programs, were then related.
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Questions were raised and answered in a friendly non-hostile manner.

The

one exception was the activity of the SAYC representative who would often
raise the negative position, point out possible problems and difficulties,
and ask the probing questions.

A certain amount of control was exercised

in this way.
Communication

Process~

The communication process in the Spokane

collaboration was inclusive, with active participation by most members.
Table 22 in Appendix A shows that about 25% of actions were by the chairperson and 8% by the coordinator.

Another 25% were National Assembly

affiliates and 18% by other participants.

The SAYC and Youth Alternatives

(together constituting the DSO Grantee) were responsible for about 22%
of all actions.
In the earlier meetings the director of Youth Alternatives participated as the juvenile justice program expert, and the SAYC representative
often participated as the planning expert.
input in substantive information.

The coordinator had little

About February, 1977, the coordinator

began to participate more in the expert role.
The communication pattern was decentralized with many persons

participating before returning the floor to the chair or the coordinator.
Decision Making Process.

The decision making process appeared to

occur in the executive and steering committees and less in the other

sub-committees.

Table 21, Appendix A, indicates that 43% of agenda items

resulted in formal decision, considerably more than in the subcommittee.
This may indicate a more formal decision making process.

There was

practically no conflict in this decision making process.

However, the

members report that many of the directions of the collaboration came from
previous discussion around town, among the interlocking boards and that
by the time a formal vote was taken, there was no need for conflict.
Power Sub-Groups.

The active presence of power sub-groups was mentioned

in many of the interviews with both collaboration members and other
respondents.

The United Way and the SAYC and several of the affiliates

were considered to be the leaders depending upon the issue.

Several of

the program directions of the collaboration appeared to result from power
plays by a bloc to protect its own "turf."

Several of the least successful

programs appeared to be a result of lack of freedom to program where the
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strengths of the collaboration lay.

This is especially true of direct

service programs where the referral relationship with SAYC was problematic.
Process Outcomes

Even with the problematic process, the Spokane representatives were
generally positive in the outcome measures.

Table 23, Appendix A, indicates

that 10 of the 15 persons interviewed felt that the collaboration had
been very effective or moderately effective.

Seven of the 15 reported

that the collaboration was most effective in getting people together.
This confirms that the local agencies had had little previous interorganizational relationships.

Six of the remaining eight mentioned advocacy

or capacity building and one mentioned direct service.
Most of the Spokane respondents would involve their agencies again.
Only two reported that they would not.
Conclusions About the Spokane Collaboration Process
Several factors appeared to affect the development and operation
of the Spokane collaboration.

First, about six months elapsed between

the start of the collaboration and the beginning of the staff work
because of LEAA's special condition.

During this early organizing period

there was a change in collaboration membership and leadership so that when
the coordinator began there was not a large core of people who had been
involved continually.
longer activea

Several of the most active and committed were no

The new members were not socialized into the structures

that the national collaboration thought necessary.
Second, with the six month start up time and the leadership crisis,
nearly nine months elapsed before the collaboration had any sense of
accomplishment.

Third, the lack of consistent leadership was problematic

to the collaboration.
Fourth, the structural relationships between SAYC, YA·and the
collaboration early in the collaboration exacerbated several problems
such as competition for power in the juvenile justice field.

Fifth, the decision to exclude the public sector was a real problem
especially when programs developed which required working relationships
with public agencies.

Finally, interlocking activity among private

agency representatives in Spokane had an impact on new programs.
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The Spokane collaboration moved a long way toward building working
relationships among the non-profit agencies.

They, more than many of

the collaborations, had to face the factors of commitment and ownership.
The staff person, operating as their employee rather than as their leader,
forced them to consider the issue of leadership,

They faced less effectively

the issues of political intrigue and power among competing organizations
and the public-private sector interaction.

When these issues have been

addressed, we feel that the active voluntary sector in Spokane can use its
energies in a creative way to serve problem youth.
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The Connecticut Collaboration
Connecticut is an industrial East Coast state of over 3,000,000
inhabitants.

It is relatively small with much religious, ethnic, economic

and political diversity.

The history of Connecticut's cultural diversity

is, to some extent, a remnant from the pre-revolutionary

divisions.

war township

In other ways the diversity relates to the economic patterns.

The southwest corner, extending from Bridgeport on the coast to Danbury
inland, contains suburbs of New York City and some of the wealthier
cities in the country.
Many residents are highly educated professionals with heavy concentrations of New York executive personnel, lawyers and bankers.

Many national

corporations have moved their headquarters out of New York City to take
advantage of the pleasant suburbs and the lower taxes of this part of
Connecticut.
Other sections are heavily industrialized.

These areas have a

concentration of immigrants or citizens of foreign parentage who came

for jobs in the factories and are first to be unemployed when industry
leaves.

The flight of New England manufacturers to the Sun Belt haR

left pockets of unemployment and generally depressed economic conditions.
In addition, the northern sections of the state and some of the coast
contain agricultural and fishing industries, many of which epitomize the
New England Yankee conservative cultural and political stance.
The national collaboration originally selected the whole state of
Connecticut as the site for several reasons:

The DSO public grantee was

a state agency, it would provide an opportunity to test a collaborative
model on a state basis, and several coalitions of human service organizations
were already operating in Connecticut on a state-wide basis.

After several

months of deliberation and negotiations, it became apparent that state
wide program collaboration was not feasible.

Ratherthanmove to a local

site, the state committee decided upon a regional collaboration in western

Connecticut for delivery of capacity building and direct service programs
while retaining the advocacy programs on the state level.

Subsequently

three towns in western Connecticut were selected for actual programs

administered through the regional office--Danbury, Waterbury and Torrington.
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Western Connecticut

Background Factors
The local collaboration site in Connecticut is most of Western
Connecticut, an area corresponding to Region A of the State Human Service
Districts divisions.

The region encompasses a 42-town area covering a

1,365 square miles with a population of 475,070.

The area is extremely

diverse socially, economically, geographically, and politically.
distinct types of communities are in the region:
suburban.

Three

urban, rural and

Median 1969 incomes ranged from $9,775 in Bridgewater, a

small semi-rural town, to $16,833 in Ridgefield, an urban New York City
"bedroom 11 community.

Eventually, the state steering committee decided to develop three
local collaborations in Region A rather than only one.

A regional executive

committee with representatives from each would make policies, work with

staff and be a liaison body with the national collaboration.

IVhile this

decision appeared to be largely political, it did present the opportunity
to test the regional concept of delivery of collaborative programs and to
determine the extent to which collaborations could be viable without full
staff.

The nationrt_l Htrtff had warned the Connecticut collaboration

earlier of the problem of trying to stretch the program funds over such a
wide area.

The three collaboration sub-regions mirrored the state's diversity.
The northwest section centered in Torrington, a town of about 32,000.
Torrington was reported by collaboration members to be a manufacturing
town with conservative status-quo attitudes.

It retained the rural-farm

cultural patterns and attitudes considered typical New England Yankee.
The area is stable or declining in population as young people move away.
The Torrington area was reported by collaboration members to be a
picture of economic contrasts.

On one hand, a sizeable blue-collar

population commuted 50 miles daily to Hartford because the pay scale was
so low in Torrington.

On the other hand, the area had a number of persons

with old wealth, illustrated by the large show-place mansions and estates.
As in most of Connecticut, there is considerable town loyalty among
the population in the northwest area.

Torrington and Winsted, a nearby

town, have long-standing feelings of competition and separation referred to
by respondents as "local nationalism."
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Waterbury, with a stable population of about 113,000, is the center
of the southeastern portion of Region A.

An industrial hub with several

Eastern European ethnic populations, Waterbury is surrounded by 13 towns.
Currently, the economy is depressed, with 7.2% unemployment for December,
1977, the highest rate in Connecticut.
Danbury, with a population of 57,000, is the center of the southwestern
area of Region A.

It is a town in transition from old native New England

to New York middle management commuters.

While the area is growing, the

political control remains in the hands of long-term residents.

This

means that growth of human services has not kept pace with population
growth.
The DSO Grantee in Connecticut was a council on Human Services, a

state public structure coordinating 11 different departments responsible
for service to youth.

With a change of administration following the 1976

election, the Governor of Connecticut abolished the Council on Human
Services.

The Department of Children and Youth Services was than chosen

to administer the DSO project.
Connecticut's DSO program attempted to test three service delivery
models:

maximum intervention with follow-up community services, limited

crisis intervention with counseling by court personnel and with no followup, and limited crisis intervention services with no follow-up.

The three

models were to be tested in three different areas of the state.

Testing

the latter two models in areas where the collaboration existed presented
a substantial problem for the DSO Grantee.

While the director of the

DSO public grant agency was enthusiastic in his support of the collaboration, the above problem required that the collaboration work with a
status offender population which would not be involved with the DSO
project.
From January to March, 1975, Connecticut had 648 status offender
cases referred to the courts.
in the state detention centers.

with truancy in second place.

About 25% of them were institutionalized
The largest number of cases were runaways,

There were 209 status offenders from

Region A in 1975-76.
However, as the collaboration completed their community needs
assessment, the public schools and youth bureau estimated that an additional
986 youth had committed status offenses without being in the juvenile
justice system.

It was the status offenders from Region A who were not
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participating in the DSO project, and the non-adjudicated youth population
for whom the collaboration ultimately planned and provided service.
The National Assembly affiliates in Region A were not easily
identified.

The regional organization of the affiliates were not contig-

uous with the boundaries of Region A or the sub-region.

For instance,

one of the sub-regions included Girl Scouts from two different councils,
neither located in the region.

This fact made the membership decisions

ambiguous and time commitment to the collaboration from staff difficult.
The financial situation of the affiliates was declining.

Two-thirds

of those on which we had data reported a decline in United Way funds in
late 1977.

About one-half reported that other funds have been cut.

Although they were located closest to their national offices, the
Region A affiliates reported less relationship with national office about
the collaboration than the affiliates at other sites.

Fewer than half

knew the names of either national or regional representatives.

Only

15% reported any communication from national representatives about the

collaboration.

Some of this communications gap could result from the late

September choice of Region A as the Connecticut local site.
The Connecticut collaboration began with an agreement by three
Connecticut State groups to co-sponsor an initial meeting in March,l976.
The three groups were the Connecticut Association for Human Services,

The Connecticut Coalition for Justice for Children and the Connecticut
22
Child Welfare Association.
The meeting was convened in Hartford with
interested affiliates and other youth serving agencies.

The national

staff, national task force members and the DSO Grantee described the
project and invited their interest.
For several months, the collaboration functioned on the state level
with the national staff and task force members actively involved with
decisions of procedure philosophy and structure.

Eventually the local

nature of delivery of service by the affiliates and communities in the
State led the collaboration to choose a local site.
The decision at to which local area the collaboration would move was
a difficult one for the collaboration to solve.
22

Hartford and Bridgeport

The Child Welfare League of America was originally a member of
the national collaboration but dropped out late in 1976. The local
affiliate, however, remained involved.

1M

were excluded because a special emphasis program being tested in
Bridgeport and Hartford was perceived to receive more than its share of
human service programs·because of its status as State Capital.

In June

three proposals for local sites were presented to the national collaboration.

Waterbury was chosen as the primary site and New London as an

alternative site.

The Waterbury proposal was later expanded to include

all of Region A.

There were feelings reported by some respondents that

the latter decisions were made because of meetings "stacked" with
representatives from Waterbury and Danbury.
The state steering committee met through the summer with the national
staff.

They drafted a statement of purpose, a plan of action, the organi-

zational structure and a job description for project staff.

In late

August, they began screening applications for staff and recruited representatives 'from Region A for the steering committee.

In early September the

coordinator was hired, to begin work in late September.
By late August, a local and autonomous regional steering committee

was instituted in order for the regional collaboration to be viable.

A

regional meeting was held September 17th and the transition was made at
that time.

Several key people from Region A had been active in the state

collaboration.

These people then assumed the leadership of the regional

collaboration.

The state steering committee retained management of the

advocacy component of the project while the regional committee managed
the capacity building and direct services components.

That meeting broke

up into the three sub-regional groups with the representatives agreeing
to form coalitions or work through already in-place coalitions.
On October 8th, the new regional collaboration met as a temporary
steering committee.

It was presented with a staff person who had already

been hired, a nearly finalized structure and a January 1 deadline for
their phased action plan.

At that point the staff person had no office

of secretary; the regional committee was meeting to work together for

the first time, local collaboration had not met and the community needs
assessment on which programs were to be based not even begun.

October, November and December were spent establishing the structure
of the collaboration, working on membership and setting up the office.
The permanent office in Southbury was between Waterbury and Danbury in
a pleasant suburban shopping center.
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During the first three months of 1977, the three collaborations
were rushing to do their community and agency needs assessments in preparation for developing the phased action plans.

In both Danbury and

Waterbury, the membership was still quite fluid and no working core had
developed.
the plan.

The regional committee appointed a sub-committee to develop
The staff person had to work with the three local groups,

continue to build membership of public and non-profit agencies, encourage
the needs assessment and guide the development of the plan.
In early April, the plan was submitted to the national collaboration
for approval.

Its basic elements were for an increase in regional staff

to contract out and monitor programs implemented by local agencies.

Some

of the programs appeared not to be new and few were to be implemented
by affiliates.

The plan was not completely acceptable to either the

national staff or LEAA.

It was top heavy with regional support staff,

and the amount of support of the direct service programs appeared low and
in some cases.

The grants to programs appeared to be reimbursements for

programs already begun.
Although the national staff clearly accepted much of the Connecticut
phased action plan, requiring revision of some elements completely and

revision of only some words and phrases of other elements, the Region A
collaboration perceived the response as rejection of their ability and as
interference with their autonomy.

These feelings blossomed into a four

month battle between the Region A collaboration and the national staff.
Much of the local energy appears to have been directed toward this hostility
rather than toward revision of the plan or mobilizing for implementation.
Region A's delay in revising the plan combined with the national
staffs' delay in immediately responding to their demands for a meeting
generated continuing hostility, with the coordinator interpreting the
communication between the two.

The Connecticut representative perceived

the National Director as obstructing the LEAA's sign off and their ability
to continue.

The National Director considered Connecticut's demands

unreasonable in view of the fact that they had failed to revise their
23
plans.
The situation came to a head at a July 29th meeting of all
23

The National Director reported that his neck was in traction and his
mother was dying during this period.
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Region A collaborations.

Following this meeting, a Torrington member

wrote a letter to National staff expressing the feelings of the groups,
and the group arranged to go to New York and "lay it on the table" to
the national staff.
The conflict was fairly well resolved at the New York meeting.

It

became apparent to some of the local representatives that the perception
of New York as the enemy was not accurate.

The national collaboration

staff seemed to be helpful and genuinely concerned with having the phased
action plan accepted.

The New York meeting also surfaced some real

incongruities between the Torrington and Danbury ideas of program,
(Waterbury was not represented.)

Some of the problems between the local

collaborations had been hidden behind the attention of the group to the
outside enemy and New York.
The local staff person lost some credibility because of the New York
meetings.

She had been the lens through which the Connecticut members

and the New York staff had viewed each other.
that the lens was somewhat distorted.

It was apparent to both

It also became apparent that some

of the delay in approval was her failure to make minor changes in the
plan.

The changes were made by the group in their hotel one evening and

presented to the national staff next day.
In late August, 1977, the plan was finally accepted and implementation began.

Almost immediately a different set of conflicts between

the Connecticut staff and the New York staff began.

The local staff

person, in order to get the programs moving, began hiring staff, letting
contracts and appeared to change programs previously agreed upon without
allowing New York to approve the decisions and apparently without the full
input of local decision makers.

A final straw occurred when the

Connecticut coordinator read the Oakland coordinator's letter of resignation

to the collaboration.

That letter was extremely hostile toward the

National Director.

Upon hearing of these activities, the National Director contacted
most of the local leaders to discuss termination of the coordinator.

He

went to Connecticut, terminated the coordinator on the spot and asked her
to leave.

A local volunteer became interim coordinator while a search was

instituted.

In November a new coordinator was hired to start immediately.
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Structural Factors
The organizational structure, which appeared viable on paper, was
in reality problematic.

Obtaining the size of staff necessary to solidify

the structure and to firm the commitment of the affiliates as well as
other members was not possible.
of the territory.

One coordinator was responsible for all

The regional collaboration, therefore, tended to build

on the previous inter-organizational relationships of local chairpersons
and the priorities of the local staff personnel rather than to rather
than to initiate new structures to address the issues of status offenders.
The Region A collaboration had representatives from the three local
collaborations and operated a regional planning body for direct services
and capacity building programs.

The Waterbury collaboration, in the

largest city, had a moderate to large membership of 43 with 11 listed
affiliates, but with no continuing core of affiliates committed to pushing
for the collaboration.
meeting.

The membership varied radically from meeting to

It was difficult to get a membership list because people would

come several times and never return.

The Danbury collaboration was also

large, with only seven affiliates among its 47 members.
public organizations.
homogeneous group,
Torrington.

It reported 23

The Torrington collaboration was a much smaller

built upon a coalition that had recently started in

Five of the nine non-profit members were National Assembly

affiliates and another two were affiliates whose national organizations
were not members of the national collaboration.
The regional Connecticut collaboration made a special arrangement with
the Court for referral of status offenders.

It was necessary for the

collaboration to make other arrangements to work with public agencies who
identify and refer other problem youth.

This meant working with health

officials, police and schools of 42 towns.

The numbers of organizations

that became legitimately involved was overwhelming.

The lack of resources

to really build collaboration of these organizations is quite obvious.
Priority and Role of Staff.

The first coordinator perceived her role

as a professional expert in the field of services to status offenders and
a manager.

Her first tasks were to build on her previous contacts with

the public juvenile justice system in Connecticut to help educate the
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non-profit sector.

This role perception is consistent with the job

description of coordinator through which she was hired.

A copy is found

in Appendix E.
In the two-page job description, non-profit or voluntary agencies
are not mentioned at all.

The phrase 'National Assembly affiliate' is

mentioned twice but with no mention of working with voluntary agencies.
The phrase 'work with volunteers' is the only indication of the non-profit
field.

The major emphasis of the job description is on fiscal and program

management, staff support to committee, supervision of staff, liaison
with various groups, and public relations.

The staff operational style reflects the above description of the
role.

Her reported activities early in the collaboration history were

heavily weighted toward building relationships with influential local,
public agencies, state-wide legislators and state government administrators.

This is supported by the response of the first interviews of November and
December, 1976, when 77% of the 39 persons interviewed who had attended
some meetings or who were local affiliates had not met the staff person.
The interim coordinator was a volunteer and a member of the regional
committee and the Danbury collaboration.

While she performed many of the

jobs necessary to undo some actions of the first coordinator, she never

really perceived herself in a staff role.

Her role continued as it had

been before; a knowledgeable, active, well respected person, with whom
some did not agree.

After an extensive search, the second coordinator was hired, also from

the Danbury area.

She was an able, intelligent person but was perceived

as an outsider to many of the collaboration members.

Many felt that she

had loyalty to New York, rather than to the local collaborators.
The first coordinator's perception of the proper role with committee
members also reflected her role perception.

She felt that ideas for the

collaboration programs would come primarily from her own expertise.
felt she needed to educate people about who status offenders are.

She
She

worried about being co-opted by local chairpersons or committees into
following their ideas rather than her own.
Little conflict appeared in Connecticut over role expectations of
the regional coordinator and the local members.

The coordinator did not

staff the local collaboration meetings, attending only about half of them.
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The regional representatives accepted her planning-management role on the
regional level and had little expectation of local support.

They also

accepted her role as liaison with New York and the DSO Grantee.

The

small amount of personal or professional support from the local representatives, however, was frustrating to the coordinator.

She reported a need

for more feed-back from the local collaborations about her activities.
National-Local Relationships.

The Connecticut regional coordinator's

relationship with the national staff, however, was in continual conflict.
She perceived that the levels of approval of programs from local to
regional to national to LEAA was cumbersome.
direct relationship to LEAA.

She argued strongly for a

Her own role perception of management and

planning for three local collaboration was similar to the National Director's
perception of his role.
of her role.

National, however, did not accept her perception

The supervisory relationship with the National Director

was affected by their developing personal incompatibility.
illustrated the structural problems of control.

It more clearly

Since it was the site

nearest to New York, there was more participation from both the national

staff and the national task force.

At one point, the Connecticut

coordinator was receiving contradictory assistance from a national task
force member and a national staff person.

Furthermore, the local members were closer to New York, could telephone
about their problems and therefore could go around the expertise of the
local coordinator to the expertise of the national staff.
Priority and Role of Chairpersons.

The state chairperson was a

volunteer member of the National Council of Jewish Women.

She had been

active in the Connecticut Association for Human Services and was an early

founder of the Coalition for Justice for Children.

Her interest and support

gave the impetus for the Connecticut collaboration for its initial six
months on the state level.

When it became regional, she remained as the

chairperson of the state collaboration where most of the Connecticut
advocacy program was implemented.
Her role was perceived consistently as enabling changes in the system
for dealing with children.

To this end she worked through state public and

non-profit agencies as an internal advocate, an external educator and a

legislative prodder.
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The local chairpersons were different in each site.

The Waterbury

chairperson was a director of a program which was already a collaboration
between one affiliate and public agencies in Waterbury.

He had been on

the state steering committee and was instrumental in bringing the collaboration to Region A.

The chairperson remained the keystone of the

Waterbury collaboration.

The Torrington chairperson was the executive

of a National Assembly affiliate in Winsted, a neighboring town.

His

perception of the role was to organize efficiently and effectively.

He

was concerned that the power of his own agency not be a barrier to
collaboration.

His priority was to bring program money into the community

for the good of youth.
The first Danbury chairperson was the executive of a local coordinating
planning body, the Danbury Area United Social Service.

He had been active

in the state collaboration and was also instrumental in bringing the
collaboration to Region A.

He was a dynamic, intelligent person with

great personal charm and charisma.

His agency was funded primarily by

Community Action Program funds which were expiring.

He perceived the

collaboration as a means to continuing what he felt was a vital service

in Danbury.
His role was primarily to get local agencies to understand the
problems as he did.

In meetings he tended to interact as an expert

rather than as a presider.
Process Factors

The nature of the collaboration meetings varied within the three
collaborations and at the regional level.
Process at the Regional Collaboration.

The Region A collaboration

seemed to work well together with good relationships.

The chairperson,

also chair of the Waterbury collaboration, acted primarily in a chair
capacity.

There were usually three active members of the Torrington

collaboration, two active Danbury collaboration members and one or two

other active Waterbury members.
Communications usually followed the pattern of a report with
discussion and the decisions made.
reporter would answer questions.

The report would be made and the
After a report, a dialogue between the

reporter and one or two other participants would occur.
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Other than the

chairperson, the coordinator and three other participants were most
active (two from Torrington and one from Danbury).

Table 22, Appendix A,

indicates the distribution of action with 43% of the acts attributed to
two of the most active non-affiliates.
The decision making process was fairly formal with votes following
the discussion.

Table 21 in Appendix A shows that 56% of all agenda items

were settled by a formal decision.
The power blocs at regional level really represent each collaboration.
In the end there were two that had impact, Danbury and Torrington.
Process in Waterbury.
got off the ground.

The Waterbury collaboration process hardly

The meetings themselves varied greatly in both size

and energy from month to month.

The coordinator was often not there at

all, came late or participated little.

The records showed that many

representatives attended one or two times only.

Even so, the meetings

were friendly and the group got along well with each other.

The inter-

views of Waterbury respondents indicate a degree of hopelessness and
cynicism along with the desire to try anything.
The communication process in the Waterbury collaboration was similar
to a meeting rather than_a working committee.
given and a few questions asked.
was necessary at each meeting.

Informative reports were

Because of the turnover, much explanation
The chairperson, of necessity, was most

active in the meetings both presiding and explaining.
exchange and discussion was low in Waterbury.

The level of

Many representatives,

including two representatives of National Assembly affiliates, came once
or twice, sat through the meetings, asked one or two questions and never

returned.
The first coordinator also had a low level of participation.

At two

collaboration meetings observed for the collaboration she said nothing
during the meetings.
Few decisions were made in Waterbury.

Table 21 in Appendix A shows

that only 18% of items discussed were followed by a decision.

Even

programs for the phased action plan were not decided in the meeting but a
list was circulated from which members were to choose projects.

We are not aware of power blocs operating in the Waterbury collaboration.

It is apparent that the chairperson's agency would have some
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influence on collaboration decisions because of his own dedicated commitment and participation.
Process in Danbury.

The Danbury collaboration held large meetings

with active participation by a core membership.

There was constant

turnover in Danbury but there was a larger constant group.

The observer

reported good relationships in the group with good humor and laughter
often reported.
The Communication process in the group consisted of much reporting
of progress and reports of activity to keep the members up-to-date on
regional collaboration matters.

The chairperson or another member of

his agency acted as the program-planning expert and directed the process.
There was little opposition to ideas supported by these two members.
participation of affiliates was very low in the process.
action was by affiliate,

non~

The

Only 9% of all

of whom was in the core group or perceived

as influential by interview respondents.

The first coordinator's

participation, when present, was to answer questions directed to her

and to make reports on regional activities and planning matters.

The

second coordinator appeared to follow the same role.
The decision making appears not to have been done in the meetings.
Only 17% of items raised in the agenda were followed by formal decisions.
Rather, it appears that the decisions for Danbury were made regionally
and reported locally or that a small core of collaboration members made
the major decisions.

The presence of a power bloc in Danbury is indicated by the nature of
the meetings and responses to the first interview.

It was a leadership

bloc which wanted to plan for and direct the collaboration's programs.
Its power appears to have discouraged active participation by others in
the work of the collaboration,

In late 1977, when two of the members

resigned, both the Danbury collaboration and programs were left with major
problems.
Process in Torrington.

The Torrington collaboration was a much

smaller group with a history in the recent past of at least meeting with
each other and a high proportion of non-profit organizations.
were lively and enthusiastic.
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Meetings

The communication process was primarily controlled by the chairperson.

However, during discussion ?r issues, the participation was

vigorous by most members.
other affiliates an
on that report.

The chairperson averaged 30% of the acts and

additional 45%.

Anyone reporting led the discussion

The first coordinator, when present, participated little.

She answered questions but did not appear to direct energies or discussions.
Much of the decision making occurred during the course of the meetings.
This is reflected in Table 21, Appendix A.

The decisions were worked

out with vigorous participation among participants and little hostility.
The meetings were small enough to give everyone an opportunity to participate without dragging the flow of the meeting.
While there did not appear to be power blocs in Torrington there
were several marginal participants in the decisions of the collaboration
generally representing women's affiliates.

Process Outcomes
Despite the problems_ recorded earlier, the process outcomes in

Connecticut were fairly favorable.

Although only 57% reported that they

would involve their agencies again, six of the seven affiliates (86%)
interviewed said they would probably participate again.

These interviews

were taken at the time of termination of the first coordinator when
spirits were at their lowest.

At that same time 28% of respondents said the collaboration was
very or moderately effective and another 43% said, hopefully, it was too
early to tell.

Fifty percent of respondents felt the collaboration had

been most effective in getting people together.
Conclusions About the Connecticut Collaboration Process
The Connecticut collaboration started with several major situational
disadvantages.

The nature of the grant and the subsequent decision over

locality, clients, population and referral procedures required much time
from the national staff and task force.

Consequently, they were able to

devote less time to the local problems.
Several additional factors around structure and process contributed
to the problem.

Since they have been discussed above, we will merely

list them here.
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1.

The lack of staff support necessary to build three new organizations.

2.

The lack of lead time and staff available to build interagency trust before collaborative planning.

3.

The decision to have a regional body coordinating three such
different groups in such different areas with such different
needs.

4.

The unrealistic expectations on staff to give support to four
new organizations, with a total of 15 to 20 committees with
membership to enlist, use and support of 117 agencies scattered
over 1,365 square miles.

5.

Local chairpersons with declining budgets and little spare time
to do major additional collaboration-related staff work.

6.

Local leaders who appeared to be pushing their own agenda rather
than the collaboration agenda.

7.

Interpersonal and role conflict between local and national staff.

Even with its turbulent history and many unresolved conflicts, the
Connecticut regional collaboration during its 14 months of existence has
mobilized tremendous energy.

If the staff were available to support their

energy in each site, both the capacity building programs and direct
services could be among the most productive of all of the collaborations.
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CHAPTER 4
LESSONS FROM THE EVALUATION
We have reported on the collaboration program and the collaboration
process in the previous chapter, following as closely as possible the
strict rules of evidence in quantitative analysis.

In this chapter we

would like to combine those results with some of the other more qualitative
findings of the evaluation.

Our presentation and interpretation come

from many sources, the collaboration staff, the field researchers, the
research literature, the voluminous data not included in the report, and
our own intuition.

This chapter has three purposes:

first, to give some guidance to

groups attempting to replicate inter-organizational collaboration programs;
second, to suggest some hypotheses for further study of the phenomena

studied in this evaluation; and third, to suggest some procedure that will
make the relationship between research and program more productive for
both.
Guidelines for Inter-Organizational Collaboration
We will briefly discuss four areas that should be resolved for interorganizational collaboration to be successful:

ground-rule decisions,

structural decisions, program decisions and conflict-resolution decisions.

Ground Rule Decisions
There are four decisions that set the stage for inter-organizational
activity and structure.

In the beginning stage of collaboration, these

decisions should be made explicit and some degree of consensus achieved.
Is the Collaboration for Planning or for Program?

Planning and

program collaborations have quite different tasks, require different
memberships and have different outcomes.
have a large heterogeneous membership.
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A planning collaboration can
The wider the representation around

a problem, the more complete the plan will be.

Members can include influ-

ential persons, professional experts, members of the potential client
groups, organizational representatives, political representatives, volunteers

and staff.

The plan and the planning process require little organizational

input other than time.

However, since the outcome of such a collaboration

is a strategy or plan, hopefully with some commitment of resources of the
planners, organizational representatives should be included.

A planning

collaboration requires less commitment of the total organization since only
one or two people are actually involved.

However, the degree of inter-

organizational relationship achieved is also apt to be less intense.
A program collaboration requires a smaller, more homogeneous group
with similar clients or potential clients, values, methods of operation,
resources and power.

Where the collaborating organizations are not similar,

the collaboration must be carefully structured to minimize differences
between them, especially power inequalities.
The Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration was, to some extent, both
a planning and a program collaboration.

During the early stages of the

program, the planning was intense and the participation was maximum.

As

the programs were implemented, the general energy level decreased, a
"let-down" was experienced and only organizations involved with

tation remained really satisfied.

implemen~

If the relationship between the task

and the type of structure needed had been explicit, some of the problems
about let-down, change of role, frustration and rewards might have been
avoided.
Are the Goals of the Collaboration Primarily Programs or Processes?
A second decision necessary in inter--organizational relationships is the

importance of the process goals relative to the program goals.

Inter-

organizational collaborations organize most effectively around specific
issues or programs.

While the two types of goals are not mutually

exclusive, their relative importance affects a number of structural
decisions.

Collaboration as an organization to achieve program goals requires
strong central staff leadership with program expertise and a structure
organized around the program goals,
Collaborating as organizations to build a process requires staff
persons with training and skills in interpersonal relationships
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and an

organizational structure which is more responsive to the development of
the representatives' expertise in relation to a program or issue.

When inter-organizational goals have a limited time for achievement,
the process of building inter-organizational trust and work style receives
much lower priority.
Who are the Collaboration Members;

Individuals or Organizations?

For inter-organizational program collaboration to be viable, representatives
must represent the organization in some capacity, whether from the stance
of staff, board, membership, volunteer or client.

Furthermore, a person

only marginally related to the agency does not really perform as a representative of that agency.
One of the problems of the national juvenile justice collaboration
was that organizational representatives of some of the larger organizations
acted as individuals rather than organizational representatives.

They had

neither knowledge of the larger perspective of their organizations nor
opportunity for input from the collaboration into their organizations'
decisions.

Their votes and actions on issues and programs were taken

without reference to their organizations.

These decisions did not bind

or even influence their organizations' cooperation.

What Stages of Collaboration has the Community Developed?

A final

decision at the start of inter-organizational collaboration is to determine
the stage of collaboration that has been previously achieved.

We would

suggest that there are five stages in the development of collaboration:
l.

Meeting around a common problem or issue

2.

Getting to know each other

3.

Developing a working style

4.

Developing programs or plans

5.

Developing trust and respect.

The development of trust and respect may never occur, may occur after
the development of plans and programs or may occur simultaneously with
these developments.

Figure 7 illustrates the progression.
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FIGURE 7
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION
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An area with a history of inter-organizational collaboration,

if it

has been satisfying to participants, requires less effort and time for
further collaboration than an area without this history or with some
dissatisfactory collaboration.
Structural Decisions
Once the ground rule decisions have been made, the structure of inter-

organizational collaboration can be clarified and explicated.

These decisions

should be made by participants but with the guidance of some outside
professional.

Obviously these decisions will be made within the context

of the community, the nature of the problem or issue and the explicit
ground-rule decisions discussed in the previous section.
We perceive five major structural decisions:

goal-priority decisions,

membership decisions, leadership decisions, staff decisions and control
decisions.

In this section we will pose questions that correspond to

evaluation results reported in detail in Chapter 3.
Goals and Priorities.

The major goal of the juvenile justice

collaborations was deinstitutionalization of status offenders.

This was

not, however, a program goal but rather the over-all guiding value.

The

project was designed to enable institutional change that would ultimately
lead to community services for status offenders and other children at
risk.

Realistic program goals must be more narrowly focused than such a

general statement.

Program goals should be explicitly defined, measurable

against program outcomes and realistic in terms of organizational

resources~

Following are some of the important questions about goals and priorities:
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1.

What are all of the specific goals of our activity?

2.

How important to us are institutional maintenance, future funding,
staff development, community support, buildings and grounds?

3.

What are our most important priorities among our program goals,
process goals and maintenance?

4.

Does our allocation of resources (money, staff time and committee
time) reflect our stated priorities?

5.

Is there consensus among the membership about goals and priorities?

6.

How will we deal with any lack of consensus?

Membership.
collaboration.

Membership was discussed previously relative to types of
Other membership decisions need to be made, relative to

the goals and priorities and the issues or problems of the collaboration.
In the juvenile justice collaborations, for instance, when advocacy was a
high priority, wider membership was functional for wider contacts.

When

capacity building of affiliates was a.high priority, a more focused working
membership was functional.

The following questions are appropriate:

1.

Who should belong to the collaboration and why?

2.

Do we want only working members?

3.

Are we willing to have some members in name only?

4.

How much staff time do we want to allocate to developing
commitment of members and potential members?

5.

How large a membership do we want? (Large groups are not functional
as decision making bodies or as work·groups.)

6.

How homogeneous do we want our membership?
the more consensus, the less conflict.)

7.

Is the presence of potential client groups, power minorities,
competing groups and funding sources in our membership functional
toward our specific goals?

8.

What is the basis for membership?

9.

What roles and activities are expected of members?

Leadership.

Who and why?

(The more homogeneous

Leadership in the various juvenile justice collaborations

was somewhat dependent on the local cultures.

Several questions, however,

are appropriate when developing the leadership of inter-organizational
collaboration.
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1.

Will the leader's primary loyalty be to the collaboration or is
the vested interest in the parent organization too strong? In
the juvenile justice collaborations, the best leadership came
from volunteers rather than from staff. (A staff person's major
interest and commitment must be to his/her own job. Volunteers
are more likely to develop stronger loyalty to organizations
which they chair.)

2.

Does the leader have a real commitment to the collaboration's
goals?

3.

Is the leader able to guide without forcing his/her own priorities?

4.

Does the leader have inter-personal skills and experience in
leadership, especially in the voluntary sector?

5.

Does the leader have the personal qualities required to gain
respect from the membership? (The leader does not need to have
professional characteristics.)

Staff.

The staff person in an inter-organizational collaboration is

the only participant without a role in a supporting organization.

The

staff person, and perhaps the voluntary leadership, are the only participants
for whom the collaboration is the major work priority.
staff person in a very vulnerable position.

This puts the

On one hand, staff personnel

lead, direct, cajole, and enable the members to reach the collaboration
goals.

On the other hand, if they are too far ahead of the membership,

the organization can let them sink.

We have already mentioned that staff

should be hired to fit specific collaboration group-rule decisions.

Some

additional questions to be considered:
1.

Does the staff person understand non-profit organizations, the
functions of committees and boards and the staff function in
such organizations?

2.

Has the staff person had experience with the working of non-profit
organizations?

3.

Does the staff person respect volunteers and the contribution to
human services of the voluntary sector?

4.

Does the staff person have skills in inter-personal relationships,
social work, community organization?

(This is more important

than knowledge about the juvenile justice system because the
latter is more easily acquired.)
5.

Does the staff person show ego problems?
motivate self rather than members?
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Will the staff have to

6.

Is the staff person well organized to handle the tremendous detail
involved in staffing committees, developing membership, planning
and/or programs, organizing and managing an organization?

7.

Does the staff work style fit the major priorities of goals
previously decided? (If maintenance is a priority, a managerexecutive; if process is a priority, a facilitator, enabler;
if program is important, a professional with program expertise.)

Decisions about the professional and personal characteristics of staff
personnel are crucial in inter-organizational collaborations.

The issues

should be discussed openly before a job description is adopted.

The

actual duties and the lines of supervision of potential staff should be
explicated and some consensus of the body reached before the search begins.
If the collaboration reaches some consensus on roles of staff, it may very
well resolve issues which otherwise would lead to conflict.
Control Decisions.

The location of control is another crucial issue

of a collaboration and must be resolved openly.

In this program, the

control by the national collaboration raised problems after the fact.
Had some of the potential conflicts been anticipated, methods to deal
with the conflicts in responsibility and supervision might have been
avoided.
Control decisions depend on the source of financing, the nature of
clients, the control of a specific profession and governmental regulation.
We have no answers to the dilemna posed by dual control.

However, unless

there is agreement between participants at all levels over goals, priorities
and the ground rules previously mentioned, problems of control and accountability will be compounded.
Program Decisions

The actual development of program depends on factors such as what is
already in the community, what is needed, the budget, available staff,
the nature of the client group, the structure and history of the sponsoring
group, and the location of clients and programs.

The juvenile justice

collaboration programs were effective to the degree to which the
following questions were addressed:
1.

Were desired outcomes of each program specified?
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2.

Were the program activities designed so that they related
logically to specific program outcomes?

3.

Was there an attempt to evaluate whether or not program activities
actually did reach program outcomes?

4.

Was there a clear plan to implement programs?

5.

Was there a structure of accountability that would permit the
plan to be carried through?

6.

Were clear incentives or rewards provided for all collaboration
activities, both planning and program activities? (Altruism is
seldom a sufficient reward for the input of organizational
resources. To be really effective, a program should provide
both long term and short term rewards; rewards for both planning
and program; and rewards for both organizational and individual
input.)

Conflict-Resolution Decisions
No matter how similar the backgrounds or perspectives of organizations
or people, their positions will never be completely congruent.

Therefore,

in any inter-organizational collaboration some conflict is inevitable.

The various conflicts in the juvenile justice collaborations
differently with different

re~mlts.

were handled

In Oakland and Connecticut, the

conflict was originally diverted by directing energies at a common enemy,
the national collaboration.

In Tucson the conflict was never openly

admitted but was present in a different form, resulting in lower levels
of personal trust among participants.

In Spokane, the conflict was

directed at persons rather than at the differences in perspective, and in
Spartanburg it was pushed on the table as an issue rather than dealt with
as an inevitable presencea

In truly effective collaboration some mechanisms must be made
available to identify conflict and handle it in a non-adversary way.

In

some ways, the successful resolution of conflict served to solidify the
collaborations in this program.

Having successfully weathered the storm

together, participants appeared more open and trustful and more committed
than before they were involved in the conflict.

The presence of rational

structures for conflict resolution, skilled leaders and staff persons
and the absence of pathological competition facilitated adequate conflict
resolution.
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Research Hypotheses Suggested by the Evaluation
Each of the program guidelines suggested above are, in effect, working
hypotheses that need further study.

In this section, we will suggest some

hypotheses which developed out of the theories and methodologies upon which
the evaluation is based.

Most of the hypotheses are consistent with either

organizational theory dealing with participation or satisfaction or small
group theory dealing with process or leadership.

We will not attempt a

description of the theories, but rather will briefly mention a theoretical
area and suggest hypotheses which seem to fit our findings.

A more

thorough analysis of the findings must wait for a later date.
Organizational Participation
There is a growing body of theory and research on organizational
participation in inter-organizational relationships.

Our evaluation

tends to support the following hypotheses.
l.

Boundary personnel, or members somewhat peripheral to their own
organizations, are more able to work for organizational change
but have less influence in bringing change to their organizations
than members such as executive directors or board members. They
a.
b.
c.

2.

are more easily coopted into work for collaboration goals
experience less role conflict
gain more satisfaction from·working for collaboration goals.

The more members of an agency's organizational set who participate
in an activity, the more likely that agency will participate.

Goal Attainment and Satisfaction
l.

Individuals feel satisfaction from attainment of group goals even
if their contribution is not identifiable.

2.

Group goals attained through individual performance set up
competitive conditions.

3.

Goals attained through group performance set up cooperative
conditions.

Small Group Process
Much of the research on small group process has been experimental,
using unacquainted individuals.

In this evaluation, we did consistent

longitudinal group analysis using structural observation.
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Our findings

suggested that organizational representatives interacted with each other
in a different way than isolated, previously unacquainted individuals in
task-groups.

Some results of previous studies also appeared to be

supported by our findings.
l.

Persons with negative feelings toward goals and activities of a
group interact less often and participate in group activities
less.

2.

The organizational status of participants and the community status
of their own organization affects the power relationship in
inter-organizational collaboration more than does the amount of
interaction. This is contrary to the findings of experimental
group process analysis.

3.

Status in a group correlates with external status.

4.

When group members perceive themselves as similar to each other,
there is high interaction and a cooperative atmosphere, and
conflict resolution occurs through consensus.

5.

A group will strive for conformity of opinion except for individual
members who disagree as a means for upward striving and personal
recognition.

6.

The larger a group, the less opportunity for feedback from
members and the less opportunity for conflict and dissatisfaction
to be resolved.

7.

The degree of congruence between group goals and individual goals
is affected by the individual original expectation of the group.

8.

Group cohesion tends to form around a perceived common danger or
enemy.

Leadership Roles
l.

A leader whose status rests on skills and knowledge valued by the
group is less approachable than a leader whose status rests on
feelings and personal characteristics.

2.

High status people in groups tend to conform to the group norms
because they helped to develop those norms along lines of their
own style.

3.

The more control a leader exerts over group behavior the less
able the group is to adapt to new behavior or ideas.

4.

Leadership stability is related to organizational goal attainment
and membership satisfaction.

126

The Relationship Between Program and Evaluation
In closing, there are several problems that arose between the program
and the evaluation that wasted energy and were dysfunctional to effective
24
evaluation. We have examined the basis for these problems elsewhere.
Here we will discuss our perceptions of some of the problems in evaluating
this program and make some suggestions for evaluating human service
programs.
"In the Beginning.

" There appears to be a general lack of commit-

ment of program funders to real evaluation.

While LEAA, HEW, and HUD

usually include an evaluation mandate, they appear to mean fiscal
accountability rather than program effectiveness when they include
evaluation.

For this program, LEAA did not include extra funds for evaluation but
forced the program grantee to fund the evaluation with program money.
It is little wonder, then, that some local agencies and collaboration
staff lacked commitment to evaluation.
time.

Another "beginning" problem was

For pre-testing for program evaluation, the evaluation content

should be in place four to six months before the program begins rather
than 4-6 months after the program begins.
"Promise Her Anything But.

"

It is very important to the evaluation

for the staff to understand and want the evaluation.

Three of the original

five local staff paid lip service to the evaluation but under-cut to
various degrees our data gathering efforts.

We involved the local program

staff as much as possible in the development of evaluation procedures and
tools.

When program staff had strong objections to a procedure we very

carefully reconsidered its use.
"The Shadow Knows . . . "

The perception of the local field researcher

by local collaboration members varied from time to time at all sites.
Originally they were considered as spies,

They were thought to have

power over allocation of original funds, refunding and the future of the
collaboration even though this was not so,
24

Genevieve Burch and Hobart A. Burch, "Coordination of Program Goals
and Research Goals in Process Evaluation," 1977 NASW Symposium Volume
(New York: National Association of Social Work, 1978).
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At other times they were asked to judge the effectiveness of the
program, tell them how they were doing, and advise on problems.
"You '11 Never Know Just How Much . • . "

One of the problems with

longitudinal data gathering on new programs is to feed back material that
is helpful to the program without incurring the hostility that might make
future data gathering difficult.

Even this two year report may hamper

our ability to gather future data.

If program's staff were less defensive

and evaluators less negative, this process might not be so difficult.
The difficulties involved mean that much of the evaluation is only
now available to program planners who have already made plans for the
next two years.

"I'd Climb the Highest Mountain . .

n

When possible, in future

research of any organizational records, budget or other necessary local
data should be collected by researchers rather then depending on organizational personnel.

It was more efficient and produced much less hostility

for our research staff to go from Omaha to the five sites to gather and
process the material on the spot than the constant return envelopes,
letters, phone calls, and implied threats.

"One Has MY Name the Other Has My Heart.

n

One of the problems of

the process data was that local field researchers had difficulty remaining
detached.

Without exception they became interested in the program and

grew to like and respect the members.
coopted.

All recognized the danger of being

One field researcher reported at the end of a grueling conflict

that he had observed,
While there's a lull in the action, let me deal with two things
that are important to me. First, as is probably the case with all
observers such as myself, I feel as if I'm always treading a fine
line between scientific honesty and interpersonal betrayal. I've
come to like many of the people in this project and to some degree
I feel a personal stake in the success of this project. As time
goes on, the struggle to be objective becomes increasingly difficult.
By 'betrayal,' I refer to the personal nature of many of my observations. I must assume that no participant here will ever have
cause to suffer because of the data I transmit to you. The trust
that exists between the group and myself is so fragile a thing. We
may relax together, and yet they know I am observing them--for what
purpose, in what detail they really don't know, a very strange social
structure, indeed.
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This conflict reflects the emotion with which I end this report.
I respect the program, I think it did a remarkable job against tremendous
difficulties.

The people involved are dedicated to the program and

to providing better services for youth.

I hope that "no participant

will ever have cause to suffer because of the data I transmit to you."
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APPENDIX A
TABLES
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January, 1978
TABLE 1
MEMBER AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF
NATIONAL VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS AND
MEMBER AGENCIES OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS
AFL-CIO
815 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 637-5189
AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES
SERVICE
20 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018
(212) 398-9142

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS
AND WELFARE FUNDS
575 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 751-1311
FAMILY SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA
44 East 23rd Street
New York, New York 10010
(212) 674-6100

AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR THE BLIND, INC.
*GIRL SCOUTS OF THE U.S.A.
15 West 16th Street
830 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10011
New York, New York 10022
(212) 924-0420
(212) 751-6900
''AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS
*GIRLS' CLUBS OF AMERICA, INC.
National Headquarters
205 Lexington Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20006
New York, New York 10016
(202) 737-8300
(212) 689-3700
*ASSOCIATION OF JUNIOR LEAGUES
825 Third Avenue
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF AMERICA, INC.
9200 Wisconsin Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Washington, D.C. 20014
(212) 355-4380
(301) 530-6500
*BOYS' CLUBS OF AMERICA
771 First Avenue
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICES OF
New York, New York 10017
AMERICA
(212) 557-77 55
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017
*BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA
(212) 687-2747
North Brunswick, New Jersey 08902
(201) 249-6000
*NATIONAL JEWISH WELFARE BOARD
15 East 26th Street
*CAMP FIRE GIRLS
New York, New York 10010
4601 Madison Avenue
(212) 532-4949
Kansas City, Missouri 64112
LUTHERAN COUNCIL IN THE U.S.A.
(816) 756-1950
Division of Mission and Ministry

360 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10010
(212) 532-6350
*Agency participants in National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force.

-'I

MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION
National Headquarters
1800 North Kent Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209
(703) 528-6405
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED
CITIZENS
2709 Avenue E East
Arlington, Texas 76011
(817) 261-4961
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-2757
*NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR HOMEMAKERHOME HEALTH AIDE SERVICES
67 Irving Place
New York, New York 10003
(212) 674-4990
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES
OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A.
475 Riverside Drive
New York, New York 10027
(212) 87 0-2385
*NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN
15 East 26th Street
New York, New York 10010
(212) 532-1740
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 223-2363
*NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY
Continental Plaza
411 Hackensack Avenue
Hackensack, New Jersey 07001
(201) 488-0400
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SETTLEMENTS
AND NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS
232 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10016
(212) 679-6110

NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, INC.
500 East 62nd Street
New York, New York 10021
(212) 644-6500
*THE SALVATION ARMY
120 West 14th Street
New York, New York 10011
(212) 620-4908
*TRAVELERS AID ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
701 Lee Street, Suite 600
Des Plaines, Illinois 60016
(312) 298-9390
UNITED SEAMEN'S SERVICE, INC.
One World Trade Center, Suite 2601
New York, New York 10048
(212) 77 5-1033
USO (United Service Organizations)
1146 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-8850
U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 659-6600
UNITED WAY OF AMERICA
801 North Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 836-7100
THE VOLUNTEERS OF Al1ERICA
340 West 85th Street
New York, New York 10024
(212) 873-2600
*YMCA of the USA
291 Broadway
New York, New York
(212) 374-2172

10007

*YWCA of the USA
600 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 753-4700

*Agency participants in National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFFILIATES IN
LOCAL JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS
OAKLAND
COLLABORATION

SPARTANBURG
COLLABORATION

SPOKANE
COLLABORATION

TUCSON
COLLABORATION

Davie White and
Loretta McDonnell
Coordinators

Penny King
Coordinator

Karen Harwood

John Sloss
Coordinator

Boys' Club
Boy Scouts
Campfire Girls
Girls' Club (Alameda)
Girls' Club (San
Leandro)
Girl Scouts

Boy Scouts
Girl Scouts

Camp Fire
Girl Scouts
Junior League
Red Cross
Salvation Army
YMCA
YWCA

Junior League

Red Cross
Salvation Army
YMCA

Coordinator

Junior League

Boys' Club
Boy Scouts
Campfire Girls
Girls' Club
Girl Scouts
Jewish Family
Services

Junior League
National Council
of Jewish Women
Red Cross
YMCA
YWCA

National Council of
Jewish Women
Travelers Aid
Association of

America

Red Cross (Alameda)
Red Cross (Oakland)
YMCA (Alameda)
YMCA (Stiles Hall)
YWCA (Oakland)
YWCA (South County)
CONNECTICUT REGIONAL COLLABORATION
Veronica McNulty and Sydell Spinner
Coordinators

DANBURY
COLLABORATION

TORRINGTON
COLLABORATION

WATERBURY
COLLABORATION

Boy Scouts (Norwalk)
Campfire (Bethel)
Family Childrens Aid
[Homemaker Health Air Service]
(Danbury)
Girl Scouts (Wilton)
National Council of Jewish
Women (Danbury)
Red Cross (Danbury)
YMCA (Danbury)

Boy Scouts (Torrington)
Girl Scouts (Torrington)
Salvation Army (Torrington)
YMCA (Torrington)
YMCA (Winsted)

Boys'Club (Waterbury)
Boy Scouts (Waterbury)
Girls' Club (Waterbury)
Girl Scouts (Waterbury)
Junior League (Middlebury)
Red Cross (Naugatuck)
Red Cross (Waterbury)
Salvation Army (Waterbury)
YMCA (Naugatuck)
YMCA (Waterbury)
YWCA (Waterbury)

TABLE 2
MEMBERSHIP IN JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATION, JANUARY
Collaboration Membership
Number Early 1977
National
Assembly
Affiliates

Site

Other
Non-profit

Public

Organizations

Organizations

Total

1977

National Assembly Affiliates
Total
Membership
Percent
And Client
Total
Membership of
Contacts of
Who Are
Collaboration Collaborating Collaborating
Organizations Organizations
Members
-·----

Oakland

--·--------·--

15

3

5

23

88

46,130

54,339

Spartanburg

6

4

11

21

86

5,421

386,946

Spokane

7

6

0

13

87

12,839

142,397

11

36

9

56

89

20,986

74 '724

Danbury

7

5

23

47!!;./

87

N/A

N/A

Torrington

5

4

9

27'p_/

71

N/A

N/A

11

7

19

43'=-/

89

N/A

N/A

National

15

0

0

15

NA

Total

77

65

76

245

90

Tucson

Connecticut

Waterbury

NA = Data are not applicable.
N/A = Data are not available.
!!;./Total includes 12 members of unknown status.
'p_/Total includes 9 members of unknown status.

~/Total includes 6 members of unknown
~/Includes 12,702,000 youth members,

·-

.........

status.

16,290,69#1
85,376

NA
658,406

TABLE 3
PROBLEMS OF YOUTH:
Question:

COLLABORATION MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS AT TIME OF FIRST INTERVIEW, FALL 1976

From your know1edge of youth and the community, what would you say are the three most important
problems with youth here?
Connecticut
Oakland Spartanburg Spokane Tucson Danbury Torrington Waterbur
Percent of Respondents

Number of respondents
Total number of responses
Unemployment
Schools - education
Recreation

Shelter
Specific services, i.e., counseling
emergency services

Transportation
Youth attitudes
Community attitudes

20
56

20
49

15
44

16
48

11
30

8
24

20
58

55
55
40
40

0
50
65
15

40
60
53
53

50
69
38
31

27
36
63
36

38
25
50
25

25
45
55
55

5
10
40
35

35
0
25
55

20
0
27
40

38
0
44
31

45
0
27
36

50
13
50
50

35
5
10
65

54

69

57

54

52

50

60

Percent in consensus on three most

. a;
mentioned problems-

~/Total of three most mentioned responses divided by all responses.

~

,;_,\j

'·

~

<

;;!; :;; "' "'

<

< "''

" "
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TAUE 5
NEEDS ASSESSMENT, PROGRAM PRIORITIES .AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
Phased Action Plans

Needs Assessment :Procedures

:Priorities
Identified
In :Program

Need Identified
From Needs Assessment

-Statistics on status
a/
offenOers and other youth=
-Community service inventory
-Affiliate resources

-Early identification of
problems
-Education
-Training of agency staff
-Shelter for runaways
-Reduce unemployment

-Runaways
-Truancy
-Alcohol abuse
-Staff training
-Pllblic relations

-The: collaboration staff was
enlarged to develop and supervise
all programs in East Oakland
-The advocacy budget was for a
public relations specialist

15

26

59

-The needs asse:ssment plan was
poor. It related moderately well
to the implementation plan
-The implementation plan was not
done collaboratively. It
contained few real capacity
building or advocacy plans

Spartanburg

-Statistics on status
a/
offenders and other youth"'
-Youth input
-Community service inventory
-Data from professionals
-Case analysb

-Unemployment
-Education
-Transportation
-Better trained ag~E:ncy
personnel
-Problems in family living
-School and community
attituOes and awareness

(All areas of
youth needs were
important. They
didn't prioritize

-The"implementation plan is not
clear; appears that collaboration
staff supervised implementation
Oirectly

11

19

70

-The direct service plan related
well to the needs assessment
plan but had little over-all
integration
-It appeared to be unrelated to
the collaboration but had some
creative program ideas
-It contained few capacity
building plans

Spokane

-Statistics on status
offenOers and other youth~/
-Interviewed community
professionals
-Brainstorming
-Yollth survey

-Education
-V.'ork
-Recreation
-Volunteer and agency staff
training
-Better use of resource:s

-Information referral
services
-Training volunteers
-Youth activities

-The plan called for the
collaboration to administer
all programs, some in cooperation
with Youth Alternatives
-The plan did not call for
implementation collaboratively
or by affiliates

41

12

47E/

-The programs related well to
the needs <tssessment
-Clients represented a wide range
of the community
-The plan contained few Oirect
service plans for status
offenders but had more for
children at risk
-Capacity building was provided
through training rather than
experience

Tucson

-Statistics on status
offenders ana other youth-~/
-Conference to do self-assessment
-Brainstorming
-Data from Metropolitan Yollth
Council

-Share information
-Redllce unemployment
-Improve schools' youth
attitlldes
-Training in work with youth
-Commllnity awareness
-Family relations

(All areas of
yollth needs were
important. They
didn't prioritize

-The implementation plan called
for the collaboration to let
contracts for direct service and
to handle the: rest of the programs
through volllnteer effort
-The capacity building plans were
good

26

12

62

-The program was good bllt i t had
relatively little impact because
it was not well integr:~ted
-It made very good use of the
collaboration
-The capacity building plans
were good

-Many children at risk in
community
-Trllancy
-Unemployment high
-Parent-child relations poor
-Agency training inadaquste
-Community attitudes negative

-Education
-Recre:ation
-Mental health
services

-The direct serviCe plan involved
having central staff who supervised
programs in existing commllnity
agencies
-Capacity building was implemented
by collaborations and central staff
-Advocacy was the major task of
the state

18

1#-/

67

-The needs assessment was good.
It related well to the needs of
youth, poorly to organizational
change but useO community
resollrces well
-It planned well for
additional central staff

-Statistics on status offen9ers~/
-Statistics on other yout~
-Youth Survey
-Community services available
-An organizational selfassessment

~/Statistics

were from a variety of sources.

The DSO Grantee in most cases had extensive data on the status offenders.

1:/!nc:llldes ombudsman, which is classified as capacity bllilding by the plan.

s./ Includes

-!)

Assessment of Plan

Oakland

Connecticut

-\-)

Implementation :Plans

Percent of
Pro,.ram Budget Allocated
Capacity
Direct
Building Advocacy Service

state collaboration.

TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM TYPES AND BUDGETS IN THE ORIGINAL PLANS
Revised Budget
Administration
Percent
Total
of
Budget
Total
Budget

Site
--

-

Oakland

$209,515

Capacity Building
Percent
Reported
of
Budget
Total

Original Budge~/
Advocacy
Direct Service
Percent
Percent
of
Reported
of
Reported
Budget
Budget
Total
Total

Total Program
Percent
Reported
of
Budget
Total

'----

$72,015

34

$17,409

15

$29,640

ll

19,940

26~_/

$68,000

59

$ll5,049

100

19

74,539

70

106,079

100

Spartanburg

167,765

57,765

33

u , 6oo-"-1

Spokane

145,041

65,275

45

33,850

41

10,326

12

38,590

47

82,766

100

26

20,450

12

98,718

62

160,293

100

15

5,500

79

93,330

100

Tucson

234,468

7l '623

30

41 ,12#1

182,458

62,548

34

14,175

Connecticut

Region A

~I

i_l

Danbury

25,280

27

Torrington

27,500

30

Waterbury

20,875

22

National

483,064

2_/ Original. budget used for program because later comparable figures unavailable.

~/Includes
~/Does not
~/Does not
~/Advocacy
.
-f/ D1rect

()

a full time staff person for public relation, information and education.
include Program Element AA.
include Program Eelment U.
is 13 percent of budget when State of Connecticut budget is included . .

.
serv1ce

.
program at 1 oca1 s1te
on 1 y.

TABLE 7
PROGR..\M IMPLEMENTATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS

Total
Number of
Programs
Planned

Percent
on a/
Time-

Percent
Cancelled

Program Implementation
Percent of
Programs
Implemented
Percent of
Or In Progress
Programs
With Affiliates
Implemented b
Part:i.cipating
Collaboratively-/

Percent of
Total Persons Served£/
Programs
Using Existing
Community
Capacity
Dire.ct d/
Building Advocacy Serv~ceResources
---

-----

Total Contact Days£/
Capacity
Building

Advocacy

D:i.rect
Service

Cost Efficiency Rate!/
Capacity
Building

Advocac·J_I

$15.82

N/A

Oakland

21

33

5

14

460

N/A

l96g/

240

NA

N/A

27

15

30

22

19
30

10

Spartanburg

48

70

N/A

286

140

NA

Spokane

2l

52

5

0

19

1 ,037

7

1 '735

NA

3.93

N/A
$2.29i/

Tucson

28

42

0

0
21

4, 99Efo./
49s;j

36

51

1 .1oJs.l

6,477

NA

2 ,11&9/

4.92

1. 63i/

Connec t:i.cu t

19

42

10

16

32

63

327
2n£1

97

NA

N/A

10.72

97

2,76(}!1
5oo!.l
40rft./

Direct
Service

---

8.34

N/~/
$2.87
5. 29
41.54
N/Ah/

NA ~ Data are not applicable.
N/A ~ Data are not available.

~/Implementation began within two months of projected date.
~/Does not include programs implemented by collaboration staff or committees.
E,! As of February 28, 1978.
!}../Status offenders included in this figure,

~/Cost efficiency rate is dollar cost per contact per seven-hour day.

The rate is derived by the formula;

Where A ~ total cost
B = salaries to youth
· D • E)
(C- ,
C = hours per program per day
D = number of participants
E = number of days
F = 7 hours per day

A-

B

i/Does not include mass media contact with the general public.
g./Represents persons served to date but not separated by program.
~/Numbers not available as of December 31, 1977 because program start was late.
!/Monthly mailing.

i 1cost efficiency rate based on persons served.

1 1ooes

not include Program Element R.
}/Youth Service Manual for planning and distr:i.bution to youth serving agencies.
count number of persons served for television programming.

~/Monthly mailing by the state collaboration.

..s:__

In addition, Tucson did some very imaginative advocacy especially with the media.

We are unable to

In addition, attendance at state legislati:m committee, state conferences with presentations, leg:i.slative workshops, etc .

TAJlLE 8
BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD PUNISHMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS,
FALL 1977
Most status offenders need
help not punishment.
Agree

Neutral

Failure to punish encourages
status offenders to be bad.

Agree
a/
Percent-

Neutral

Disagree

Site

Disagree

Oakland (86)

91

5

3

34

17

49

Spartanburg (53)

93

3

4

54

8

38

Spokane (150)

91

5

4

43

10

47

Tucson (269)

92

6

3

46

10

44

Connecticut (72)

94

0

6

45

13

42

a/

-Percentages may not total 100 in some cases, due to rounding.

TAJlLE 9
CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS,
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977

Children should not be
detained while awaiting
a hearing just to protect
society.

Children who are beyond the
control of their parents
should be put into detention
centers to protect society.

Percent
Agreeing
1976
1977

Agreeing
1976
1977

Percent
Disagreeing
1976
1977

Percent

Percent
Disagreeing

1976

1977

Oakland

42

37

46

52

26

26

61

55

Spartanburg

56

52

34

38

25

35

60

55

Spokane

41

39

41

48

30

24

62

59

Tucson

45

40

41

46

22

28

68

60

Connecticut

46

48

44

42

33

22

61

70

! i
I

TABLE 10
CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES
TOWARD PERSONAL DISTANCE AND BEHAVIOR,
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977
I would discourage
my daughter from
inviting a sexually
promiscuous girl to
stay overnight.
Percent Disagreeing

I would be willing
to pay more taxes
for special school
programs for kids
who are constantly
truant.
Percent Agreeing

I would be willing
to have a well
supervised halfway
home for runaways

(4-6 kids) next
door to me.

Percent Agreeing

1976

1977

1976

1977

1976

1977

Oakland

23

33

43

43

40

40

Spartanburg

12

7

58

47

43

50

Spokane

30

35

60

65

49

57

Tucson

35

4

61

65

61

62

Connecticut

32

42

54

56

65

74

TABLE 11
CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD MIXING
STATUS OFFENDERS AND OTHER CHILDREN,
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977
Organizations should not mix status offenders

with other groups of children
Percent Disagreeing

Percent Agreeing

1976

1977

1976

1977

Oakland

40

36

48

55

Spartanburg

24

19

7l

66

Spokane

19

26

7l

61

Tucson

31

22

62

66

Connecticut

23

21

67

72

l':U!LE 12

CHANGE IN ORGANIZAl'IONAL CAPACITY OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY .AFFILIATES TO SERVE STATUS OFFENDERS,
FALL 197S l'O FALL 1977

Site and Numbar (N)

I

Parc:.ant
Organizations
With
Substantially
lncraasacl
Capacity
(As Percaived
By Staff)

Change In
Mambarshi
Number
Number
l.Jith
1;'ith
Increase Decrassa

Oakland (15)

33 parcent

2

2

Spartanburg (6)

Considerable
raised
consciousness

3

2

Change In
Pro ram Bud et
l'lur.tber
Numbar
ll'ith
With
Increasa Oacrease
5

Number
\<lith
Policy
Statemants
On Services

p~~~~~~/ 1'1~~:~!~/

4

l

3l

55

35

l

3

0

5

4

>00

30

50

0

3

56

87

1

142

Spokone (7)

43 percent

1

7

0

3

Tucson (11)

55 percent

0

0

7

2

1

Connecticut (23)

Much more
knowledge in
all areas

N/8

1'1/A

N/8

N/8

0

~ational

50 percent

3

3

4

4

12

(15)

. I ::tembarship Awuraness
Staff and Board Truining
Board Awareness
Number of
Percent 0£
l'otal
Organizations
Organizations
Attitudas
Organizational
Parcent
With Chauga
Participation
Number Of
With
Pcrc~nt
OJ' Items Of Items
In Regular
In Collaboration Organizations
lnc:reasad
Communication
Discussion
With
With
Capacity Building
Spokan To By
To )!embars
At Board
And Advocacy
Collaborotion
::.:legative Positive
Neetings
Progroms
Coordinator

65

25

0

35

60

3

'!:/A

70

25

N/A

N/A

283

20

N.,

N8

0

7

85

,<.I

NA " Data are not applicable.
N/A" Data are not available.

:g_/ Change in attitudes between first interview (Fall, 1976) and second inti?.rview (Fall, 1977).

~/Represents

only programs completed or c:urri?.ntly in progress.

£;./New staf.l' mamber.

~/Chang a

in data gathering method.

_£/Implcm<?.nted program be.l'ora form was developed.
!/se.a Table 15, Appendix A, for tachnical assistance devaloped for locals.

-:i

42£/

Staff Ex erience
Organizations
Implementing
Collaboration
Percent Of
Pro rams
Collaboro.tion
Percent
Programs
Of All
lmpl<=Jnented b/
Number A.l'filiates By Af£iliotcs--

N/AS)

0

40

29

5

4

67

19

6

54

3

8

57

N/A£/

N/A

NA

"

"
1-u

TABLE l3
CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL ADVOCACY AND DIRECT SERVICE BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFFILIATES,
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977
Advocacy

Direct Service

Number of
Number of
Organizations
With Advocacy
Communications

1975-76

Site

Oakland

0

1977
0

New Monies

Organizations
Reporting
Advocacy Activity
1977 and

1975-76
0

Planned
For Future

Reported
Number of

Status Offenders
Served by
Individual

Affiliates

0

0

Spartanburg

0

1

0

0

20

Spokane

0

0

0

0

307

Tucson
Connecticut

National

Reported
Number of Other
Children at Risk
Served by
Affiliates
Fall 1977

Number of
Status Offenders
Served in

Collaboration
Direct Service
Programs

3,420

200~/
164

113

Obtained or

New Programs
Planned for
Status Offenders
arid

Children at Risk

4

73

7

0

3

0

0

0

0

763

985,

127

8

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

9

12

NA

NA

NA

N/A
N/As_/

12

n!e/

NA = Data are not applicable.
N/A = Data are not available.

~/Plus

10,000 reported by The Red Cross.

£/10 of the 12 for whom we have data increased advocacy content from previous year.

~/These
~/These

s;_

'\.!\

data are not available in consistent form.
data are not available in consistent form.

Table 14 shows type and location of direct service programs.

Allocated for
Direct Services

and Programs for
Status Offenders
by Affiliates

N/A
4,650
N/A
96,000
N/A
N/Aj_/

TABLE 14
DIRECT SERVICE PROGRAMS DEVELOPED OR PLANNED
BY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR
STATUS OFFENDERS AND CHILDREN AT RISK
AT OTHER THAN COLLABORATION SITES

Boys Club
60 percent have tutoring classes
54 percent have work-training programs
61 percent have youth employment
27 percent have drug/alcohol abuse prevention
National Alcohol Abuse Prevention Project - 13 pilot sites
National Health Project - 5 local sites
10 local clubs were recipients of Honor Awards for Program Excellence
centered around programs for status offenders.
Camp Fire Girls
New Day Implementation Program
Girls Clubs
73 percent conduct juvenile delinquency programs
88 percent conduct career/job development programs
45 percent have joint planning with juvenile delinquency authorities
Girl Scouts
Eight direct service programs conducted by various local clubs
Junior Leagues
11 percent of programs were in criminal justice (101)
8.4 percent of programs were in child welfare (77)
Reflected interest in:
1) Child Abuse
2) Youth Service Programs
3) Juvenile Justice Research and Impact
4) Volunteer Participation
5) Citizens Involvement and Advocacy
6) Juvenile Courts

:.

National Council for Homemaker Health Aid Services
Working with children at risk is high priority
National Council of Jewish Women
Task Force Progress Reports on Justice for Children list 77 different
projects
The Justice for Children Programs had three major program pieces
1) children's rights
2) how to set up a group home
3) Coalitions For Action
Major areas of work in 1976
1) beginning direct service programs
2) monitoring court services

3) developing community awareness
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
Promoted the use of youth service bureaus
Helped schools increase capacity to
1) prevent delinquency
2) develop alternatives to juvenile incarceration
3) work with status offenders more beneficially

Young Men's Christian Associations

National Youth Project Using Mini-Bikes has 385 operating units
Local YMCA Juvenile Justice Programs:
l) 108 direct-prevention juvenile justice programs
2) 70 diversion programs
3) 13 alternative treatment programs
Young Women's Christian Associations

45 funded projects by community YWCA's from 1969-1972
11 intervention programs in New England Area
36 community association-sponsored projects
New York State YWCA Intervention Project (5 year) with 6 participating
YWCA's

TABLE 15
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DEVELOPED OR PLANNED
BY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR
STATUS OFFENDERS AND CHILDREN AT RISK

Boys Clubs
BCA National Director William R. Brecker serves on the President's
National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention
four regional workshops on government funding
BCA Programs and Services Survey by Carole Kazlow, Ph.D. and Susan
Lackman
BCA National Director met with HEW secretary and White House staff
to formulate a national youth policy
Camp Fire Girls
Workshop for youth development and advocacy
Girls Clubs
4 regional Juvenile Justice Youth In Trouble Workshops
Juvenile Justice Specialists provided Technical Assistance to
individual clubs
GCA training sessions designed to have impact on girls in conflict
GCA national staff members served on U.S. Women's Agenda Task Force
on Juvenile Justice

GCA staff was represented on State Planning Agency and Regional Units
GCA staff attended symposium on status offenders in Washington, D.C.,
sponsored by National Council of Jewish Women
GCA appointed a Juvenile Justice Specialist to their National Staff
sessions on locating funding sources and developing proposals were

held for local clubs at regional meetings
Resource News publications regularly reported information useful to
the development of local programs
Juvenile Justice Specialist represents GCA on the National Task Force
on Juvenile Justice, National Assembly of Voluntary Health and
Social Welfare Organizations, Inc.

Junior Leagues

Impact - 4 year project funded by LEAA
l) provided orientation materials on crime and delinquency
2) Impact Training Institute was attended by 192 community delegates
who then acted as consultants
3) Impact Follow-Up meetings were attended by 366 delegates,
provided aid in program development and technical assistance
upon request

National Council For Homemaker Health Aid Services
Costs of Homemaker-Home Health Aide and Alternative Forms of Service
Child Abuse and Neglect - What Can Be Done
National Council of Jewish Women
published Children Without Justice: A Report of the National Council
of Jewish Women by Edwin Wakin, New York, a NCJW Juvenile
Justice survey
developed Children Without Justice promotional kit
published National Council of Jewish Women Symposium on Status
Offenders: Manual for Action
published article in Federal Probation discussing new volunteer in
juvenile justice
Symposium on Status Offenders held in Washington, D.C.
May 17-19, 1976; published National Council of Jewish Women
Symposium on Status Offenders: Proceedings, May 17-19, 1976
St.. Louis Section prepared Child Abuse and Neglect Manual
was featured in The Youngest Outlaws: Runaways In America by Arnold
P. Rubins ~ublished by Julian Messner, A Division of Simon
and Schuster, Inc, 1976) Chapter on the NCJW's Teaneck group
home in Teaneck, New Jersey
served as a resource in the area of Juvenile Justice and Voluntarism
at the Volunteers Conference In Wisconsin
presented "Symposium on Child Abuse: Let's Break the Cycle," held by
NCJW Stamford Section and Junior League of Stamford and

the Hospital Auxiliary of Stamford.
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
a basic service of NCCD is to provide technical assistance to state
and local agencies and organizations; examples of the kinds of
technical consultation offered include:
1) Community Consultations - Several hundred were made each year.
(Program assessments and evaluations, on-site technical assistance,
survey of training needs, management studies.)
2) Training Activities: 3 seminars, 5 workshops, 5 training programs
Young Men's Christian Association
11

Planning For Juvenile Justice," a manual for local YMCA's

"The YMCA and the Juvenile Offender"
"The YMCA In the Streets, 11 manual
"Report of Conference of Supervisors of the Detached Worker Program"
674 on-site visits to locals by 8 regional Juvenile Justice staff
directors

Young Women's Christian Association
"Job Guidelines for Teen Counseling Training and Career Development"

"Lets Try a Workshop With Teen Women"
"Attention Is Needed, Action Is Called For"
27th National Convention - Juvenile Justice Optional Workshop

TABLE 16
SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLABORATION SITES

Total
Population/
Estimat.;'(1975)

Sites

Percent
Growth
Since
1970

Per Capita
Estimate
(1974)

Income

(1970)

Percent of
Population
Under 18
(1970)

Income

Median
Family

Number of
Status
Offenders
(1974)

Percent of
Population
With High
School
Education

(1970)

1,091,4o#1

1.9

$5,034

$9,626

27.4

4,500

56.9

Spartanburg

191,000

9.9

4,346

8,187

32.5

107

43.1

Spokane

305,600

6.3

4,499

9,137

31.2

898

64.0

Tucson

443,700

26.2

4,385

8,759

33.7

2,147

63.0

c/
Waterbury-

761,000

2.2

N/A

10,459

31.8

648

42.8

Oakland

N/A = Data were not available.

~/Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
b/
-Alameda

~ounty.

~/No data were available for the other Connecticut sites.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing: 1970 [PHC (1) Series] for each
SMSA; Current Population Reports, "Population Estimates and Projections: 1975 Population Estimates and 1974
Per Capita Income Estimates" for each county [P-25 Series]: and Current Population Reports, "Population
Estimates: July 1, 1975," for each county [P-26 Series].

1,;--..

r..:.:

TABLE 17
KNOWLEDGE BY LOCAL AFFILIATE OF NATIONAL TASK FORCE REPRESENTATIVE,
FALL 1976

Doesn't Know

Anyone Nationally
or Regionally
Site

Knows Regional
Representative
Percent

Knows National
Task Force
Representative
By Name

Oakland (11)

18

9

73

Spartanburg (11)

27

27

46

Spokane (14)

29

36

36

Tucson (12)

33

25

42

Danbury (5)

80

0

20

Torrington (4)

75

25

0

Waterbury (12)

25

50

25

Connecticut

TABLE 18
REPORT BY LOCAL COLLABORATION REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNICATION
FROM NATIONAL TASK FORCE, FALL 1976

Site

Amount of Perceived Conununication
Much
Some
Little

Oakland

3

4

4

Spartanburg

8

1

4

Spokane

6

3

5

Tucson

6

3

3

Danbury

4

0

1

Torrington

6

0

0

12

2

1

Connecticut

Waterbury

TABLE 19
WORK STYLES OF LOCAL COLLABORATION STAFF
· a/
Percent of Time Reporte d ~nAppointments
Study and
Administration
and
Paper Work
Phone Calls Meetings

Site

Average Daily Number of
Meetings

Phone
Calls

Appointments

Oakland

25

21

46

0.68

1.86

0.50

Spartanburg

40

26

35

0.76

2.90

1.30

Spokane

27

30

39

o. 77

3.97

1.37

Tucson

41

17

35

0.71

2.80

2.30

Connecticut

36

13

37

0.52

3.74

1. 25

a/
-Travel and miscellaneous not included,

TABLE 20
COLLABORATION REPRESENTATIVES' PERCEPTIONS OF FREQUENCY
OF CONTACT WITH LOCAL COLLABORATION STAFF

No
Contact

Site

Percent Respondini'"-1
Only at
Some
Meeting
Contact

Frequent
Contact

Oakland (19)

21

5

32

42

Spartanburg (21)

19

0

19

62

Spokane (15)

33

0

20

47

6

6

19

69

76

3

10

10

Tucson (16)
Connecticut (39)

-a/ Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding.

TABLE 21
PERCENT OF ITEMS DISCUSSED AT COLLABORATION MEETINGS WITH FORMAL ACTIONS TAKEN

Total Number of
Items Discussed

Site

Number of Items
Discussed With
Formal Decision Recorded

Formal Decision Recorded

Percent of Items
Discussed With

Oakland
1 - Subcommittee
2 - Board

76
106

18
25

24
24

Spartanburg
1 - Subcommittee
2 - Executive Committee

36
371

9
131

25
35

312

72

23

398

170

43

203
213

49
35

24
16

161
51
34
185

90
9
17
32

56
18
50
17

204

142

70

26

30

u#l

Spokane
1 - Subcommittee
2 - Executive Committee
and Steering Committee
Tucson

1 - Subcommittee
2 - Steering Committee
Connecticut
1 - Region A
2 - Waterbury
3 - Torrington
4 - Danbury.
National
1 - Task Force
2 - Steering

~/More than one formal decision recorded per topic discussed,
·,~h.

''"'''
-~

TABLE 22
ACTIONS OF COLLABORATION MEMBERS IN FORMAL MEETINGS

Chairperson/Coordinator

Total

Average
Percent
Of Acts By
Chairperson

Actions

(When Present)

Average
Percent
Of Acts By
Coordinator
(When Present)

DSO Grantee
Average
Percent
Of Acts By

Oakland
1st Chair/1st Coordinator
2nd Chair/snd Coordinator

2,897

Spartanburg
2nd Chairperson
3rd Chairperson

4,805

ao#1

Spokane

Coordinator
And Chairperson

Influential

All Other

All Other

(When Present)

(When Present)

Affiliates

Affiliates

Particiuants

26l
19

2~l

51l
27

22l
22

17 J
27

39l
49

25

s£1

27

7

17

1#/

14

28

33

22

11~/

14

18

48

11

16

18

19

2

14

e/
43e/
5s-

22

Connecticut
Region A

2,591

14

23

33

Danbury

1,388

25

33

33

N/A-

Torrington

1,565

30

14

44

N/A-

507

38

12

34

N/A-

£/

f/

f/

100 percent.

~/Chairperson represented one organization identified as most influential.
£/Data gathering method varied from that used in other sites.

~/Only two were identified as
~/Had one or more influential

most influential.
non-affiliate.

i/Did not attend observed meetings.

~/None were identified as most influential.

-!;___

,}/
£1
16

9
29

11

13

24
e/
44·-

were not available.

~/Percentages represent average participation per meeting attended throughout the observation period.

'v\

Of Acts By

Average
Percent
Of Acts By

1#/

1 '721

= Data

Average

Percent

12

Tucson

N/A

Percent

Of Acts By
Three Most

Percenti!/

26

Waterbury

Other
Participants

Average
Percent
Of Acts By
DSO Grantee

Number

Site

National Assembly
Affiliates
Average

Therefore row totals do not equal

TABLE 23

MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENE3S OF TI:IE COLLABORATIONS, FALL 1976

Perce tions of Process Outcome

Respondents
Number

Site

'!},

\

Moderately
Effective

Not Very
J::ffective

Percent~/

Too Early
To Tell Respondents
Number

Perceptions of What Collaboration Did Best
Getting People
Together In
Program
Capacity
Collaboration Plannin11: Building Advocacy

Direct
Service

Don't
Know

Percent~/

Perceptions of Whether They Would Join Again
Yes But
Not in The
Don't
Same Way
Know
Yee
No
Respondents
Percent~/
Number

Oakland

(17)

0

18

82

0

(16)

44

19

6

13

0

19

(16)

94

0

Spartanburg

(14)

29

50

21

0

(14)

29

7

0

0

64

0

(14)

79

14

7

0

Spokane

(15)

27

40

20

13

(14)

so

0

29

14

7

0

(15)

87

0

13

0

Tucson

(14)

37

43

21

0

(15)

33

13

0

33

13

6

(14)

100

0

0

Connecticut

(14)

14

14

28

43

(14)

so

7

7

7

21

7

(14)

57

0

35

~/Percentages

..,_

Very
Effective

may not total 100 because of rounding or nonresponse .

0

